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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

AND THE OLYMPIC MOVEMENT:

A QUESTION OF RECOGNITION

by



BRIAN B. PENDLETON

A THESIS

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and
recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for
acceptance, a thesis entitled ..THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF.....
CHINA AND THE OLYMPIC MOVEMENT: A QUESTION OF RECOGNITION.....
submitted by ..BRIAN B. PENDLETON.....
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor in Philosophy.

DEDICATION

夺取全国胜利,这只是万里长征走完了第一步....中国的革命是伟大的,但革命以后的路程更长,工作更伟大,更艰苦。

毛泽东
一九四九年三月五日。

To win country-wide victory is only the first step in a long march of 10,000 'li'. . . . The Chinese revolution is great, but the road after the revolution will be longer, the work greater and more arduous.

Mao Zedong
5 March 1949

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study was to investigate, document and analyze the situations, personalities and historical and socio-political factors surrounding the issue of the recognition of and participation by athletes from the People's Republic of China in international sporting events from 1949 to 1978. The study considered several issues: the emergence of 'two Chinas' in 1949 and the subsequent attempts by each side to gain recognition as the sole government of China; the relationship between China and the International Olympic Committee; the interaction between China and the International Sports Federations; and the involvement of China in Regional Games and international meets and tournaments.

For nearly three decades the sole factor governing the participation by Chinese athletes in international competitions was whether or not the international organization concerned recognized as a separate entity a sports association from Taiwan province. In all such cases, China either refused to affiliate with or withdrew from those federations or committees until they annulled the membership of the Republic of China (Taiwan) association.

The issue of the recognition of 'two Chinas' was found to have had an impact on the majority of international sport governing bodies. At the time of writing, the dispute between China and the Olympic Movement remained essentially unresolved.

PREFACE

The humidity dropped from a sweltering 90 to 66 per cent, but tempers rose on Dorchester Street in front of the Queen Elizabeth Hotel on July 15, 1976, as Montreal resident Andrew Howick attempted a citizen's arrest of Lord Killanin, President of the International Olympic Committee. Along with many others, the President's official car was illegally parked. That Howick's gesture was unsuccessful was perhaps significant in that it was one of the few instances in which Killanin emerged unscathed in the weeks prior to the opening of the Games of the XXI Olympiad. Spiralling costs, construction delays, threatened boycotts by Third World nations, and the refusal by the Canadian government to admit athletes from Taiwan who claimed to represent China all contributed to Killanin's frustrations. Although the issue of participation by Chinese athletes in the Olympic Games was not new, never was it so visible as in the summer of 1976.

Both the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) were accredited to attend the 1952 Helsinki Games. In 1954 the PRC was admitted to membership in the International Olympic Committee (IOC), but later withdrew in 1958 after a series of bitter disputes over the IOC's recognition of 'two Chinas.' Subsequent attempts to resolve the problem by having ROC athletes compete under the designation of 'Taiwan' or 'Formosa' added to the confusion and, in 1968, the IOC General Assembly approved that, in future, the 'Republic of China' was to be the officially recognized name of the

territory. To sports officials in Peking all of these moves were seen as interference in the internal affairs of the Chinese nation and further contributed to the antagonism between the IOC and China. The Republic of China was recognized by the IOC, the People's Republic was not. The ROC took part in the 1972 Munich Games, the PRC did not and little change was anticipated for the Montreal Games.

In early July of 1976, however, headlines around the world carried the news that the Canadian government would refuse entry to athletes from Taiwan who claimed to represent China at the Games. Seldom in recent years has any event, certainly within the sporting arena, attracted such attention and elicited such criticism from such a global audience as did the stand taken by the Canadian government. The eventual withdrawal of the Taiwan delegation on July 16 did little to resolve the conflict which continues to the present.

The details surrounding the events in Montreal comprise but a portion of the substance of this study--an undertaking which attempts to analyze the situations, personalities, and historical and socio-political factors which have, for over a quarter century, fueled the debate over the recognition of and participation by Chinese athletes in international sporting events. In this regard, the study includes documentation and analysis of several issues: the emergence of 'two Chinas' in 1949 and the subsequent attempts by each side to gain recognition as the sole government of China; the relationship between China and the International Olympic

Committee; the interaction between China and the International Sports Federations; and the involvement of China in Regional Games and international meets and tournaments. The time frame covered in the study is 1949 to 1978. Background material on sport in China prior to 1949 is provided as an introduction for the reader.

The major limitation of the project was the availability of and access to source materials from the All-China Sports Federation, the International Olympic Committee and the International Sports Federations. A further limitation which arose in the course of researching the topic was the extremely emotional response the issue has generated for nearly three decades. As a result, the exchanges between groups and individuals were often characterized by highly charged rhetorical responses which biased much of the source material to a degree not usually encountered. Time has not healed all wounds, but has served to further exacerbate them in many cases.

For the purposes of this study, the following terms required definition and clarification:

International Olympic Committee (IOC) - The private, autonomous and self-perpetuating body, composed of a President, Executive Board and co-opted individual members, entrusted with the promotion, control and development of the modern Olympic Games acting with the assistance of the International Federations, National Olympic Committees and individual athletes.

National Olympic Committee (NOC) - The territorial agent of the IOC in one country which, in cooperation with the National Associations, organizes and controls the representatives of the nation at the Olympic Games in accordance with the fundamental rules of the IOC.

International Federation (IF) - The international organization composed of affiliated National Associations responsible for the conduct and administration of one specific sport. For example, the International Amateur Athletic Federation (IAAF) is the ultimate authority governing the conduct of track and field athletics.

National Association - The national body which promotes, controls and administers a specific sport in one country. It must be affiliated with the International Federation for the same sport if its member athletes are to compete in sanctioned competitions. For example, the Canadian Track and Field Association (CTFA) is affiliated with the IAAF.

Olympic Movement - The all-encompassing, world-wide network of organizations, committees and federations identified above which administer and regulate the conduct of international competitions subscribing to the tenets of Olympism as defined by the IOC.

Olympism - The philosophy underlying the Olympic Movement as conceived, nurtured and propagated by Baron de Coubertin including statements on and concerns for amateurism, physical and character development, internationalism, and aesthetics and arts and letters.

In addition, the following abbreviations and acronyms, also described when first used, appear throughout the study.

Governmental and Non-Governmental Organizations

ACSF	-	All-China Sports Federation (Chinese Olympic Committee)
PCSC	-	Physical Culture and Sports Commission
PRC	-	People's Republic of China*
ROC	-	Republic of China*
ROCOC	-	Republic of China Olympic Committee

*Confusion often arises in the literature due to the multitude of terms used to designate the 'two Chinas' and their respective sports governing bodies. Thus, the following terms have appeared over the past quarter century, seldom serving to clarify and often resulting in increased antagonism, in the debate over recognition:

- People's Republic of China, China, Communist China, Red China, Mainland China, Continental China, Democratic China, Democratic Republic of China, Democratic and Popular Republic of China, or China (Pekin(g)).

- Republic of China, China (Taiwan), China (Formosa), Nationalist China, Taiwan (Formosa), National Republic of China, Taipei (Taiwan), Formosa, or Republican China.

To underline the often bitter rhetorical disagreements stemming from this confusion, these appellations have been quoted in their original form. However, the term "China" has been used consistently to refer to the area, both before and after 1949, under the effective control of the mainland government.

International Federations (Sport on the Olympic Program)

IAAF	-	International Amateur Athletic Federation
FISA	-	Fédération Internationale des Sociétés d'Aviron
FIBA	-	Fédération Internationale de Basketball Amateur
FIBT	-	Fédération Internationale de Bobsleigh et de Tobogganing
AIBA	-	Association Internationale de Boxe Amateur
ICF	-	International Canoe Federation
FIAC	-	Fédération Internationale Amateur de Cyclisme
FEI	-	Fédération Equestre Internationale
FIE	-	Fédération Internationale d'Escrime
FIFA	-	Fédération Internationale de Football Association
FIG	-	Fédération Internationale de Gymnastique
IHF	-	International Handball Federation
FIH	-	Fédération Internationale de Hockey
IIHF	-	International Ice Hockey Federation
IJF	-	International Judo Federation
FIL	-	Fédération Internationale de Luge de Course
FILA	-	Fédération Internationale de Lutte Amateur
FINA	-	Fédération Internationale de Natation Amateur
UIPMB	-	Union Internationale de Pentathlon Moderne et Biathlon
ISU	-	International Skating Union
FIS	-	Fédération Internationale de Ski
UIT	-	Union Internationale de Tir
FITA	-	Fédération Internationale de Tir à l'Arc
FIVB	-	Fédération Internationale de Volleyball
IWF	-	International Weightlifting Federation
IYRU	-	International Yacht Racing Union

International Federations (Sport not on the Olympic Program)

FIDE	-	Fédération Internationale des Echecs
IBF	-	International Badminton Federation
ILTF	-	International Lawn Tennis Federation
ITTF	-	International Table Tennis Federation
WBF	-	World Badminton Federation

International Multi-Sport Organizations

AGF	-	Asian Games Federation
FECG	-	Far Eastern Championship Games
FISU	-	Federation Internationale du Sport Universitaire
GANFO	-	Games of the New Emerging Forces
IOC	-	International Olympic Committee
ISF	-	Interschool Sports Federation

Regarding the transliteration of Chinese names and terms appearing in the study, material translated by Chinese agencies into English has been, wherever possible, compared with the original Chinese text. Chinese place names and terms have been romanized according to the 'hanyu pinyin' system used in the People's Republic of China. Where names of prominent individuals have common and recurring usage in English-language publications both the pinyin and a parenthetical Wade-Giles spelling are given on first appearance of the name. In addition, the Chinese practice of placing the surname first is followed throughout. The only exceptions to a uniform use of pinyin romanization are:

- (1) Peking is habitually used instead of 'Beijing';
- (2) Hong Kong is used rather than 'Xianggang'; and
- (3) Chiang Kai-shek is the form adopted for the name
of the former head of the ROC government.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Portuguese explorers first came in contact with the inhabitants of China's eastern coastline early in the sixteenth century.¹ Eventually securing a trading center at Aomen (Macao) near the estuary of the Zhu Jiang (Pearl River), these representatives of Europe's newly emerging maritime powers were soon followed to the Far East by the Dutch and the Spanish. By 1700 British mercantile interests had established commercial offices in the southern city of Guangzhou (Kwangchow--more commonly referred to as Canton), a river port from which the gradual expansion to other areas was to emanate. It was to these areas that the first foreign residents brought such customs, expectations and practices (including the pursuit of sport) as were to be found in their homelands and which were to become a part of the legacy acquired by the Chinese.

It was the interaction of foreign and Chinese organizations and personalities over the past century which influenced much of China's contemporary sport. A discussion of the European's pursuit of sport in nineteenth century China, a review of China's own rich cultural heritage of sports, and an elaboration concerning the problems associated with the attempted fusion of these during the

first half of this century constitutes an introduction to the recent issues, factors and events surrounding China's search for recognition in international sport.

The Foreigner's Pursuit of Sport

The Sports of the Europeans in China

One of the first sports clubs based on the European model in China was the Canton Regatta Club formed by representatives of several foreign factories in Guangzhou in 1837.² Numerous contests and outings were held in subsequent years on the waterways of the fertile delta until the club relocated in Hong Kong following the Opium War of 1840-41. Sport was, from the earliest years of foreign settlement, to provide one of the means of contact between colonial representatives. The close and rival ties between Shanghai and Hong Kong were enhanced in 1866 with the inauguration of a series of cricket matches. In 1892 tragedy struck when the P and O steamship Bokhara went down on a return trip from the northern port resulting in the loss of many passengers and all but two of the Hong Kong team.³

Rowing was one of the most popular sports in Shanghai in the mid-1880s and one would often see single and double sculls and eights on the urban waterways.⁴ To the transplanted Englishman, however, all was not up to the standards deemed essential for success in rowing. Notwithstanding the satisfactory environs of the harbor and a small adjacent creek, two boathouses and ample craft, one

observer remarked that the rowing was not "first class" and suggested that:

the reason for this lack of watermanship (was) partly due to the difficulty in coaching otherwise than from the stern of (the) boat, there being no towing path on which the coach can ride or run alongside his men, as is done at Oxford or Cambridge, while the hire of launches is too expensive.⁵

To remedy this seemingly deplorable situation, the writer suggested that:

It would well repay the club to have a path made alongside the creek and to get a profesional out from home for a year or two to initiate a high-class style, after which the traditions, once firmly established, would pass down naturally to succeeding generations of oarsmen. . . .

After all, skill in rowing is but a question of degree and of no vital importance in a place so isolated from other rowing centres as is Shanghai, while the club is certainly one of the best to get into on arriving there, especially for youths, as plenty of good open-air exercise can thus be obtained in the society of strong, healthy-minded men.⁶

Although the available accounts of sport in these early years were almost always authored by foreigners, occasionally western pastimes were interpreted through Chinese eyes. A sketch of rowers which appeared in a Shanghai magazine was accompanied by this brief account.

In the fair weather of spring and autumn, Westerners regularly hold boat races for high stakes. The little oars fly by like swallows crossing a screen; the shallow boats are like leaves, light as seagulls playing on water. Amid the waves the high-spirited participants don't mind getting wet. Spectators on both banks cheer them on. Their whole country is mad about it.⁷

During this period the foreign community, under the leadership of Paul King, a local customs official, established the Shanghai Gymnasium. Located in a former congregation hall, the club initially boasted having such items as weights, rings, clubs, trapezes and general gymnastic apparatus and later added a boxing ring.⁸ King was also responsible for promoting gymnastics and boxing in the foreign community in Tianjin (Tientsin) in order that some amusement and training might be afforded those individuals not fond of skating or ice-boating during the frozen winter months.⁹ For the international residents of Peking, 100 km northwest, winter likewise provided an opportunity to skate. A special ice surface was flooded daily during the cold weather and an enormous mat shed was constructed to shield the surface from the wind-blown dust.¹⁰ Meanwhile, for those who dared to venture onto the moat outside the city wall, the chief attraction was to watch Chinese skaters whose technique has been described as follows:

As a rule (they) wear only one skate, on which they propel themselves by striking the ice with the other foot until a certain speed has been attained, when they spread out their arms, bend forward until their noses almost touch the ice and raise the skateless foot high over their backs. This bird-like skim on one leg seems to be their ideal of graceful skating.¹¹

Concerning other sports engaged in by foreign nationals, King again emerges as the chief chronicler of the era. Allowing for his enthusiastic reminiscences and often hyperbolic accounts, it nevertheless becomes apparent that sport was engaged in by at least some

of those resident in China before the turn of the century. King vividly describes a golf match played along the banks of the Chang Jiang (Yangtze River):

Our harbour master, Mr. E. Molly--a fine specimen of an Australian--was an ardent golfer, and was reckoned as one of the longest drivers in the Far East. He naturally thirsted for something beyond the narrow confines of the recreation ground, so one day he and I scrambled down to the water's edge in the middle of the river--forty feet below the Bund level--and teed our balls for a down river trip. It was the original Scottish game, straight ahead for seven miles, with the bones of sunken ships and high stone boulders as 'hazards' --a unique and most exhilarating experience. Aided by a carrying wind, Molly made some truly astonishing drives, while I plodded along behind as best I could.¹²

Still another observer has recalled that golf was played on rough links some three miles bicycle ride from Macao. The game's popularity, however, must be held suspect as "the club there consisted of six members when at its zenith, and occasionally two in times of dearth."¹³

In addition to such other active sports as tennis, hunting and riding which were available to those living and working in the foreign community, country retreats, private clubs and race courses sprang up wherever port city concessions were gained. Concerning racing, Ready related:

Many ports have a capital race course, which is always circular in shape, enclosing what are generally the grounds of the recreation club. . . .

On actual race days, of which there are generally two, with a third or off-day tacked on, things reach a climax. All business is curtailed or altogether suspended

An excellent champagne lunch is served in the grand-stand, and presided over by the clerk of the course, who, by virtue of his exalted office, ranks high in the community, when suitable toasts are proposed and cordially honoured, followed by an adjournment to the paddock for a stroll and a smoke, after which attention is again claimed for the business of the afternoon's racing.¹⁴

If the foregoing account accurately reflects the ceremony and ritual associated with horse racing in the international community, one readily sees a lifestyle existing which attempted to duplicate and retain the privileges and exclusiveness of the ruling class in its colonial possessions. The most exclusive of all race courses, and one destined to be a major confrontation site in later years, was to be found in Shanghai.

On occasion, foreigners did observe and record the recreational pastimes of the Chinese and it is from these accounts that one gains insight into the sporting preferences of the people.

The European Views Chinese Sport

In the observations of seaman Edward Brown one obtains a brief glimpse of such activities as horse racing, archery contests, foot races, theatre performances and an elephant race presented before the ruling nobility in 1858.¹⁵ Puppeteers, ballad singers and story tellers often vied with acrobats, gamblers, conjurors and weight-lifters for the attention of passersby on festive occasions,¹⁶ while pyrotechnic displays of "burning moons, fiery flowers and bright stars"¹⁷ climaxed the day's carnival atmosphere.

Competitive and recreational sailing and rowing were not unknown to the Chinese in this warm, tropical region. The Archdeacon of Hong Kong, John Henry Gray, reported having observed a regatta in 1866 in which forty-two boats competed over a three mile distance for seven prizes, the first being "a roast pig, a red tablet with a highly eulogistic inscription, a small marble screen on which good moral sentences were recorded, two silver wine-cups of antique shape, and a silk banner."¹⁸

On participation by the Chinese in athletic sports, Gray observed that "of such manly games as wrestling, boxing, cricket, rackets and football they are apparently ignorant."¹⁹ He did note, however, that among the population were those who were expert at their own version of the game of 'shuttlecock.' From the following account, written in 1893, the intricacies of the game are detailed.

There is no battledore used by the Chinese, but the shuttlecock is kept up in the air by the foot. Two, three, four, or more players get together; and, if two, stand opposite each other, if three or more, they form an irregular ring and kick the shuttlecock up into the air in such a manner that it may fall near another player. If a foot stroke is impossible, when the shuttlecock is falling near one, then it is allowable to keep it up by hitting it with the hand and thus send it to another player, or bang it into the air in such a way that it may return in a position to be easily hit by the foot. There are several foot-strokes--the most common being with the inner side of the sole of the right shoe. A hit is sometimes made with the outer side of the sole of the right shoe. Another hit that must require some dexterity (if we may be allowed to use such a word in connection with the foot) is given with the right foot--with the inner side of the sole of the right shoe--from under the calf of the left leg. The most usual form of this stroke is as follows: the left leg is doubled round so that the foot is in front of the body and about ten or twelve inches from the ground; this is done while the shuttlecock is descending; and, when it is almost near enough

to hit, a spring is taken off the ground with the right foot last, and the shuttlecock is immediately hit by the inner side of the sole of the right shoe from under the left calf. Another variety of this stroke is to stretch the left leg out in a sloping direction downwards from the body with the foot a few inches above the ground, and then a similar stroke is made as described above. Another stroke is made with the sole of the right foot from behind the body, the foot in delivering it being kicked backwards and upwards. With many of the strokes delivered from the feet, the shuttlecock is sent up some ten, twenty, or more feet into the air, though occasionally a forward kick is given which directs it towards another player, with, perhaps, a slightly rising direction. The play often begins by one player tossing the shuttlecock with his hand up in the air towards another player opposite him. The object of the play is, of course, to keep the shuttlecock up as long as possible. The shuttlecock itself is rather different in construction from that in use in the West, no cork being used; a number of layers of skin are employed, the two outer being snake's skin and the inner ones are shark's skin or paper, there being some seven or eight inner layers. The feathers used are duck's feathers and are three in number.²⁰

Notwithstanding detailed observations such as these, the European outlook was, generally, not only ethnocentric as to which 'manly sports' were worthy of indulgence, but also urban-centered in perspective (to the extent that settlement concessions were established based on European laws and rights of extra-territoriality), a situation which belies not only the social distance but also a lack of awareness of conditions up to and beyond the turn of the century. The comments of one foreign resident of Hong Kong in the months immediately preceding the revolution of 1911 confirm the isolation of the international community.

For the Chinese resident. . . . None share the foreign sports. Cricket, lawn tennis, football, are not for such as they. To swim is to provoke the devils in the water.²¹

In reality, the Chinese Football Club was first formed in 1904 and by 1910 the Hong Kong Chinese Recreation Club had pioneered tennis and cricket among the local residents.²² In addition, students who had returned from overseas promoted baseball as early as 1882.²³ This is not to suggest that these pastimes were widely practiced by the Chinese, but neither were they unknown. Prior to the twentieth century the isolation of the foreigner in China resulted, in general, in few opportunities for the Chinese to experience European forms of sport first hand.

Nevertheless, the accounts and observations of writers of the era, predominantly civil servants and entrepreneurs, confirm the existence of a rich traditional heritage of cultural and athletic pursuits among the Chinese, a legacy which only in recent years has become universally available.

Chinese Sports: A Rich Heritage

Literary and artistic evidence suggests that the Chinese people have had a longstanding awareness of sport and, for a small percentage of the population over the centuries, a history of active participation in sport. As in many cultures such daily activities as fishing, hunting and swimming that were required for survival and subsistence grew into leisure pursuits for the nobility and the privileged classes. In addition to these active forms of recreation, table games such as weiqi (Chinese 'go') and xiangqi (Chinese chess),

dancing and gambling have deep roots in Chinese culture.²⁴ Han and Tang Dynasty (see Table 1) stone carvings and earthenware artifacts have been discovered which depict dancing, musical and gambling activities of the ruling classes.²⁵ The acrobats and jugglers who today excite both Chinese and foreign audiences carry on the rich cultural heritage of their ancestors.

It is, however, from the military arts of ancient China that much may be gleaned regarding early sporting activity. Despite the mingling of fact and legend, the fatuous and the fantastic, the ancient Chinese concern with military affairs has resulted in a cultural tradition which continues to flourish today. Wushu, meaning military skills or arts, includes a variety of physical exercises involving a series of gymnastic movements, performed either with or without weapons. The underlying purpose of wushu was to cultivate agility, adroitness, stamina and strength among the disciples of the activity.²⁶

In ancient China accounts of archery date back 5,000 years and by the time of the Zhou Dynasty (1066-221 BC) the skill had been elevated to an esteemed position as one of the six arts--rites, music, literature, mathematics, archery and charioteering--essential for feudal education.²⁷ An elaborate system of target shooting existed wherein detailed and distinctive targets were assigned to specific categories of nobility.²⁸ In addition to archery and charioteering

TABLE 1
THE DYNASTIES OF CHINA

Xia	2205-1766	BC	Dong Wei	534-550	AD
			Bei Qi	550-577	AD
Shang	1766-1066	BC	Xi Wei	535-557	AD
			Bei Zhou	557-581	AD
Zhou	1066-221	BC			
Xi Zhou	1066-771	BC	Sui	581-618	AD
Dong Zhou	770-256	BC			
Chunqiu	772-481	BC	Tang	618-907	AD
Zhanquo	403-221	BC			
			Wudai-Shiguo	907-979	AD
Qin	221-206	BC	Hou Liang	907-923	AD
			Hou Tang	923-936	AD
Han	206 BC-230	AD	Hou Jin	936-946	AD
Xi Han	206 BC-23	AD	Hou Han	947-950	AD
Dong Han	25-220	AD	Hou Zhou	951-960	AD
			10 guo	902-979	AD
Sanguo	220-280	AD			
Wei	220-265	AD	Song	960-1279	AD
Shu	221-263	AD	Bei Song	960-1127	AD
Wu	222-280	AD	Nan Song	1127-1279	AD
Jin	265-439	AD	Liao	907-1125	AD
Xi Jin	265-316	AD			
Dong Jin	317-420	AD	Xi Xia	1032-1227	AD
16 guo	304-439	AD			
			Jin	1115-1234	AD
Nanbeichao	386-589	AD			
Nan Chao	420-589	AD	Yuan	1279-1368	AD
Song	420-479	AD			
Qi	479-502	AD	Ming	1368-1644	AD
Liang	502-557	AD			
Chen	557-589	AD	Qing	1644-1911	AD
Bei Chao	386-581	AD			
Bei Wei	386-534	AD	Zhonghuaminguo	1911-1949	AD

Xi (Western); Dong (Eastern); Nan (Southern); Bei (Northern);
Hou (Later)

Source: Xinhua Zidian, pp. 587-89.

skills,* references to wrestling dating back 3,000 years have been discovered which state that "during the winter, the King ordered all his generals to go in for military drill, to practise archery, charioteering and wrestling."²⁹ During the Sui Dynasty (581-618 AD) wrestling matches were held before the emperor on a monthly basis and by the Yuan era the indigenous Chinese forms had merged with those of the northern Mongolians.³⁰ Later, during the Qing (Manchu) Dynasty training camps were established. The appearance of 'jacketed wrestling' has led to speculation that its export to Japan influenced the development of jujitsu.³¹ Wrestling remains popular today, particularly among such national minorities as the Weiwuer (Uighurs) and the Yi who live in Xinjiang (Sinkiang) and Yunnan provinces respectively.

Among the many traditional sports currently being revived and promoted in China one bears mention above all others--Chinese boxing. Although details on methods, techniques and skills are often

*In an attempt to further the development of and maintain an interest in these ancient sports, regional traditional sports meets were held in several areas soon after the founding of the People's Republic and the first All-China Traditional National Sports Festival was held in November 1953, in Tianjin. Among the ancient sports demonstrated were wushu, wrestling, horsemanship, archery and weightlifting. The latter event having been performed with oblong stone blocks of various sizes into which a handle was carved. Juggling skills were required as well as lifting strength. The style of wrestling demonstrated at the festival involved rounds of three minutes duration with the winner being determined in a two of three fall match. Contestants wore trousers and short-sleeved jackets and were permitted to grasp only the arms, hands, belt or jacket of the opponent. Archery contests and demonstrations included target shooting, trick and accuracy displays, and an exhibition of strength involving the simultaneous drawing of four bows. See, "Traditional Sports of China," People's China, vol. 1 no. 7 (1 January 1954), pp. 17-23 and "Tournament of Old Sports," China Reconstructs (March-April 1954), pp. 41-43.

either lacking or ambiguous, it appears that during the Zhanguo (Warring States) period the chivalry which had formerly characterized the conduct of war disappeared. Where formerly rank was deferred to in battle, arrows were shot in sequenced flights, and grain and supplies were sent to besieged enemies, now defeated armies were often slain on the spot. Another change saw the footsoldier replace the chariot in battle.³² Nobility still controlled the conduct of war, but the common infantryman now added the aspect of single, hand-to-hand and armed combat. One outcome of these new military tactics was the evolution of numerous forms and styles of boxing which have generally been grouped into two main schools: the outer and the inner.³³ The former stressed the development of strength, speed and power, while the latter concentrated on relaxation, rhythm and fluid motion.

Of the many forms in the inner school, three are now most widely practiced.³⁴ First, taijiquan (taichi chuan) is characterized by subtle yielding and emphasizes relaxation, controlled breathing and continuous interaction among numerous movements in four major groups--roll back, ward off, push and pull; second, xingyi (hsing yi) is distinguished by the application of energy forces in five technique areas--splitting, crushing, drilling, punching and crossing; and third, bagua (pa kua) boxing emphasizes the use of horizontal strength and the open palm. Where xingyi's movement is linear, bagua's is circular.

The outer school is best known through the Shaolin system introduced in the sixth century to monks residing in the Shaolin monastery in Hunan province.³⁵ The recently popularized gongfu (kungfu) styles owe their beginnings to the Shaolin forms, although gongfu is, technically, a generic term for exercise in general and not a particular style in and of itself. The many traditional combat forms often included the use of weapons such as knives, spears, chains and innumerable varieties of swords. In addition, there are styles which re-enact famous historical and legendary fighting scenes, such as "Wu Song Breaking His Fetters"³⁶ in which the hero fought and defeated four armed guards, using only his feet and elbows, while handcuffed in chains. These ancient skills have, today, been refined and are popular in both theatre and ballet sequences and as exhibition contests.*

Inherent in both of the above mentioned schools of boxing was an awareness of the health and fitness components of exercise and sport. Recent archaeological discoveries provide evidence of the existence of systematic exercise programs over 2,000 years ago. Of a series of over 40 tomb drawings unearthed near Changsha during scientific excavations, 31 were preserved in a condition which permitted interpretation of the figures and translation of the

*In 1959, standard movement sequences were approved and published in each of the five basic forms of wushu: changquan (chang chuan), the sword, the broadsword, the spear and the cudgel. Taijiquan is also being promoted and popularized by authorities who recently developed two routines, a simplified one of 24 movements and a longer series of more than 80 movements. See, "New Development of Ancient Sports," China Reconstructs (May 1966), pp. 20-21 and "Tai Chi Chuan for Everyone," China Reconstructs (September 1977), pp. 42-43.

accompanying script. Three distinct categories of movement were evident: breathing exercises, exercises of the arms and legs, and exercises with such equipment as balls and sticks.³⁷ Centuries later during the three kingdoms period Hua Tuo is reputed to have originated a series of exercises representing the movements of five animals--the tiger (hu), the deer (lu), the bear (xiong), the monkey (yuan) and the bird (niao).³⁸ This series served as the forerunner for several other calisthenic programs, including the "Eight Daily Graceful Exercises"³⁹ of the Song Dynasty, which have evolved over the millennia.

Closely allied to the foregoing boxing and exercise systems as a means of military training and fitness development are several ball games, some similar to present-day football, polo and golf, which have long histories in China. A forerunner of football, zuqiu (tsu chu), was known in China during the fourth century BC.⁴⁰ Prior to the appearance of an inflatable ball, leather stuffed with hair and feathers served as the object of pursuit. Handling of the ball was not permitted and a referee was present to control the play.⁴¹ Han and Tang Dynasty illustrations depict the game being played between two teams within defined boundaries and later drawings detail the form and construction of the goal area.⁴² In a fifteenth century scroll painting the emperor is seen watching not only football and archery, but also polo.⁴³ Introduced during the first century AD, polo became an important adjunct to cavalry training as well as an amusement for the nobility. Not to be outdone as a mere spectator,

the emperor is depicted in another portion of the scroll as taking part in a game similar to croquet. It was polo, however, which received great attention during this era, as the substantial number of existing clay figures, paintings and illustrations confirm the great diffusion of the game and especially the popularity it enjoyed among the ruling classes.

Another popular Chinese pastime bearing a marked resemblance to a later western game has been described as follows:

- (1) The dimensions of the ground varied according to the number of players. In the playing area, to start the games, 'teeing grounds' were made, which should be wider than a foot and which usually faced the east; and 'holes' were also made at certain distances, which must be indicated by a colored flag.
- (2) Balls were usually made of mahogany or of some hard wood. The weight of the ball should be in proportion to the weight of the stick or the 'club'; if the ball was too heavy, it would be too slow in moving, and if it was too light, it would float in the air.
- (3) The head of the club was of hard wood and the handle was made of bamboo bound together with gut and heavily pasted with glue. The length of the club and the size of the handle should be adapted to the height and the weight of the player.
- (4) The number of players was unlimited. If there were more than ten players, two groups should have been formed with five or more players on each side. A game played with more than ten players was generally called a big assembly; from eight to six players, a medium assembly; and from six to four, a small assembly.
- (5) Before the start of the game, all players come together to choose their striking order. Then, the members of the opposing teams alternately 'struck off' from the teeing grounds.

- (6) There were many ways of striking. The four best advertised positions in which the stroke might be properly made were 'stepping forward,' 'standing still,' 'squatting down,' and 'dashing along.'
- (7) Points were counted by adding stakes [sic] and the winner was finally honored by special rewards.
- (8) There were twenty-one penalties [sic] which were emphatically mentioned at the end of the regulations.⁴⁴

The foregoing regulations suggest that a form of golf was known in China long before the game gained a following in the west.

The diverse climate and geography of the country also contributed to the development of such sports as swimming in the southern regions and ice activities in the north. A form of hockey, with formalized rules, is said to have existed centuries ago in the frozen northlands.⁴⁵

Thus, although participation in sport prior to the arrival of the foreigner in China may not have been widespread and was certainly not universal, the Chinese predilection toward sport was centuries old. This predilection, coupled with the propensity of mankind to be attracted toward the novel behavior patterns of other groups, was probably instrumental in the upsurge of organized sport following contact with western trading nations.

East Meets West: The Rise of Modern Sport

If foreign groups were generally isolated and withdrawn from the Chinese populace, the missionary schools and the Young Men's Christian Association stand as the exceptions to the rule. First represented in China in 1895 by Dr. D. Willard Lyon, the YMCA was to have a marked effect on physical education and sport in the three decades prior to the establishment of the Nationalist government in 1928.⁴⁶ Although the impact of the YMCA's presence in China on the general population is difficult to assess and, indeed, was probably minimal, when its influence began to fade it could be credited with having contributed in several aspects of the movement to modernize and westernize Chinese sport and physical education. The YMCA developed urban-based programs, conducted training courses for sports personnel, assisted in the formation of local and regional sports associations, cooperated with government schools in designing curricula, prepared texts, rule books and other written materials, and initiated a series of national athletic meets and international competitions.⁴⁷ It is these latter accomplishments which deserve attention in this study in that they were the forerunners of later contact with international sports federations and the IOC.

Under the leadership of Dr. Max J. Exner, the first National YMCA Director in Shanghai, a series of national athletic meets was inaugurated in 1910. With the responsibility for the management of the meets gradually being turned over to Chinese personnel, the series was to continue until 1948 (see Table 2).⁴⁸

TABLE 2
NATIONAL ATHLETIC MEET SERIES

Meet	Date	Location	Participants	Championship
1st	1910 October 18-22	Nanjing	140 plus teams	None
2nd	1914 May 21-22	Peking	298	None
3rd	1924 May 22-24	Wuchang	520	North China
4th	1930 April 1-10	Hangzhou	1631	Shanghai & Guangdong
5th	1933 October 10-20	Nanjing	2248	Shanghai
6th	1935 October 10-20	Shanghai	2700	Shanghai
7th	1948 May 5-15	Shanghai	2233	None

Source: Wu, Tiyu Shi, p. 380.

The responsibility for the organization and sponsorship began first with the YMCA, later fell to the Chinese Athletic Associations, and was eventually assumed by the Nationalist government. The program of events varied and grew over the years to ultimately include track and field, soccer, tennis, basketball, volleyball, baseball, swimming, softball, weightlifting, boxing, table tennis and selected events for women. Athletes first entered as regional representatives and later competed as members of local unit teams.

Shortly thereafter, Chinese athletes entered a major international competition for the first time--the Far Eastern Championship Games (FECG). Held on an almost regular basis during an all but stable political period, the Games survived until the early years of the Sino-Japanese conflict which preceded the outbreak of World War II (see Table 3).⁴⁹

The significance of these Games is difficult to ascertain. On the one hand, they served to encourage participation in sport, indirectly influenced the government to promulgate laws concerning physical education and to convene conferences, and may have contributed to increased expressions of national pride among the Chinese. Not without their critics, however, the FECG assuredly had little direct impact on the lives of the vast majority of Chinese peasants whose rural-agrarian existence was seldom touched by urban-centered events such as these sporting contests. Indeed, there is little indication that the observations of a foreigner at the turn of the century had changed to any marked degree during the first three decades of the 1900s.

To the poor, who form an immense majority of the population, life is a never ending struggle against starvation. They rise at dawn and work until dark, have no Sunday or other rest days in the year. . . . With them half a day of idleness means half a day of hunger, and they appear to lack both opportunity and capacity for what is called social enjoyment.⁵⁰

Following the suppression of the warlords, these peasants looked to the newly formed government to provide, at least to some degree, new measures of economic and social justice which would eventually provide these opportunities.

TABLE 3
FAR EASTERN CHAMPIONSHIP GAMES

Meet	Date	Location	Team Championship
1st	1913 February 1-9	Manila	Philippines
2nd	1915 May 15-22	Shanghai	China
3rd	1917 May 8-12	Tokyo	Japan
4th	1919 May 12-17	Manila	Philippines
5th	1921 May 30- June 4	Shanghai	Philippines
6th	1923 May 21-26	Osaka	Japan
7th	1925 May 16-24	Manila	Philippines
8th	1927 August 27- September 5	Shanghai	Japan
9th	1930 May 24-31	Tokyo	Japan
10th	1934 May 12-19	Manila	None

Source: Wu, Zhongguo Jin Bainian, pp. 97-102.

Track and field, swimming, baseball, soccer, basketball, volleyball and tennis were included in the program throughout the series, while cycling and an all-around championship appeared occasionally.

The period from October 1928 until September 1949 marked the era of official rule by the Nationalist government headed by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and his Guomindang (Kuomintang) Party, although at no time during the two decades could it be said that China was unified under a central, stable government. The political climate was first one of limited civil war, then a war of resistance against the Japanese, and finally an all-out civil war which eventually saw Chiang's retreat to the island province of Taiwan in response to the southern advance of the Communist liberation armies.

The social, economic and political conditions of the 1930s and the 1940s were hardly conducive to a planned and systematic development of sport. Nevertheless, the government's record of accomplishments was not totally blank. A National Physical Education Law was enacted in 1929 and remained in effect, in theory if not in practice, for twenty years.⁵¹ The act made physical education a required middle school subject and set general guidelines on local level organization, but as the national government seldom had effective control at the 'grass roots' implementation of the law was inconsistent. In addition, the first national physical education conference was convened in 1932 and the government assumed responsibility, through the China National Amateur Athletic Federation (CNAAF), for the sponsorship of the 4th to 10th National Athletic Meets.⁵² In response to the demands of a nation at war, sport and physical education underwent a 'militarization' with increased

emphasis on Boy Scout and Girl Guide organizations and on the promotion of gliding associations and the construction of parachute towers in the wartime capital of Zhongqing (Chungking).⁵³

The 6th National Athletic Meet, held in 1935, was noteworthy on two accounts.⁵⁴ First, the city of Shanghai, in spite of the general depression, was able to support construction of the first phase of a major sports complex which included a stadium, swimming pool and gymnasium. The second stage was to include baseball diamonds, volleyball and tennis courts and an auditorium. Second, the number of competing athletes exceeded the total number of athletes who entered the 10th Olympic Games held in 1932 in Los Angeles. The enthusiasm of one of the organizers must, however, be weighed carefully when he remarked that "the meet has served, and served well, the importance of the unity of the people as one race and one nation."⁵⁵ Perhaps a more realistic assessment of the status of sport during these years can be seen in the following statement:

Poverty, the lack of recreation grounds, and of time to make proper use of them, all tend to retard the really popular indulgence and interest in outdoor games, but these obstacles will be overcome as the general standard and style of living is raised.⁵⁶

In the sphere of international sport, China joined the International Olympic Movement (see Chapter III), sent delegations to the Olympic Games of 1932, 1936 and 1948, and attempted to raise its level of international performance. Nevertheless, critics continued to express concern about the relatively poor performance of Chinese

athletes and blame was laid on "the responsible people who (have) failed to raise the physical side of (our) education to a high enough standard."⁵⁷ At the 1936 Olympics China's soccer team was defeated 2-0 by Great Britain in the first round and her basketball team won but one of four matches while being outscored 136-99 in total.⁵⁸ The failure of Chinese athletes to return from Berlin with better results prompted a reporter for the Ta Kung Pao to suggest that all the so-called colored races, with the exception of the Chinese, played a prominent role and, specifically noting the success of Japanese athletes, he concluded that "the advance in athletic prowess shown by small and weak nations at the Games makes China's discomfiture all the greater."⁵⁹

Thus, as with the question of the overall impact on and lasting contribution towards sport made by the YMCA, the achievements of the government during this period remain tenuous and have prompted one writer to concede that, as late as 1949, "the vast majority of Chinese had not only never participated in sports, but had never even been to school."⁶⁰

While the social and political constraints of the era clearly saw no advantage accrue to sportsmen in the Communist areas of rural China in comparison to athletes in the Nationalist-controlled urban areas, at the time of liberation the new government was undoubtedly well prepared to expand its organizational work relative to sport. Historical records and artifacts indicate that western games and contests had grown in popularity prior to 1949. Following Mao

Zedong's (Mao Tse-tung) personal interest and involvement in fitness and sports activities, first enunciated in an article written in 1917--"A Study of Physical Culture" (Tiyu Zhi Yanjiu)⁶¹--sports were promoted not only for their contribution to fitness and military preparedness, but also as recreational pursuits. During the period of the War of Resistance Against Japan, a sports committee was formed in Yan'an (Yenan) in 1939 and within three years a Physical Culture Department had been established and a New Sports Institute inaugurated.⁶² Zhu De (Chu Teh), Commander-in-Chief and later Chairman of the National People's Congress, served as honorary director of the institute. Notwithstanding the problems and hardships associated with life in a war-ravaged country, including a lack of adequate sports equipment and playing areas, swimming, skating, track and field, volleyball, gymnastics and table tennis all had a following in the rural areas, but reputed to have been the most popular of all was basketball.⁶³ At the time of liberation, then, a leadership positively inclined towards sport, a growing reserve of trained physical culture cadres, and a population buoyed and enthused by the momentum of the liberation movement augured well for the future.

Summary

The interaction between foreign and Chinese organizations and individuals over the past century influenced much of China's contemporary sport. The Europeans who settled in China during the nineteenth

century brought with them the popular recreational and sporting pastimes of their homelands, including such activities as rowing, gymnastics, boxing, skating, golf, tennis, hunting and horse racing among others. Although they seldom mixed with the local residents, these foreigners did observe that the Chinese were fond of such activities as acrobatics, rowing, skating and community festivals.

In reality, literary and artistic evidence suggests that the Chinese have had a centuries-old predilection for a variety of sports. Table games, dancing, hunting, archery, swimming, skating and military sports were popular with all social classes from peasant groups to imperial rulers. Numerous forms and styles of indigenous boxing and exercise routines also have deep roots in Chinese history. In addition, ball games similar to present day football, polo and golf were practiced long before contact with the west.

Under the leadership of the YMCA and missionary schools western sports and physical education were promoted on an organized basis at the turn of the century. Although some advances were made, the social, economic and political constraints of the 1930s and the 1940s effectively mitigated against the expansion of programs from the urban areas to the countryside where the vast majority of the population lived. The seeds had been sown, but it would take a revolution to bring them to fruition.

FOOTNOTES
TO CHAPTER I

¹John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer and Albert M. Craig, East Asia: The Modern Transformation (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), pp. 3-79.

²William C. Hunter, Bits of old China (London: Kegan Paul, Trench and Company, 1855), p. 276.

³Geoffrey Robley Sayer, Hong Kong 1892-1919: Years of Discretion (Hong Kong: University Press, 1975), p. 73.

⁴Paul King, In the Chinese Customs Service: A Personal Record of Forty-seven Years (London: Heath Cranton Limited, 1924), p. 71.

⁵Oliver G. Ready, Life and Sport in China (London: Chapman and Hall Limited, 1903), p. 15.

⁶*Ibid.*, p. 16.

⁷*Ibid.*

⁸King, A Personal Record, p. 67.

⁹*Ibid.*, p. 83.

¹⁰Ready, Life and Sport, p. 151.

¹¹*Ibid.*

¹²King, A Personal Record, pp. 186-87.

¹³Ready, Life and Sport, p. 14.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 11-13.

¹⁵Edward Brown, Cochin-China and My Experience of It: A Seaman's Narrative (London: Charles Westerton, 1861), pp. 216-221.

¹⁶*Ibid.* See also, Gray, China, pp. 382-92.

¹⁷John Henry Gray, China: A History of the Laws, Manners and Customs of the People (London: MacMillan and Company, 1878), p. 397.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 383.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 396.

²⁰J. Dyer Ball, Things Chinese (London: Sampson Low, Marston and Company, Ltd., 1893), pp. 395-96. A pictorial representation of this technique is found in William Speer, The Oldest and the Newest Empire: China and the United States (Hartford: S.S. Scranton and Company, 1870), p. 103.

²¹Sayer, Hong Kong, p. 110.

²²"Athletic Progress," in Tang Leang-li (ed.) Reconstruction in China (Shanghai: China United Press, 1935), pp. 96-97. See also, Hao, Physical Education, pp. 194-96.

²³Thomas E. LaFargue, China's First Hundred (Pullman: State College of Washington, 1942), p. 53, contains a photograph of the "Orientals" baseball team taken in 1878 at the Chinese Educational Mission Headquarters in Hartford, Connecticut. The first Chinese students enrolled in the program had arrived in the United States in 1872 and by 1881 had left for home.

²⁴Shi Ji-wen, Sports Go Forward in China (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1963), p. 3.

²⁵Wu Wen-zhong, Zhongguo Tiyu Shi Tu Yanxi (Taipei: Guoli Taiwan Shifan Daxue Tiyu Xuehui, 1970), plates pp. 13-20.

²⁶Shi, Sports, p. 1.

²⁷Ibid. See also, Donn F. Draeger and Robert W. Smith, Asian Fighting Arts (New York: Berkley Publishing Company, 1969), pp. 11-21.

²⁸Wu, Zhongguo Tiyu, plates pp. 2-3.

²⁹Shi, Sports, p. 2.

³⁰Draeger and Smith, Fighting Arts, pp. 31-47.

³¹"The Art of Ju-jitsu," in Tang Leang-li (ed.) China Fact and Fancies (Shanghai: China United Press, 1936), pp. 98-99.

³²Draeger and Smith, Fighting Arts, pp. 15-16.

³³"An Ancient Form of Physical Culture," China Reconstructs (August 1955), pp. 27-28.

³⁴Draeger and Smith, Fighting Arts, pp. 31-47.

³⁵Ibid. See also, Hao Geng-sheng (Gunsun Hoh), Physical Education in China (Shanghai: The Commercial Press, 1926), pp. 1-39.

³⁶"An Ancient Form," p. 28.

³⁷Tiyu Bao (Physical Culture News), 30 May 1977.

³⁸Xin Tiyu (New Physical Culture), (November 1977), p. 43.

³⁹Hao, Physical Education, pp. 40-61. For photographic representations of these and other exercise programs see Wu, Zhongguo Tiyu, plates pp. 9-12.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 4.

⁴¹Shi, Sports, p. 2.

⁴²Wu, Zhongguo Tiyu, plates pp. 21-22.

⁴³Ibid., plate p. 25.

⁴⁴Hao, Physical Education, p. 28.

⁴⁵Shi, Sports, p. 3.

⁴⁶For an account of the events of this era see, Jonathan Kolatch, Sport, Politics and Ideology in China (Middle Village, New York: Jonathan David Publishers, 1972), pp. 3-30.

⁴⁷Ibid. See also, Hao, Physical Education, pp. 90-161.

⁴⁸Wu Wen-zhong, Tiyu Shi (Taipei: Guoli Bianyiguan, 1962), p. 380. See also, Kolatch, Sports, p. 14.

⁴⁹Wu Wen-zhong, Zhongguo Jin Bainian Tiyu Shi (Taipei: Shangwu Yinshuguan Faxing, 1967), pp. 97-102. See also, Kolatch, Sports, pp. 71-72.

⁵⁰Chester Holcombe, The Real Chinaman (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1895), p. 93.

⁵¹Zhu Ming-yi, "Physical Culture," in The Chinese Yearbook 1935-36 (Shanghai: China Yearbook Publishing Company, 1936), pp. 541-53.

⁵²Kolatch, Sports, pp. 11-30.

⁵³Republic of China Ministry of Information, China After Five Years of War (London: Victor Gollancz Limited, 1943), pp. 201-07.

⁵⁴William Z.L. Sung, "The Sixth National Athletic Meet," The China Quarterly, vol. 1 no. 2 (December 1935), pp. 133-38.

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 134.

⁵⁶"China Today and Tomorrow," in Tang Leang-li (ed.) The New Social Order in China (Shanghai: China United Press, 1936), p. 264.

⁵⁷Ta Kung Pao, 12 August 1936.

⁵⁸For details of the individual matches and games see, Frederick W. Rubien (ed.) Report of the American Olympic Committee--Games of the XI Olympiad, Berlin, Germany (New York: American Olympic Committee, 1936), pp. 172 and 256.

⁵⁹Ta Kung Pao, 17 August 1936.

⁶⁰Kolatch, Sports, p. 50.

⁶¹A copy of the original Chinese text appears in, Mao Zedong, "Tiyu Zhi Yanjiu," in Stuart S. Schram, Une Etude de L'Education Physique (Paris: Mouton, 1962).

⁶²"Sports Activities in Yanan During the Anti-Japanese War," China Sports (June 1966), pp. 27-28.

⁶³"Sports Role in Success of the 'Thrusting Detachment' During the Anti-Japanese War," China Sports (September 1966), pp. 50-51. In addition, recently published accounts and photographic records document the variety of sports practiced in the Communist base areas. See, for example, Michael Lindsay, The Unknown War: North China 1937-1945 (London: Bergstrom and Boyle Books Limited, 1975); Tiyu Bao, 10 August 1977; and Xin Tiyu, (December 1977).

CHAPTER II

'ONE CHINA': THE TAIWAN QUESTION

IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Following the surrender of the Japanese in 1945 which ended World War II, the internecine civil war between the Nationalist and Communist armies erupted afresh. A cease-fire agreement signed in January 1946 was short-lived and by July Chiang's Guomindang forces moved against Mao's troops who occupied the rural areas of north-central China. Within a year the balance had shifted and the Red Army, soon to be renamed the People's Liberation Army (PLA)--its ranks strengthened through successful agrarian reform policies which gained the support of the peasants and its military capacity enhanced as a result of the surrender of Nationalist soldiers and the capture of modern weapons--moved to a partial counter-offensive in the north and northwest.¹ By the fall of 1948 three decisive campaigns saw the PLA gain effective control of north and central China. On April 21, 1949, troops moved across the Chang Jiang River in a final drive southward forcing Chiang's government to transfer its headquarters first from Nanjing to Zhongqing, then to Chengdu and, finally, into exile on the island of Taiwan in December 1949. Two months earlier, Mao Zedong had proclaimed the establishment of a 'New China,' with its capital in Peking.

In subsequent months, the two regimes--the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC)--contended for recognition in the international community as the one, legitimate government of all China. The extent to which the United States became involved in the dispute was to have a pronounced effect on international politics for the succeeding two decades. It is, however, neither the purpose nor within the scope of this study to present an analysis of U.S.-China relations alone. Nevertheless, the impact of American involvement has proven to be a significant factor in Chinese diplomatic and people-to-people relations for over a quarter century. Included in the areas adversely affected was the field of international sport. Consequently a brief examination of U.S.-China relations is pertinent.

Support and Recognition: 1946-1950

Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the United States declared war and entered the Asian, Pacific and European fronts. As an ally of the Chinese, who had been at war with Japan for nearly a decade, the Americans immediately provided military and economic assistance to Chiang's government. China was soon recognized as an equal partner in the war effort and the Cairo Declaration, issued December 1, 1943, supported the eventual restoration of all territories taken from China by Japan.² On the death of

President Roosevelt in April 1945, Harry S. Truman took the oath of office and in July at the Potsdam Conference reaffirmed the stance adopted by his predecessor.

But the question of support to China was soon to become a clouded issue. In the course of the Chinese civil war several American advisors and ambassadors attempted, while continuing to supply arms and aid to the Nationalists, to mediate a lasting truce between the forces of Chiang and Mao. In August 1946 the U.S. signed a sales agreement with Chiang's government for disposition of surplus war material in China and the Pacific islands³ and the China Aid Act of 1948 authorized not only \$338 million for economic aid, but also \$125 million for military aid.⁴ By the spring of 1949 Congress had authorized the President to extend unobligated funds, until February 15, 1950, to those areas of China that were not yet under control of the PLA.⁵ Notwithstanding this continuing assistance, the United States appeared to realize the futility of its efforts. In the letter of transmittal to the President which accompanied the State Department's "White Paper on China," Secretary of State Acheson conceded that:

The unfortunate but inescapable fact is that the ominous result of the civil war in China was beyond the control of the government of the United States. Nothing that this country did or could have done within reasonable limits of its capabilities could have changed that result; nothing that was left undone by this country has contributed to it. It was the product of internal Chinese forces, forces which this country tried to influence but could not. A decision was arrived at within China, if only a decision by default.⁶

In an attempt to clarify the American position regarding its stance on the situation of Chiang's retreat to Taiwan, Truman announced on January 5, 1950, that:

The United States has no predatory designs on Formosa or on any other Chinese territory. The United States has no desire to obtain special rights or privileges or to establish military bases on Formosa at this time. Nor does it have any intention of utilizing its armed forces to interfere in the present situation. The United States government will not pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China.

Similarly, the United States Government will not provide military aid or advice to Chinese forces on Formosa.⁷

Meanwhile, the newly formed government in Peking was officially recognized on October 2, 1949 by the Soviet Union, the first nation to do so. In subsequent months, 25 other nations followed the lead of the U.S.S.R. and recognized the People's Republic as the official government of China. Table 4 lists, in chronological order, the countries which extended recognition during this period. The position adopted by the United States in respect to the recognition of a new government was that three criteria must first be met:

- (1) It must exercise effective control in the country it purports to govern.
- (2) It must recognize its internal obligations.
- (3) It must govern with the consent of the people.⁸

At the United Nations, the Soviet delegate, Jacob Malik, walked out of the Security Council on January 10, 1950, when the Council refused to oust the Nationalist Chinese representative.⁹ Three days later Malik again walked out. On February 3, the Nationalist

TABLE 4

COUNTRIES RECOGNIZING THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: 1949-1950

Government	Recognition	Diplomatic Relations
1. U.S.S.R.	October 2, 1949	October 3, 1949
2. Bulgaria	October 3, 1949	October 4, 1949
3. Romania	October 3, 1949	October 5, 1949
4. Hungary	October 4, 1949	October 6, 1949
5. Czechoslovakia	October 5, 1949	October 6, 1949
6. Democratic People's Republic of Korea	October 5, 1949	October 6, 1949
7. Poland	October 5, 1949	October 7, 1949
8. Yugoslavia	October 5, 1949	January 10, 1955
9. Mongolia	October 6, 1949	October 16, 1949
10. German Democratic Republic	October 27, 1949	October 27, 1949
11. Albania	November 21, 1949	November 23, 1949
12. Burma	December 16, 1949	June 8, 1950
13. India	December 30, 1949	April 1, 1950
14. Pakistan	January 5, 1950	May 21, 1951
15. United Kingdom	January 6, 1950	June 17, 1954
16. Ceylon	January 7, 1950	February 7, 1957
17. Norway	January 7, 1950	October 5, 1954
18. Denmark	January 9, 1950	May 11, 1950
19. Israel	January 9, 1950	---
20. Afghanistan	January 12, 1950	January 20, 1955
21. Finland	January 13, 1950	October 28, 1950
22. Sweden	January 14, 1950	May 9, 1950
23. Democratic Republic of Vietnam	January 15, 1950	January 18, 1950
24. Switzerland	January 17, 1950	September 14, 1950
25. Netherlands	March 27, 1950	November 19, 1954
26. Indonesia	April 13, 1950	June 9, 1950

Source: A.M. Halpern (ed.), Policies Toward China: Views from Six Continents (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), pp. 496-97.

delegation threatened to veto any resolution to recognize the right of the People's Republic to represent China. Five days later, the Security Council decided that the problem would be handed over to the General Assembly. A memorandum from UN Secretary General Trygve Lie on March 8 favored the seating of the People's Republic, to which Acheson replied that the United States would not vote to seat the Peking government while it still recognized the Nationalists. Conversely, the American representative indicated that the United States would not veto any majority decision to seat the People's Republic.¹⁰ Lie repeated his appeal for recognition of the PRC in early June without success. In the following weeks a series of events was to further complicate the issue and see the question of China's membership in the UN effectively blocked for two decades.

The Impact of the Korean War: 1950-1960

At dawn on June 25, 1950, North Korean forces crossed the 38th Parallel and marched southward on the peninsula.* Two days later, President Truman, equating the move with a massive communist offensive in Asia, linked the Korean situation with the heretofore internal struggle of the Chinese over the island of Taiwan, stating that:

In these circumstances, the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to the United States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area.

*For a discussion of the events and circumstances surrounding the conflict in Korea see, Isidor F. Stone, The Hidden History of the Korean War (New York: Montly Review Press, 1952).

Accordingly, I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa. As a corollary of this action, I am calling upon the Chinese Government on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the mainland. The Seventh Fleet will see that this is done. The determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations.¹¹

The American administration had, with these few sentences, re-entered the Chinese civil war. Less than 24 hours later, Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou En-lai accused the U.S. of aggression against Chinese territory and affirmed the determination of China to free the island:

All the people of our country will certainly fight to the end single-handedly to liberate Taiwan from the grasp of the American aggressors. The Chinese people, who defeated Japanese imperialism and Chiang Kai-shek, the hireling of American imperialism, will surely be victorious in driving off the American aggressors and in recovering Taiwan and all other territories belonging to China.¹²

After expressing concern on several occasions for the security of her northern border areas and after repeated warnings that any substantial movement of the American-dominated United Nations army towards the Manchurian frontier would pose a direct threat to its security, a large force of Chinese volunteers entered the war in October of 1950.¹³ In a speech before the UN, the leader of a special Chinese delegation made only passing reference to the conflict in Korea while focusing on the issue of the so-called status of Taiwan and suggested that the United States was using the war as a pretext to again interfere in China's internal affairs.¹⁴ On February 1, 1951, the UN General Assembly accepted an American resolution naming China as the aggressor in Korea.¹⁵ Eight days later a Mutual Defense

Assistance Agreement was signed between the United States and the Republic of China.¹⁶ A speech delivered on May 18 by Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Dean Rusk, served to indicate the pejorative nature of the rhetoric which characterized the period:

We do not recognize the authorities in Peiping for what they pretend to be. The Peiping regime may be a colonial Russian government--a Slavic Manchukuo on a larger scale. It is not the Government of China. It does not pass the first test. It is not Chinese.¹⁷

As the war in Korea continued, newly elected President Dwight D. Eisenhower adopted a somewhat different tactic in regards to the presence of the Seventh Fleet in Taiwan. Expressing the opinion that the navy had, in the past, served to provide a defensive shield for China and that the time had come to 'unleash' Chiang's forces, the President's 1953 State of the Union Message suggested that "we certainly have no obligation to protect a nation fighting us in Korea."¹⁸ Further strengthening its ties with the Chiang administration, the United States later signed a "Mutual Defense Treaty" which included provision for "the right to dispose such United States land, air and sea forces in and about Taiwan and the Pescadores as may be required for their defense, as determined by mutual agreement."¹⁹ The reaction from Zhou was predictably swift and scathing:

The "Mutual Security Treaty" concluded between the United States and Chiang Kai-shek has no legal basis whatsoever and is null and void. This treaty is a betrayal of China's sovereign and territorial rights and the Chinese people oppose it resolutely. . . .

Taiwan is China's territory. The Chinese people are determined to liberate Taiwan. Only by liberating Taiwan from the tyranny of the Chiang Kai-shek gang of traitors can the Chinese people achieve the complete unity of their motherland and further safeguard the peace of Asia and the world. All proposals to set up a so-called "independent state" of Taiwan, to "neutralize" Taiwan or to place Taiwan under "trusteeship" mean, in practice, dismemberment of China's territory, infringement upon China's sovereignty and interference in China's internal affairs. All are therefore utterly unacceptable to the Chinese people.²⁰

The signing of the Korean armistice in July 1953 had served to ease, somewhat, the immediate tensions in Asia but this expansion of American involvement in Taiwan did little to resolve the impasse between the Communist and Nationalist administrations. Although contacts during this period between the United States and China were to grow to include ambassadorial talks in Geneva, no major change relative to the status of Taiwan was to accrue.

Meanwhile, following China's participation at the Bandung Conference of African and Asian nations and after a lull of more than five years, several Third World countries including the United Arab Republic (Egypt) recognized and established diplomatic relations with the People's Republic. Notwithstanding these gains in the international community, the United States was able to command continued support in its efforts to bar China's participation at the United Nations. In 1951 the U.S. had introduced a resolution which proposed placing a moratorium on the question of the admission of China, a proposal which received support for the next decade. Table 5 presents the voting patterns from 1951-1961 when, for the first time, the U.S. altered its tactics and joined in a five-power

resolution which proposed that any change in Chinese representation at the UN be considered an 'important question' thus requiring a two-thirds majority for approval.²¹

TABLE 5
VOTING AT THE UNITED NATIONS ON
THE U.S. MORATORIUM PROPOSAL

Year	Session	Membership	To Consider	Not to Consider	Abstention	Absent
1951	6th	60	11	37	4	8
1952	7th	60	7	42	11	0
1953	8th	60	10	44	2	4
1954	9th	60	11	43	6	0
1955	10th	60	12	42	6	0
1956	11th	79	24	47	8	0
1957	12th	82	27	48	6	1
1958	13th	81	28	44	9	0
1959	14th	82	29	44	9	0
1960	15th	99	34	42	22	1

Source: Feeney, PRC, p. 20. The U.S. proposal was to 'not consider' placing the question of Chinese representation on the UN agenda.

One of the effects of the UN moratorium was that several international organizations sought, in light of the apparently unresolved question of Taiwan's status, to admit to membership both the PRC and the ROC, thus creating in essence 'two Chinas.' Following several unsuccessful attempts to annul these actions, China withdrew from the

International Geophysical Year Committee, the International Red Cross, and several international sports federations including the International Olympic Committee.²² China had, during this period, expressed a willingness to negotiate with the authorities on Taiwan for the peaceful liberation of the island and, proclaiming that all Chinese belong to one family, had issued the challenge:

The gate of the motherland is always wide open for all patriots. Every Chinese has both the right and the duty to make his contribution to the sacred cause of the unification of the motherland. With the unity of the entire nation and the efforts of all our people, the liberation of Taiwan will certainly be consummated.²³

Signifying the United States' intention to support the ROC, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles suggested, in a major policy speech on June 28, 1957, that American recognition of China would be inadvisable as the likely consequences of such action would be:

- (1) The many mainland Chinese, who by Mao Tse-tung's own admission seek to change the nature of their government, would be immensely discouraged.
- (2) The millions of overseas Chinese would feel that they had no Free China to which to look.
- (3) The Republic of China would feel crushed by its friend, . . . and we are honor-bound to give our ally, to whom we are pledged by a mutual defense treaty, a full measure of loyalty.
- (4) The free Asian governments of the Pacific and Southeast Asia would be gravely perplexed.
- (5) United States recognition of Communist China would make it probable that the Communist regime would obtain the seat of China in the United Nations, which is not a reformatory for bad governments but supposedly an association of those who are already peace-loving and who are able and willing to carry out the charter obligations.²⁴

By the summer of 1958 tensions in the Taiwan Strait were strained to the limit and in August and September the contending forces of Mao and Chiang clashed over the ROC-held offshore islands of Jinmen (Quemoy) and Mazu (Matsu), threatening to draw the U.S further into the conflict.²⁵ At this same time the activities of an influential pro-Taiwan organization in the United States increased and gained further prominence for its leaders.

The "China Lobby"

The presence and involvement, beginning in the 1940s and continuing to the present, of individuals and groups who became known as the "China Lobby" was significant in regards to the Taiwan issue. To the extent that the "China Lobby" was influential in molding public opinion and governmental action, especially in the United States, reference to its activities is warranted at this juncture.

Several groups were formed in the two decades following World War II which waged extensive propaganda programs designed either to support or oppose the Nationalist government and American policy toward it. The American China Policy Association, the China Emergency Committee, the Committee to Defend America by Aiding Anti-Communist China, and the Committee on National Affairs were pro-Chiang, while the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy, the Institute of Pacific Relations, and the National Committee on

United States-China Relations were identified as anti-Chiang groups.²⁶ In addition to these groups, the Committee of One Million, established initially in 1953 to block the admission of the People's Republic to the United Nations, played an active role in several nation-wide campaigns which were critical of accommodation with China under any circumstances, including trade, diplomatic recognition, and people-to-people contacts in sport. Through the distribution of publications, the release of editorial statements to the press, the convening of conferences and meetings, and extensive lobbying at both state and national levels, the Committee was effectively able to marshal both public acquiescence and Senate and Congressional support. The impact of the "China Lobby" influenced not only American foreign policy towards China but also had a marked effect on individuals and organizations in the U.S. Private China specialists became suspect; scholarly organizations and foundations which had close liaison with China came under close scrutiny and were forced to curtail their research activities. Beyond that diplomats and government personnel of longstanding service and recognized expertise, men such as John Service, Edmund Clubb, John Carter Vincent and John Davies were either transferred or forced to resign in response to pressure resulting from the anti-Communist activities of Senator Joseph McCarthy and pro-Chiang lobbyists.²⁷ An attempt to launch an investigation of the "China Lobby" in 1952 was unsuccessful. Nonetheless the result of these changes stripped the PRC of much of its support for gaining a seat in the United Nations.

From Isolation to Containment: 1960-1969

America's posture and policies towards the People's Republic received renewed attention in 1960 as the U.S. election campaign gained momentum. The two Presidential hopefuls, Vice-President Richard M. Nixon and Senator John F. Kennedy, in a series of radio and television debates, disagreed on the issue of defense of the offshore islands of Jinmen and Mazu. Kennedy's position was that:

These islands are a few miles, five or six miles off the coast of Red China within a general harbor area, and more than 100 miles from Formosa. We have never said flatly that we will defend Quemoy and Matsu if it [sic] is attacked. . . . I think it is unwise to take the chance of being dragged into a war which may lead to a world war over two islands which are not strategically defensible, which are not . . . essential to the defense of Formosa.²⁸

Nixon's viewpoint was that defense of the islands was an essential aspect of American policy, a stance he sought to justify by asking:

Now what do the Chinese Communists want? They don't want just Quemoy and Matsu. They don't want just Formosa. They want the world. And the question is if you surrender or indicate in advance that you are not going to defend any part of the free world, and you figure that is going to satisfy them, it doesn't satisfy them. It only whets their appetite. And then the question comes--when do you stop them?²⁹

The extent to which the China question influenced the voting is unknown, but following Kennedy's election in November foreign policy advisor Chester Bowles (D. Conn.) advocated the adoption of a 'two-China' policy based on "an independent Formosa and an independent (Communist) China."³⁰ However, following the President's inauguration no change in U.S. policy was immediately evident. China rejected

American proposals to discuss an exchange of newsmen, the release of imprisoned Americans, and a general settlement of disputes until U.S. forces were withdrawn from Taiwan.³¹

The attitude of the United States at the UN did change when, for the first time in a decade, the American representative supported a proposed debate on the question of Chinese representation. During the subsequent discussion several resolutions were presented and on December 15, 1961, the General Assembly rejected a Soviet proposal to admit China and to expel the Nationalists. A second resolution, advocating the admission of China without expelling Chiang's representative, was also defeated. Gaining approval, however, was the 'important question' resolution.³² As outlined in Table 6, this new tactic was to successfully exclude China from the UN for a further decade.

Following the assassination of President Kennedy on November 22, 1963, the Johnson administration gave no indication of a major change in U.S. attitudes toward China. Although Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Roger Hilsman acknowledged that "we have no reason to believe that there is a present likelihood that the Communist regime will be overthrown," he suggested that the U.S. was prepared "to keep the door open to the possibility of change."³³ Clearly, it was China that would be required to change its stance, not the United States.

TABLE 6
VOTING AT THE UNITED NATIONS ON MOTIONS
TO SEAT THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC

Year	Session	Membership	For	Against	Abstention	Absent
1961	16th	104	36	48	20	0
1962	17th	110	42	56	12	0
1963	18th	111	41	57	12	1
1964	19th	Vote Not Taken				
1965	20th	116	47	47	20	2
1966	21st	121	46	57	17	1
1967	22nd	123	45	58	17	3
1968	23rd	126	44	58	23	1
1969	24th	126	48	56	21	1

Source: Feeney, PRC, p. 20.

Elsewhere, several nations began to express concern and displeasure over the continued isolation of China. The British Foreign Secretary, Lord Home, suggested that "the facts of international life require that Communist China be seated in the United Nations."³⁴ Canadian government officials announced wheat, barley and flour sales to China totalling \$362 million and later France, Australia and Japan were to establish trade links with the PRC.³⁵ In December 1963, Chinese Premier Zhou En-lai embarked on a two-month tour of Africa and on January 27, 1964, the French administration of Charles de Gaulle became the first western government to establish diplomatic ties with China in nearly 15 years. The American State Department called the French action "an unfortunate step."³⁶

As American involvement in Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam increased, so did the potential for direct confrontation with China. Speaking to a press conference in Peking on September 29, 1965, Foreign Minister Chen Yi stated that China was fully prepared against U.S. aggression and, in reply to U Thant's call that the UN achieve universality of membership in response to the demands of the situation in Vietnam and the impasse over disarmament, he outlined the conditions under which China would enter the world body. Chen's demands included that the UN

. . . must oust the Chiang Kai-shek clique, must cancel its 1951 resolution condemning China and North Korea as aggressors, and adopt a resolution condemning the . . . (U.S.) as the aggressor (in Korea).

In addition, he stated that:

The UN Charter must be reviewed and revised . . . by all countries, big and small; all independent states should be included in the United Nations; and all imperialist puppets should be expelled.³⁷

Meanwhile, in Washington the Senate Foreign Relations Committee began a series of hearings in March 1966 on U.S.-China policy. One witness suggested a need for basic changes in the overall U.S. posture toward 'Communist China,'³⁸ while Harvard Professor John K. Fairbank postulated that:

Containment alone is a blind alley unless we add constructive competition and international contact. . . . Peking's rulers shout aggressively out of manifold frustrations. . . . Isolation intensifies their ailment and makes it self-perpetuating, and we need to encourage international contact with China on many fronts.³⁹

These sentiments were echoed by Vice-President Hubert Humphrey when he proposed that American policy become one based on "containment without necessarily isolation."⁴⁰ Pro-Nationalist supporters, however, criticized these views and former Republican representative Walter Judd urged that "this is the time to stand fast for the basic containment policies that have proved sound and more successful during the last 15 years than most people believed possible."⁴¹ Other speakers likewise advocated continuing a "rigid attitude of inflexibility . . . of extreme hostility,"⁴² a stance which drew the observation that it was the "United States rather than Communist China which (had) been isolated."⁴³ The Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, presented the administration's views summed up as 10 essential elements which included a continuing commitment to the ROC both on Taiwan and in the UN.

On June 9, 1966, sixty leading American China experts founded an organization dedicated to providing information concerning the People's Republic to the American public--the National Committee on United States-China Relations.⁴⁴ Further support for a change in U.S. policy came in October of that year from the United Nations Association, an independent, non-partisan organization devoted to supporting the UN, which urged that the United States adopt a 'two-China' policy. The UNA predicated its proposal on the assumption that the General Assembly might eventually vote Nationalist China out of the UN and that the adoption of a 'two-China' stance might strengthen and thus save the Republic of China's membership.⁴⁵

On November 21, the U.S. Ambassador to the UN announced support for an Italian resolution which proposed a study on the question of Chinese representation.⁴⁶ Two days later, Canadian External Affairs Minister Paul Martin suggested that the People's Republic should be seated in the Security Council and the General Assembly, but that Nationalist China should retain its seat in the General Assembly.⁴⁷ No action was taken on the Canadian proposal and, in any case, it is doubtful that China would have consented to what amounted to yet another proposal to recognize 'two Chinas.'

In addition to the problems posed by the apparent evolution of more flexible approaches toward the question of China's representation at the UN, the Committee of One Million received another setback when, on December 17, New York Republican Senator Jacob K. Javits announced his withdrawal from the Committee which prompted its secretary, Marvin Liebman, to send a memorandum to all Congressional members of the organization stating that, in future, their names would no longer appear on Committee letterhead and publications.⁴⁸ China's increasing acceptance in the international community also received a setback, however, when the domestic fissures surrounding the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of 1966-1969, including the recalling of all but one of China's ambassadors from overseas, brought into question, for a number of foreign governments, the future stability of the government in Peking.

Renewing International Contacts: the 1970s

In April 1969, amid calls for unity across the land, the 9th Party Congress was convened in Peking bringing to a close a chapter in China's Cultural Revolution. The still unresolved question of Taiwan's status was brought forward in the report summing up the experiences of the previous four years when it was charged that "to date U.S. imperialists still occupy our territory Taiwan."⁴⁹

Shortly before the issue of this report, Richard M. Nixon had become the 37th President of the United States and, while he indicated that American foreign policy was to continue to oppose China's admission to the UN, public pressure was mounting for a re-evaluation of the government's policy. Speaking before the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations on March 20, 1969, Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D. Mass.) advocated seeking accommodation with China:

Both of us--Chinese and Americans alike--are prisoners of the passions of the past. What we need now, and in the decades ahead, is liberation from those passions. Given the history of our past relations with China, it is unrealistic to expect Peking to take the initiative. It is our obligation.⁵⁰

Noting that the problems to be overcome were legion, Kennedy nevertheless went on to suggest several steps which might be taken by the United States: an announced indication of a willingness to adopt a new China policy, a unilateral withdrawal of travel and trade restrictions, an offer to re-establish consular offices, and a withdrawal of opposition to China's admission to the UN.⁵¹

Faced with mounting domestic dissent over the Vietnam War the President outlined a new Asian policy, later to be known as the "Nixon Doctrine,"⁵² during a news conference on July 25, 1969, in Guam. The substance of Nixon's announcement was that, although the U.S. would continue to support its Asian allies, in future the responsibility for Asian peace and security was to be borne principally by the Asians. In regards to China, Secretary of State William Rogers, speaking on nation-wide television on December 23, 1969 said, "The Administration feels it is impossible for a nation of 800 million people, almost 25 percent of the world's population, to be isolated. It doesn't make sense. So we're going to do whatever we can to establish friendly relations with them."⁵³

This indication of a subtle change in American attitudes toward China was followed by similar statements culminating in the President's foreign policy message to Congress delivered on February 25, 1971:

It is a truism that an international order cannot be secure if one of the major powers remains largely outside it and hostile toward it. In this decade, therefore, there will be no more important challenge than that of drawing the People's Republic of China into a constructive relationship with the world community, and particularly with the rest of Asia.⁵⁴

Nixon, on the other hand, indicated no major change in America's attitude regarding the question of Taiwan's status at the UN as he went on to state that "the question of its (China's) place in the United Nations is not, however, merely a question of whether it should participate. It is also a question of whether Peking should be permitted to dictate to the world the terms of its participation."⁵⁵

Elsewhere, China's quest for recognition as the sole legitimate representative in the international community gained support as Canada and Italy along with several other nations accorded diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic. Canadian recognition, in addition to coming from a western government, was noteworthy in that it provided a model subsequently to be used by other governments. The Canadian formula "took note" of China's claim to Taiwan, thus acknowledging that the territorial sovereignty of China and the issue of Taiwan was an internal affair which required neither Canadian approval nor endorsement. The text of the joint communique stated:

The Chinese Government reaffirms that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China. The Canadian Government takes note of this position of the Chinese Government.⁵⁶

At the United Nations the winds of change also prevailed when, for the first time in 1970, a majority of nations voted in favor of seating China. But the resolution failed to gain the necessary two-thirds majority as an 'important question,' thus postponing approval until the 26th General Assembly conclusively resolved the issue.

On July 15, 1971, seventeen nations proposed that an item be included on the agenda entitled "Restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations" to which the United States responded with a counter-proposal entitled "The representation of China in the United Nations."⁵⁷ Following several

procedural discussions, the debate, highlighted by three draft resolutions, took place from October 18-25. The first resolution, sponsored by Albania, called for the recognition of the People's Republic of China and the expulsion of the Republic of China. The second proposed that any decision which would deprive the ROC of representation be designated an 'important question' requiring a two-thirds majority. The third draft, a 'two-China' proposal, advocated affirmation of the right of both the PRC and the ROC to representation.⁵⁸ Voting took place on October 25 on each of the three resolutions. The latter two propositions were defeated while the Albanian proposal gained acceptance (see Table 7).

TABLE 7

VOTING AT THE UNITED NATIONS ON THE
ISSUE OF CHINESE REPRESENTATION

Year	Session	Membership	For	Against	Abstention	Absent
1970	25th	126	51	49	25	1
1971	26th	131	76	35	17	3

Source: New York Times, October 26, 1971. Prior to adoption of the Albanian resolution, the General Assembly had rejected both the important question resolution (55-59-15) and a proposal to separate the admission/expulsion issues (51-61-16).

In subsequent months, China was also accorded recognition in such UN specialized agencies as UNESCO, ILO, ICAO and IAEA.⁵⁹ In addition, the People's Republic joined other non-governmental bodies which had rejected the claims to recognition and representation made by the ROC.

The events of 1971 had not been totally unexpected in Taiwan and on July 15, Chiang Kai-shek, appearing before the National Security Council, acknowledged that the future was tenuous. Nevertheless, in the rhetoric of the preceding two decades he proclaimed that ". . . recovery of the Chinese mainland is our prime objective and unceasing task. We can never set this aside in favor of lesser problems."⁶⁰

The posture and performance of the Nixon administration during this period reflected the government's attitude of promoting a 'two-China' policy. While maintaining its support for the Chiang regime, the United States sought to improve relations with China. Between July 1969 and April 1971 the U.S. eased trade restrictions, approved changes in passport validation requirements for travel to China, authorized selective licensing of non-strategic goods for export, and lifted the ban on certain shipping regulations for foreign carriers dealing in oil products with China.⁶¹ On March 15, 1971, it was announced that specially validated passports would no longer be required by American citizens travelling to the People's Republic.⁶² In April a table tennis team was invited to Peking,

the start of the famous 'ping pong diplomacy.' In his conversation with the American delegation, Premier Zhou En-lai remarked that:

Contacts between the people of China and the United States had been very frequent in the past but later they were broken off for a long time. Your visit to China on invitation has opened the door to friendly contacts between the people of the two countries. We believe that such friendly contacts will be favoured and supported by the majority of the two peoples.⁶³

Less than a year later, Richard Nixon was to become the first American President to visit the People's Republic. The significance of Nixon's visit was not to be underestimated following two decades of isolation between the two major powers, but neither were the longstanding differences to be easily set aside. A joint communique, issued at Shanghai on February 27, 1972, covered several areas of mutual concern (see Appendix A) and in regards to the question of Taiwan stated:

The two sides reviewed the long-standing serious disputes between China and the United States. The Chinese side reaffirmed its position: The Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States; the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of "one China, one Taiwan," "one China, two governments," "two Chinas," and "independent Taiwan" or advocate that "the status of Taiwan remains to be determined."

The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.⁶⁴

Although the Shanghai Communique neither established definitive procedures nor set a time frame for the normalization of relations between the two countries, several issues have since stalled the process and the movement toward eventual full diplomatic recognition. On the one hand, the majority of American forces have been withdrawn from Taiwan, while at the same time U.S. arms sales to the ROC government have more than doubled, trade has increased several fold, and corporate investment has expanded. Concurrently, on American soil contacts between Nationalist Chinese and U.S. officials have been made easier with the opening of five new ROC consulates--in Atlanta, Portland, Kansas City, Guam and American Samoa.⁶⁵

Both pro-China and pro-Chiang supporters have been critical of these U.S. actions, with Senator Mike Mansfield (D. Montana) having observed in 1975 that

All this hardly adds up to carrying out the obvious intent of the Shanghai Communique which anticipated our military disengagement from Taiwan and the Chinese Civil War, a war which ended, for all practical purposes, more than a quarter century ago.

In the context of the Shanghai Communique, as long as we are involved in Taiwan, we are involved in China's internal affairs. In my judgment, there has been all too much evasion on this issue. It is in this nation's interest to bring our military posture in the Taiwan area into accordance with the Nixon-Chou agreement of 1972.⁶⁶

The unproductive tenure of the Ford administration in regards to the normalization of relations contributed to China's growing impatience and a cooling of relations between the two nations. As for the island of Taiwan, the number of countries recognizing the Republic of China dropped to 26 by 1975, although unofficial ties in the economic and cultural spheres remained substantial, including those with governments such as Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany which had earlier recognized the People's Republic. The population, nevertheless, remained under a state of martial law in response to anti-Communist government initiatives and economic prospects for the future hinged not only on the maintenance of a healthy trade balance but also on the uncertainties of a budget in which defense expenditures dwarfed all other categories.⁶⁷ Another unanswered question dealt with the future leadership of the divided Chinese nation.

In April 1975, funeral guns boomed over Taipei as official ROC sources announced that the body of 87 year old Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek would be buried in a Christian ceremony, but that a formal state funeral would be postponed indefinitely pending the return of the regime to the mainland.⁶⁸ Eighteen months later, National Day celebrations on October 1 were cancelled in Peking as

China mourned the passing on September 9 of 83 year old Chairman Mao Zedong. Memorial messages called upon the nation's 800 million citizens to turn their grief into strength and carry on the cause left behind, including the liberation of Taiwan.⁶⁹

Thus for both China and Taiwan the issue of recognition as the one legitimate government of all Chinese people remains of paramount concern. In sport, as in all areas where international contacts are made, the political dispute over the recognition of 'one China' has been a bitter, protracted struggle.

Summary

China's search for recognition in the international community following the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949 suffered numerous setbacks as a result of the deepening Cold War and the outbreak of the Korean conflict. American support for the Chiang Kai-shek administration and the decisive role played by the United States in blocking China's entry into the United Nations contributed to the animosity which developed between the two countries.

Employing several tactics, the United States and its allies were effective in excluding China from the UN until 1971. In spite of increasing support for the normalization of relations between China and the U.S., continued American corroboration in Taiwan

was a roadblock to fruitful discussion on the question of the establishment of formal state-to-state ties.

The 'two Chinas' issue, propagated largely by American actions during the 1950s became, over the years, a reality in that the functioning of a government on Taiwan was supported and sustained by the United States. To others, however, the principle of a separate, independent state remained a myth.

FOOTNOTES

TO CHAPTER II

¹"The People's Liberation War: 1946-49," China Reconstructs (September 1959), pp. 25-29. See also, Orville Schell and Joseph Esherick, Modern China: The Making of a New Society from 1839 to the Present (New York: Vintage Sundial Books, Random House, Inc., 1972).

²China and U.S. Far East Policy: 1945-1967 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Service, 1967), p. 36.

³Ibid., p. 41.

⁴Ibid., pp. 255-56.

⁵Ibid., p. 46.

⁶The China White Paper: August 1949 (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1967), I, xv-xvii, cited in Roderick MacFarquhar, Sino-American Relations 1949-71 (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), p. 69.

⁷American Foreign Policy 1950-1955 (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1957), II, pp. 2448-49.

⁸Congressional Quarterly, China and U.S., p. 47.

⁹Ibid., pp. 48-49 outlines the sequence of events which highlighted the early months of 1950.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹American Foreign Policy, p. 2468.

¹²Oppose U.S. Occupation of Taiwan and "Two Chinas" Plot: A Selection of Important Documents (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1958), pp. 5-6. For a slightly different translation into English see, MacFarquhar, Relations, p. 84.

¹³Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War (New York: Macmillan, 1960).

¹⁴"The Speeches of China's Representative at the U.N. Security Council," People's China supplement (16 December 1950), pp. 3-16. See also, MacFarquhar, Relations, pp. 86-98.

¹⁵Congressional Quarterly, China and U.S., p. 56.

¹⁶American Foreign Policy, p. 2470.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 2474.

¹⁸MacFarquhar, Relations, p. 107.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 110.

²⁰"Foreign Minister Chou En-lai's Statement on U.S.-Chiang Kai-shek Mutual Security Treaty," in Important Documents, pp. 18-27.

²¹William R. Feeney, "The Participation of the PRC in the United Nations," Southern Illinois University: Asian Studies Occasional Paper Series #11, n.d., pp. 1-31.

²²For the complete text of these several withdrawal statements see, Important Documents, pp. 77-102.

²³Ibid., pp. 50-51.

²⁴Congressional Quarterly, China and U.S., p. 82.

²⁵Several interpretations of the events during this period exist, including: Tang Tsou, "The Embroilment Over Quemoy: Mao, Chiang and Dulles," Institute of International Studies, University of Utah, 1959; J.H. Kalicki, The Pattern of Sino-American Crises (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975; and "Premier Chou En-lai's Statement on the Situation in the Taiwan Straits Area," Important Documents, pp. 70-74.

²⁶Congressional Quarterly, China and U.S., pp. 23-28.

²⁷Ross Y. Koen, The China Lobby in American Politics (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1974). Published initially in 1960, Koen's book was a victim of the then still powerful "Lobby" which was successful in suppressing its distribution.

²⁸Congressional Quarterly, China and U.S., p. 100.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Ibid.

³¹MacFarquhar, Relations, p. 180.

³²Feeney, PRC, p. 20.

³³MacFarquhar, Relations, pp. 201-05.

³⁴Congressional Quarterly, China and U.S., p. 102.

³⁵Ibid., p. 103.

³⁶Ibid., p. 133.

³⁷Ibid., p. 165.

³⁸"Senate Hearings on China," in Kwan Ha Yim (ed.) China and the U.S. 1964-72 (New York: Facts on File, 1975), p. 106.

³⁹Congressional Quarterly, China and U.S., p. 180.

⁴⁰Kwan, Facts on File, p. 111.

⁴¹Congressional Quarterly, China and U.S., p. 182.

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³Ibid., p. 183.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 190.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 201.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 205.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 206. See also, John W. Holmes, "Canada and China: The Dilemmas of a Middle Power," in A.M. Halpern (ed.) Policies Toward China: Views from Six Continents (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965).

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 211.

⁴⁹Peking Review, Special Issue (28 April 1969), pp. 26-27, cited in MacFarquhar, Relations, p. 248.

⁵⁰Kwan, Facts on File, p. 189.

⁵¹Ibid., pp. 190-91.

⁵²Ibid., p. 207.

⁵³Quoted in "The United States and Mainland China," Current Scene: Developments in the People's Republic of China (1 March 1971), p. 22.

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 23.

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 24.

⁵⁶Information Division, Department of External Affairs, "Establishment of Diplomatic Relations with the People's Republic of China," Statements and Speeches (70/19), Ottawa, 1970.

⁵⁷U.S. Participation in the U.N.: Report of the President to the Congress (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1971), p. 53.

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 54.

⁵⁹Ibid., pp. 57-58.

⁶⁰Chiang Kai-shek, "The Stand of Our Nation and the Spirit of Our People," Issues and Studies (July 1971), p. 3.

⁶¹Kwan, Facts on File, pp. 216-17.

⁶²Ibid.

⁶³Peking Review (23 April 1971), p. 5.

⁶⁴Cited in Mike Mansfield, "China: A Quarter Century After the Founding of the People's Republic," Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1975, pp. 39-41.

⁶⁵Paul T.K. Lin, "The Road Ahead," New China, vol. 1 no. 3 (Fall 1975), pp. 34-35. See also, USCPFA, "The Taiwan Question: Roadblock to Friendship," pamphlet series #1 (August 1975).

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 8.

⁶⁷For details of recent events in Taiwan see, Thomas J. Bellows, "Taiwan's Foreign Policy in the 1970s: A Case Study of Adaptation and Viability," Asian Survey, vol. xvi no. 7 (July 1976), pp. 593-610, and Gerald McBeath, "Taiwan in 1977: Holding the Reins," Asian Survey, vol. xviii no. 1 (January 1978), pp. 17-28.

⁶⁸Vancouver Sun, 7 April 1975.

⁶⁹Peking Review (13 September 1976), pp. 10-11.

CHAPTER III

CHINA'S RELATIONS WITH THE INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE

It must be understood that the modern Olympic Games are not a public enterprize. They are a unique and private affair conceived by Baron de Coubertin and turned over to the International Olympic Committee to promote and to protect. They are not subject to change or alteration at every popular or journalistic whim. No one is required to, and no one has the right to, participate. This is a privilege confined to those who comply with the Olympic Code.

Avery Brundage¹

The modern Olympic Games, revived under the tutelage of Baron de Coubertin, were first held in Athens in 1896. The conduct of the Games themselves, however, comprises but a part of the Olympic Movement which reflects the philosophy of Olympism as conceived, nurtured and propagated by Coubertin.² Although the success of the Movement has often been questioned and its goals misunderstood, nearly a century after their revival the Games remain the world's single most influential and often controversial sporting endeavor. (The spirit of Olympism has been broadly defined to include: amateurism, physical and character development, internationalism, and aesthetics and arts and letters.)³ Except for the continuing problem of defining and

regulating the concept of amateurism, no issue has been as perennially controversial as that concerning the status of China in the Olympic Movement.

This chapter discusses the concept of the Olympic Movement, including the structure and function of the International Olympic Committee; documents China's early involvement in the Olympic Games; identifies the issues and factors surrounding China's claims for recognition following the establishment of the People's Republic; and analyzes and interprets the events which have influenced relations between China and the International Olympic Committee from 1949 to the present.

The Olympic Movement

The aims of the Olympic Movement are to promote the development of those fine physical and moral qualities which are the basis of amateur sport and to bring together the athletes of the world in a great quadrennial festival of sports thereby creating international respect and goodwill and thus helping to construct a better and more peaceful world.⁴

The Olympic Movement is the all-encompassing, worldwide network of organizations, committees and federations which administer and regulate the conduct of international competitions subscribing to the tenets of Olympism as defined in the fundamental principles of the International Olympic Committee cited above. The Movement's mandate for action and guidelines governing its operation are contained in the Olympic Rules (see Appendix B). In addition to the thousands of

individual athletes who compete, the Olympic Movement is composed of the International Olympic Committee (IOC), the guide, guardian and arbiter; the National Olympic Committees (NOC), the representatives of the IOC delegated to act in their respective territories to promote the Olympic Movement and ensure the adherence to the fundamental rules of the IOC; and the International Federations (IF), the bodies responsible for the administration and management of their single, respective sports.⁵ The significant and integrally related role of the International Sports Federations in the controversy over China's participation in the Olympic Movement is detailed in Chapter IV. Notwithstanding the fact that the IFs are responsible for the recognition of individual national sport associations, for the technical arrangements and the conduct of their respective sports (without whose help the Olympic Games could not take place) the IOC remains, in accordance with article 23 of its Rules, the 'supreme authority':

The International Olympic Committee is the final authority on all questions concerning the Olympic Games and the Olympic Movement. It delegates, however, to the International Federations the technical control of the sports which they govern. In all other respects the powers of the International Olympic Committee are paramount.⁶

What, then, is the structure and function of this powerful body? The International Olympic Committee is a private, autonomous, self-perpetuating body composed of a President, an Executive Board, and individual co-opted members entrusted with the promotion, control

and development of Olympism. As the policy maker and idealistic promoter rather than the operator of the Olympic Games, the IOC has as its aims:

- (1) the regular celebration of the Games;
- (2) making the Games ever more worthy of their glorious history and of the high ideals which inspired their revival by Baron Pierre de Coubertin and his associates;
- (3) encouraging the organization and development of amateur sport and sport competitions;
- (4) inspiring, and leading sport within the Olympic ideal, thereby promoting and strengthening friendship between the sportsmen of all countries.⁷

Membership in the IOC has been characterized, with few exceptions and changes since 1894, by several factors including: self-recruitment, with incumbent members selecting new members; autonomy, with no recourse to other bodies being required; reverse representation, with members being ambassadors to their country of residence and not representatives of them to the IOC; and independence, with neither real nor implied obligation to any group or government being permitted.⁸

The President of the IOC is elected from among the members. Since 1894 only six men have assumed the mantle of the presidency, possibly the most influential office in amateur sport: Demetrius Vikelas, 1894-1896; Baron Pierre de Coubertin, 1896-1925; Count Henri de Baillet-Latour, 1925-1942; J. Sigfrid Edstrom, 1946-1952; Avery Brundage, 1952-1972; and Lord Killanin, 1972 to the present.⁹

The nine-member Executive Board, composed of the President, three Vice-Presidents, and five additional members, is responsible

for ensuring that IOC rules and regulations are observed, for preparing the agendas for IOC meetings, for submitting the names of individuals recommended for election, for the management of IOC finances, and for supervising the administrative work of the General Secretariat whose headquarters are located in Lausanne, Switzerland.¹⁰ Where particular or persistent problems arise or when cooperative undertakings demand special expertise, specific Commissions exist, including, for example, Finance, Press and Public Relations, Eligibility, Medical, Olympic Program and Tripartite (consisting of three members of each of the IOC, the IFs and the NOCs, under the chairmanship of the President).¹¹

Finally, as a policy setting body, the IOC requires the assistance of territorial agents, the National Olympic Committees, who in cooperation with the national sport associations, organize and control the representatives of the nation at the Olympic Games and protect and develop the Olympic Movement and amateur sport within their respective geographic locations.¹² The duties of the NOCs include the obligation to resist political or commercial interference and religious or racial discrimination. It is also the NOC which is responsible for assuring and attesting to the amateur status of each competitor. Since 1965, the IOC General Assembly has served as a forum for NOC representatives. The Committee, however, retains its ultimate authority over the composition and actions of each NOC. Specific IOC regulations require that each NOC be comprised of at least five national sport associations affiliated with IOC recognized International Federations; that IOC members resident in the country

be included as voting members on the NOC; and that forfeiture of recognition of a NOC by the IOC for failure to comply with fundamental rules results in the NOC losing its right to send participants to the Olympic Games.¹³ As of 1978, the International Olympic Committee recognized 133 National Olympic Committees, including the Republic of China Olympic Committee (ROCOC) in Taiwan.¹⁴ Although the All-China Sports Federation in Peking had functioned as the Chinese Olympic Committee for over a quarter century, its status as a NOC had not been recognized by the IOC.

The Early Years: 1922-1948

In 1922 the IOC co-opted as its first member from China the President of the Far Eastern Championship Games organization, Wang Zheng-ting (Dr. C. T. Wang) of Shanghai. The son of an Episcopal clergyman, Wang graduated from Yale University in 1910 and returned to China to serve in several government positions. Following service as a special representative to the Versailles Treaty talks and as a negotiator with Japan and Russia, he was named Foreign Minister in 1928 and later Ambassador to the United States.¹⁵ Wang's early involvement as YMCA General Secretary led to his selection to numerous boards and committees, including the China National Amateur Athletic Federation and, in 1932, the Committee for Physical Culture in the Ministry of Education.¹⁶ As the demands of his diplomatic career increased, the IOC saw the need to add a second member from China.

Kong Xiang-xi (H. H. Kung), a lineal descendant of Kongzi (Confucius) of the 75th generation, joined the IOC in 1939. Also educated in the United States, he served in numerous financial and industrial capacities in the Chiang government.¹⁷ Having little formal background experience or apparent involvement with sport, Kong's contribution to the IOC was limited.

The third Chinese member of the IOC was elected in 1947: Dong Shou-yi (Tung Shou-yi). Dong, who was educated at Springfield College, returned to China as a physical culture instructor and sports administrator, eventually rising to the rank of Professor. An able administrator, he was named General Secretary and an Executive Director of the CNAAF (Chinese Olympic Committee) in 1944.¹⁸

Following the defeat of the Chiang government in 1949, the future role and involvement of the three Chinese members of the IOC was in doubt. Kong, who had seldom attended IOC sessions, moved to New York, and by 1955 had ended his contact with the Committee. The 67 year old Wang relocated in Hong Kong and was named an honorary IOC member in 1957, remaining so until his death in 1961.¹⁹ Only Dong stayed in China, moving to Peking and continuing his involvement with both the Chinese Olympic Committee and the IOC. In terms of IOC regulations regarding the status and requirements for membership, he alone met the criteria of maintaining residence in his country and of being in position to carry out his duties as an IOC member (see Rule 13, Appendix B).

Although China first participated at an IOC meeting in 1928 when a representative of the YMCA attended the sessions held at the time of the Amsterdam Games, no athletes were to represent China until the 1932 Los Angeles Games when a single competitor, Liu Chang-chun, participated without distinction.²⁰ In contrast, China's Asian rival Japan sent a team of 131 athletes, including 16 women; a delegation second in size to only that of the host nation.²¹

In preparation for the 1936 Berlin Games authorities contemplated sending a team of 50 athletes consisting of football and basketball teams, and competitors in gymnastics, swimming and track and field.²² The Nationalist government provided \$170,000 of the estimated \$220,000 required to fund the training, selection and travel of the Chinese contingent.²³ This amount appears, however, to have been inadequate as the delegation was required to travel third-class for 17 days at sea. They arrived only two days before the Games began, tired and with little time to recover and make preparations.²⁴ Although contradictory figures exist as to the number of individuals in the delegation, indications are that Chinese athletes participated in cycling, weightlifting, swimming, track and field, football and basketball events.²⁵ The football team was defeated by Great Britain 2-0; the basketball team defeated France 45-38 and lost to Japan 35-19, to Peru 29-21, and to Brazil 32-14.²⁶ China's other entrants competed without distinction which prompted the following reflection in the press:

The failure of China's picked team at this meeting will have at least one good result, whereas one or two lucky victories might well have put quite a false complexion on the real state of things. We know now, at least, that in the grim struggle for existence, it is not luck which prevails in the long run.²⁷

A special commission to study sport and physical culture was also sent to Berlin at this time. Composed of ten provincial and municipal officials, twelve representatives supported by the CNAAF, and seven self-supported individuals, the commission investigated programs in Germany during a four-month period from June to September.²⁸

World War II resulted in cancellation of the Games of the XII and XIII Olympiads scheduled for 1940 and 1944 (see Appendix C). Conflicting figures again exist concerning Chinese participation at the 1948 London Games. While accreditation badges were issued to 56 individuals, including 33 athletes, an analysis of the competitor listing indicates that only 26 Chinese athletes actually participated, again without distinction:²⁹

athletics (men)	3
basketball	10
cycling	1
football	11
swimming (men)	<u>1</u>
	26

Subsequent events were also to limit participation by Chinese athletes in future Olympic Games.

Continuing and Renewing Contacts: 1949-1952

The civil war, which by 1948 had seen the balance shift in favor of Mao's liberation forces, undoubtedly affected the organization and delivery of sports services throughout China. By 1947 the CNAAF had moved its headquarters to Zhongqing and retained regular contact with only 14 of 29 branches.³⁰ Notwithstanding these difficulties, the federation continued to list among its Executive Directors, Wang and Dong (who served concurrently as Secretary General).³¹ The retreat to Taiwan of the Chiang administration in December 1949 led to much confusion regarding the status of both the CNAAF (Chinese Olympic Committee) and the individual IOC members from China. Although there was little contact between the IOC and China immediately following liberation, the National Olympic Committee listed in the official IOC Bulletin (#27 June 1951) was the Chinese Olympic Committee with offices in Nanjing (Nanking).³² One month later, the Bulletin listed the NOC recognized by the IOC as being the Chinese Olympic Committee (Taiwan).³³ IOC Director Monique Berlioux, in an account of this period published several years later, suggested that "in 1951, the Chinese Olympic Committee recognized by Lausanne retreated to Formosa."³⁴ Similar confusion is also to be found in IOC Bulletin #64 which incorrectly stated that "after 1951, this Committee withdrew its archives to Taiwan."³⁵ In reality, if the Committee had indeed withdrawn to Taiwan, this most likely would have occurred in late 1949 or early 1950.

The situation was undoubtedly, in the eyes of the IOC at least, uncertain. Several of the NOC members of the CNAAF had fled to Taiwan with Chiang; some had remained on the mainland; and little was heard from either Peking or Taipei. The new government in Peking had, in fact, moved quickly to ensure continuity in the provision of sport and physical culture services. The CNAAF was reorganized into the All-China Athletic Federation in the first month following the establishment of the People's Republic and, since 1949, has served as the mass organization for sport, including in its duties and mandate the responsibility for the conduct of national and international sports.* Continuing the work of the CNAAF, the ACAF also functions as the Chinese Olympic Committee. In 1952 the government created, at the Ministerial level, the "Tiyu Yundong Weiyuanwei" (Physical Culture and Sport Commission) which is responsible for the overall planning and coordination of physical culture and sport.³⁶

The question of Chinese involvement in the Olympic Movement following these changes first arose at the 1952 IOC meetings in Oslo, Norway when IOC President J. Sigfrid Edstrom met with an attaché from the embassy of the People's Republic in Oslo. Although no official records of the meeting are available, a recollection several years later by IOC Chancellor Otto Mayer suggested that, following a stormy discussion, "Edstrom, in a familiar gesture, hit the table with

*The foreign language translation of "Zhonghua Quanguo Tiyu Zonghui" was changed on July 4, 1964 from All-China Athletic Federation (ACAF) to All-China Sports Federation (ACSF)/La Fédération des Sports de Chine.

his cane . . . and left."³⁷ The position adopted by China was later enunciated by NOC representative Sheng Zhi-pai (Sheng Chih-pai) who stated in a speech:

. . . any other bodies or representatives, including the athletic bodies or representatives of the reactionary clique in Taiwan, can not be regarded as any legitimate representatives of China The National Olympic Committee of China has decided to declare to the International Olympic Committee that we continue to participate in the Olympic organizations. The present seat of the National Olympic Committee is in Peking.³⁸

Sheng went on to declare that China was prepared to send a delegation to the forthcoming Summer Games. In an attempt to clarify the situation, IOC Vice-President Avery Brundage suggested that contact be made with the Chinese members of the IOC and with the international sports federations to determine the status of China's national sports associations in the parent IFs. On April 25, 1952, the international aquatics federation, FINA, approved and recognized the reorganization of the CNAAF into the ACAF and welcomed the "continuing" involvement of the association in Peking. Similar action was taken in June by the football federation, FIFA (see Chapter IV). In response to further requests from the ACAF for recognition from the IOC, the IOC replied on June 21 that "our Rules forbid to have two Committees from the same country."³⁹

In July the issue of 'two Chinas' was raised again at the 47th IOC General Assembly in Helsinki. Edstrom presented the view that:

The National Olympic Committee of Nationalist China (Formosa) is the only Committee recognized by us. On the other hand, the O.C. of Democratic China (Pekin) claims the rights to be the only Committee representing the whole of China.⁴⁰

In the discussion which followed, Brundage stated that:

. . . with regards to Nationalist China (Formosa) it has given no signs of life these last few years but for about two months ago and because of this, the situation (for the Helsinki Games) has become perplexing.⁴¹

Edstrom proposed that either both or neither of the claimants be recognized. The Executive Board opted for the latter action in presenting its recommendation to the Assembly.⁴² Debate on the issue was lengthy and voting on the question confused. The initial balloting was on two items:

- (1) No Chinese teams can participate in the Helsinki Games -- 22 votes.
- (2) The two Chinese teams are authorized to participate in the Games -- 29 votes.⁴³

Thus as the outcome was contrary to that proposed by the Executive Board another polling of the members followed, the Minutes of which highlight the confusion surrounding the issue:

A second round of secret balloting is asked for by the E.C., on the non-participation of the Chinese teams to the Games. This proposal stands in opposition to the one made by Mr. F. Pietri which runs as follows:

"The IOC while reserving its ultimate decision concerning the respective situation of the All-China Athletic Federation and the Chinese National Olympic Committee at Tai-wan, which decision depends principally on a precise determination of the international status of both countries, authorizes the athletes of both organizations to participate, in agreement with the organizing committee of the Games of Helsinki, in those events of the present Games in sports recognized by their International Federation."

Vote: Voting papers delivered and returned: 53
 In favor of F. Pietri's proposal: 33 votes.
 The E.C.'s proposal obtains 20 votes.⁴⁴

Having received a second rejection of its proposal, the Executive Board bowed to the wishes of the Assembly and authorized participation by teams representing both the ACAF and the NOC (Taiwan). Adding to the confusion, Brundage contradicted Edstrom's previous statement that the IOC recognized only the Taiwan committee, when he said:

In order to avoid all misunderstanding, it is necessary to specify that IOC does not recognize any Chinese National Olympic Committee. On the other hand, whilst we are breaking our Rules, we do so, inspired by sympathetic feelings toward the Chinese athletes who are on their way to Helsinki. [No Chinese athletes had, in fact, left for Finland and would not do so for a week.] The IOC authorizes them to participate in the Games of the XVth Olympiad held at Helsinki. This decision must not be misinterpreted, it is not opening a precedent, it is but an exceptional decision.⁴⁵

The difficulty in reaching a decision effectively mitigated against any substantial participation by China in the Games. With the celebrations scheduled to open on July 19, there was little advance planning that could be done as the invitations to the two Chinese organizations were not received until July 18. Five days later, the ACAF accepted and a delegation left by air for Helsinki, arriving on July 29.⁴⁶ The Taiwan committee did not send a delegation.

Due to its late arrival, the 40-member Chinese delegation had little opportunity to participate in official Games events. Contrary to reports which suggest that China did not participate in any events, swimmer Wu Chuan-yu competed in a 100 meter backstroke heat, finishing fifth in 1:12.3.⁴⁷

At a press conference held on July 31, delegation leader Rong Gao-tang (Jung Kao-tang) expressed regret that the team was unable to enter in a greater number of events due to the time constraints and then outlined recent developments in sport in China noting, specifically, that the CNAAF had been reorganized into the All-China Athletic Federation (Chinese Olympic Committee).⁴⁸ IOC member Dong Shou-yi also spoke at the reception and refuted the assertion of a Taiwan representative who claimed to be the 'Acting Chairman of the Chinese Olympic Committee.' Challenging suggestions that he, Dong, had been imprisoned and had died in a concentration camp, the IOC member referred to the Olympic Rules in demanding the cancellation of the memberships of Wang and Kong both of whom now neither resided in China nor were in a position to carry out their duties effectively.⁴⁹

Despite the efforts of the ACAF members the question of participation by the People's Republic in the Olympic Movement remained tenuous in that several international sports federations who met concurrently with the Games were unable to resolve the impasse surrounding China's claims for recognition. ACAF representative Sheng Zhi-pai attended meetings of the basketball, football, swimming and track and field federations gaining but few concessions (see Chapter IV).

On August 1, the Chinese delegation hosted a goodwill reception attended by 100 athletes from 16 countries: Finland, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, the United States, the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, the German Democratic Republic,

Austria, Australia, Canada, Ceylon, Great Britain and New Zealand.⁵⁰ Before returning home, Chinese athletes also competed in several exhibition matches in Finland, Poland and Romania.⁵¹

The IOC Recognizes 'Two Chinas': 1952-1957

Following the Helsinki Games, China continued to press for recognition. At its 48th Session in Mexico on April 20, 1953, the IOC tabled the application of the ACAF for the third straight year citing a lack of information on the organization, its rules and statutes.⁵² At the suggestion of Lord Burghley, the debate was to be resumed the following year in Athens. Prior to the 1954 Session, a letter was sent to the IOC from the Vice-President and General Secretary of the ACAF, Rong Gao-tang, requesting that "the question of continued recognition of the Chinese Olympic Committee [should] be solved satisfactorily without any further delay."⁵³ On May 14, 1954, recognition of the Chinese NOC was approved by a vote of 23:21. Two weeks later, IOC Chancellor Otto Mayer, acknowledging the Chinese request of April 9, officially informed the Chinese Olympic Committee in Peking of the decision reached in Athens and welcomed China into the "Olympic Family."⁵⁴

The vote did not, however, resolve the conflict in that the IOC soon after listed 'two Chinas' on its membership roles:

Chine:

Chinese National Olympic Committee, National Amateur Athletic Federation, Taiwan (China).

Comité Olympique de la République populaire chinoise, Peking.⁵⁵

The strange mixture of French and English in the official IOC records was, perhaps, indicative of the confusion surrounding the issue, especially when the ACAF had sent an English translation of its Constitution and related documents to the IOC.

Although the listing of 'two Chinas' undoubtedly raised protests from both sides no changes were forthcoming from the IOC, and in preparation for the 1956 Olympic Games scheduled for Melbourne, invitations to participate were sent to both Chinese committees. On December 20, 1954, the ACAF accepted their invitation but soon after protested that the invitation to Taiwan was "a gross violation of Olympic rules"⁵⁶ which specified that only one NOC from each country was to be recognized. At the 50th IOC Session the following June in Paris Rong again raised the issue. IOC President Brundage later recalled the incident:

The representative of Democratic and popular China's NOC took the floor to make a declaration 99% political. I had the obligation of answering to make him understand that all political questions were banned from IOC discussions. I excused him for breaking the rules, supposing that he was ignorant of them and I expressed the hope it would never happen again.⁵⁷

In spite of China's growing frustration with the IOC, the ACAF continued to make preparations for the Games. On November 21, 1955, the Taiwan committee, which had previously maintained that it would not compete if the ACAF entered the Games, changed its position and also commenced preparations for sending a delegation to Australia.⁵⁸ ACAF representatives continued to protest the involvement of the Taiwan committee, again only to have the question not reach the floor

on a procedural decision at the 51st Session held in January 1956 in Italy. IOC member Dong repeated China's demands in an article printed on March 18 in Renmin Ribao (People's Daily).⁵⁹

In September, the ACAF announced that athletes were to be chosen to enter several events, including: weightlifting, track and field, swimming, soccer, basketball, gymnastics and marksmanship.⁶⁰ Trials were held in Peking in October resulting in the selection of 92 athletes. Reinforcing the claim that Taiwan was a province, the organizing committee extended invitations to athletes from Taiwan to attend the trials. The invitations offered to cover all expenses and guaranteed free entry and exit to the mainland.⁶¹ The Taiwan committee refused and later asked the IOC to bar athletes from the mainland on the grounds that they were professionals.⁶² On October 22, in response to queries regarding the issue of two separate Chinese teams, Rong cited the fact that in 1948 at the 7th National Athletic Meet (see Chapter I) a team representing 'Taiwan province' had entered and added that the dispute between the two organizations was strictly an internal matter to be solved by the Chinese themselves.⁶³ Rong furthermore protested the reported IOC decision to identify the two Chinese entries as 'Peking-China' and 'Formosa-China.' An editorial in Renmin Ribao echoed similar concerns:

There is every reason to suspect that certain persons of authority on the committee have been influenced or have come under the sway of certain international forces that have been plotting to occupy or split China's territory Taiwan and to involve this international athletic organization in their 'two Chinas' intrigue.

The editorial continued:

The Chiang Kai-shek clique prevented Taiwan athletes from taking part in these selective trials and falsely used the name of the Chinese nation to lodge a 'protest' with the International Olympic Committee. This is utter nonsense. The International Olympic Committee should reject this absurd 'protest' and refrain from interfering in our internal affairs by discussing the question of our selection of athletes.⁶⁴

The leaders of the Chinese delegation left for Melbourne soon after and on November 6 Rong cabled Brundage and other IOC members announcing that China would not participate unless the question of a separate Taiwan team was resolved (see Appendix D).⁶⁵ The IOC's response was to suggest that perhaps an arrangement similar to that concluded in regard to the formation of one team composed of athletes from the 'two Germanys' (a delegation was formed which marched behind a mutually acceptable flag, shared a common emblem and wore similar uniforms) could be made.⁶⁶ Such had been the intent of the Chinese proposal to form a delegation following participation at the selective trials in Peking; the proposal was rejected by the Taiwan committee. Confusion arose at the Games when the flag of each of the Chinese delegations was incorrectly raised when the 'other' team's representatives arrived! Prior to the scheduled arrival of China's athletes and in response to a lack of action by the IOC on the issue of two Chinese teams, the ACSF withdrew from the Games. The IOC responded by expressing "resentment and displeasure at the actions of the Peking committee in repeatedly raising political questions which have no place in International Olympic Committee discussions."⁶⁷

China's Withdrawal From the IOC

The dispute between China and the IOC continued at the 1957 General Assembly meetings in Sophia, Italy when Dong protested that the name of the People's Republic had been incorrectly recorded in the Minutes.⁶⁸ The error, probably a reflection of the Cold War rhetoric of the decade, irritated the Chinese member and was indicative of the IOC's lack of understanding of events and issues in China. The impact of the Cold War on sport was also to manifest itself in the months ahead in connection with the 1960 Winter Games scheduled to be held in Squaw Valley, California. The organizing committee wrestled with the United States government on the question of entry visas for athletes from socialist countries. By September 1957 fingerprinting requirements were lifted and Secretary of State Dulles indicated that Chinese athletes would be subject only to those immigration requirements which would be in effect for all competitors.⁶⁹ The issue became academic, however, when China severed its ties with the IOC and several international sports federations in 1958 over the continuing recognition of 'two Chinas.'

Responding to the planned entry of a delegation from Taiwan at the 3rd Asian Games in Tokyo, ACAF General Secretary Zhang Lian-hua (Chang Lien-hua) announced in March 1958 that China would not participate (see Chapter V). Relations between the IOC and its member from China, Dong Shou-yi, grew worse in the early months of 1958

as seen in the tone of communications between Dong and Brundage.

In a letter to Dong on January 8, Brundage remarked:

You know, and as a matter of fact, everyone knows that there is a separate government in Taiwan, which is recognized internationally and specifically by the United Nations, consisting of most of the governments of the world. We did not create this situation. As a matter of fact, the natives [the Taiwanese] are neither Chinese nor Japanese.⁷⁰

to which Dong replied, in detail, on April 23:

I must point out to you that the natives of Taiwan are Chinese just as you and your fellow countrymen are Americans. More than 90% of the 8 million odd people in Taiwan belong to the Han nationality If, from the fact that a certain number of national minorities reside in Taiwan, you can assert that the natives are not Chinese, then would not we have more reasons to say that the people living in the United States now are not Americans because the Red Indians were the original inhabitants of the American continent? Could you accept this, my dear Mr. President?

Regarding the question of "a separate government in Taiwan," he continued:

It was only under the protection of the US Government which has definite political purposes, that they were able to flee from the mainland to Taiwan. Now they cannot represent anyone but their own shadows. That these traitors are able to survive in Taiwan until today is due to the political, economic and military aid openly given by the US Government and open interference in the internal affairs of our country by the US Government It is because the US Government has persisted in a hostile policy towards our country, compelled other countries by nasty means to follow its policy, and manipulated the so-called 'majority' in the United Nations to turn the United Nations into its virtual voting-machine, that some countries up to now dare not sever relations with [the] Chiang Kai-shek clique entrenched in Taiwan and that the United Nations is still incapable of expelling Chiang's 'delegates' and restoring to our country its rightful place in the United Nations.⁷¹

In concluding, he reiterated the Chinese position that the problem between the two Chinese sports organizations was an internal affair to be solved by the Chinese people and challenged Brundage, saying:

. . . one cannot but feel that you, honorable President, who have always claimed to play 'no politics' and [have] been blaming others for dealing with politics, have evidently fallen into the political whirl-pool of artificially creating 'two Chinese Olympic committees' and has [sic] been unfriendly to my country and the Chinese Olympic Committee. Now it is very obvious that it is you and not we who have introduced political questions into the IOC meetings.⁷²

Following circulation of this lengthy letter to IOC members, Brundage replied on June 1:

The members could not understand how one of their colleagues could be so ignorant of the principles of the Olympic movement. It is better that I say nothing of the insulting tone of your communication.

and, adding to the pejorative tenor of these communications, the President concluded:

Despite your obligations as a member of the International Olympic Committee, on every occasion you have attempted to introduce political questions and if you continue to violate both the letter and the spirit of our rules the only remedy will be to request your resignation.⁷³

The series of bitter exchanges came to an end on August 19 when Dong wrote:

A man like you, who are [sic] staining the Olympic spirit and violating the Olympic charter, has no qualifications whatsoever to be the IOC President. All who are faithful to the Olympic spirit will surely oppose your shameless acts.

I have been a colleague to other members of the IOC for many years. We have jointly made contributions to the international Olympic movement and built up a good friendship among us. I feel painful, however, that the

IOC is today controlled by such an imperialist like you and consequently the Olympic spirit has been grossly trampled upon. To uphold the Olympic spirit and tradition, I hereby declare that I will no longer cooperate with you or have any connections with the IOC while it is under your domination.⁷⁴

At the same time, the ACAF ceased to recognize and formally severed its relations with the IOC, citing several of the points raised by Dong in the previous months (see Appendix E).⁷⁵ Having already withdrawn from the international football federation, FIFA, in June, the ACAF also severed its ties with eight other international federations (see Chapter IV) effectively breaking almost completely with the Olympic Movement.

Press reaction in China predictably supported the decision of the ACAF and noted:

In future, we will continue to exert ourselves to popularize sports activities among the people and will strengthen the ties between the Chinese sports circles and their colleagues in other countries as well as their friendly cooperation with other countries in international sports events. We are firmly convinced that the just stand of the Chinese Olympic Committee will win the support of the fair-minded people in the sports circles of various countries and honest members in the IOC. The Chinese Olympic Committee will work together with our friends in the sports circles of all countries to safeguard the lofty Olympic ideals.⁷⁶

Sportsmen, officials and administrators were also quoted as supporting the ACAF decision and NOC Chairman Ma Yue-han (John Ma) condemned the "dirty manipulation" of Avery Brundage, "his scheme to create 'two Chinas,' and his willingness to serve as a lackey of American imperialism."⁷⁷ Reaction around the world was mixed, often reflecting the Cold War alliances of the era. Several of the prevailing views were

enunciated by the editor of the British publication World Sports when he speculated on some possible reasons for China's withdrawal:

- (1) a snap decision, taken in error, seeking to draw other Eastern bloc countries away from the IOC.
- (2) a calculated move to give China 'breathing space' in order to prepare, in isolation, for a triumphant entry into the Olympics at some future date.
- (3) a decision based on purely political principles, without ulterior motives.⁷⁸

The author went on to suggest that, although the initial first reaction was "Good riddance!", the Chinese withdrawal was a serious rebuff to the IOC and hurt not only the organization but China as well. His solution:

. . . strive hard in continued efforts to educate them firmly and unconditionally in the highest sporting principles. Active steps, not passive wishes, should be made to make them see the light and to restore them to the world of sport on our own terms [emphasis added].⁷⁹

Although the editorial noted the 'tragedy' of China's withdrawal from the major international sports organizations, one need not speculate too deeply on China's reaction to this proposal for it was precisely this approach which involved the imposition of foreign value systems on China, as had been practiced for over a century, that the People's Republic was rebelling against.

The IOC responded to China's withdrawal by issuing a lengthy statement citing its version of the dispute. The document maintained that the pre-war Olympic committee withdrew its archives (records) to Taiwan in 1951 and presented the argument that the Peking committee

had not gained recognition for several years due to the political nature of its representatives (see Appendix F). The statement added:

We do not intend to make public the comments of the letter in which the Committee of the People's Democratic Republic of China made known their decision to disassociate themselves from the Olympic Movement, nor do we propose to publish the text of the communication received from Tung Shou-yi. In view of their tendencious and political nature also their openly defamatory tone towards the President of the International Olympic Committee neither communications are worthy of publication.

The IOC paper ended with a biting "moral conclusion":

Youth of China, the new generation of a people of 600 millions, (who will never be allowed to read these lines), because of the decision of those who control you, it will not be possible for you to meet your comrade athletes from foreign lands, and you are compelled to abstain from taking part in the coming Olympic Games, as was your right, and where you were awaited with open arms. This has come about for political reasons which do not interest the International Olympic Committee.⁸⁰

A Name-Change for the Taiwan Committee

The 'China problem' continued to be debated at the 55th IOC Session in Munich in 1959, albeit without China present. There emerged from the deliberations a consensus that the central issue now focused around the name 'Chinese Olympic Committee' and the geographical area over which the committee had jurisdiction. In response to a Soviet proposal that the recognition of the Taiwan committee be annulled, the American member, Douglas Roby, suggested that the organization be asked to change its name.⁸¹ Following debate on the proposal, the following motion was approved by a vote of 48:7:

The Chinese National Olympic Committee having its seat in Taipei (Taiwan) will be notified by the International Olympic Committee chancellor that it cannot continue to be recognized under that name since it does not control sport in the country of China, and its name will be removed from the official list.

If an application for recognition under a different name is made it will be considered by the International Olympic Committee.⁸²

Reaction to the IOC's decision was noteworthy in three aspects.

First, the response from governments, sports bodies, the media and the public around the world was directly related to the Cold War alliances and polarized attitudes which prevailed and the rhetoric used often reflected, specifically in the United States, paranoia over the perceived 'Red menace.' Second, while Avery Brundage and the IOC were often attacked over this decision, equally did they receive support and encouragement. Third, support for the IOC stand did not necessarily mean support for the People's Republic, as many who expressed a pro-Brundage position did so while still retaining their anti-Communist, anti-China feelings. Although the sequence of events following the announcement by the IOC was relatively unimportant in the final outcome, a review of the actions and responses generated by the IOC decision provides useful insight into the problems encountered by the IOC and to the interrelated nature of sport and politics in the 1950s. For the ACAF, which had withdrawn from the IOC, the question of a name-change for the Taiwan committee was of peripheral, although significant, concern at this stage of China-IOC relations.

The IOC decision was immediately interpreted by many as having been an expulsion of Taiwan and drew criticism from several quarters. Leading the attack was the Committee of One Million (see Chapter II). On June 2, 1959, Committee Secretary Marvin Liebman sent a letter to 'friends' of the organization urging their immediate protest to the IOC, the United States Olympic Committee and members of the Senate and Congress. Liebman suggested that the IOC's action:

. . . set(s) a milestone in international hypocrisy and, if permitted to stay in effect, would once and for all make valueless the spirit and meaning of the International Olympic Games. To expel Free China, a nation which has always fulfilled its international responsibilities, in order to appease Red China which is considered by most of the world an international gangster is beyond understanding.⁸³

Anonymous letters from 'An American Sports Fan' and 'A. Bostonian' to the IOC President displayed the extreme reaction encouraged by the Committee of One Million:

Invite our leaders . . . who parade the 'Anti-Christ' throughout our land and wine and dine the 'Devil' beyond that reserved for Kings while our boys suffer and starve in Red dungeons. Invite the traitors in our midst who have helped us to build up the 'Anti-Christ' to the Monster he now is, nourishing him at every whim and shrinking in fear at his every sham.

Lastly, fly the American Flag at Half-Mast for today Honor, Loyalty and Tradition are Dead. We've lost the will to fight for what is right and we are spiritually rotting while being led by the Ghouls toward our gutless end.⁸⁴

The response from government leaders, officials and civil servants was, while not as paranoic, equally critical. The State Department in Washington expressed regret at the IOC's action and suggested that such a political decision was totally inconsistent with the non-political traditions of the IOC.⁸⁵ President Eisenhower

expressed the opinion that "the Olympic Committee has gotten into politics rather than merely into international athletics"⁸⁶ and Republican Representative Francis E. Dorn of Brooklyn called on the US Olympic Committee to withdraw from the Games. On June 2, he submitted the following resolution concurrently to the House and Senate:

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That it is the sense of the Congress that the expulsion of the Republic of China from the International Olympic Committee should be cancelled forthwith; that the Republic of China should be permitted to retain its membership on the International Olympic Committee; and that the Red Chinese should not be permitted to hold membership on such committee.

SEC. 2. It is further the sense of the Congress that representatives of the United States should not participate in the Olympic games if representatives of the Republic of China are denied the opportunity to participate in such games.⁸⁷

Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson was quoted as having said that the IOC decision was the result of the Russians working on Brundage and having "beat his brains out."⁸⁸ Stemming from this rhetoric was a proposal in the House of Representatives to prohibit the use of Army personnel and equipment at the 1960 Winter Games, if athletes from any 'free nation' were banned.⁸⁹ Wisconsin Republican Melvin Laird also recommended that restrictions be placed on the \$400,000 Army appropriation and the American Legion took steps to cut off its contribution to the Olympic fund.⁹⁰

American sports governing bodies were also critical of the IOC decision. IOC member Roby led the attack in claiming that the vote was 28:24, far from the almost unanimous figures cited by the

Committee.⁹¹ The USOC, fearing further backlash and anticipating problems in fund raising to support the American entry in the upcoming Games, issued a statement in late July urging the IOC "to recognize the Nationalist Chinese under their rightful name--the Republic of China Olympic Committee."⁹² This action followed the cabling to IOC members and the international sports federations of a resolution from the AAU which stated:

WHEREAS, the International Olympic Committee at its last meeting in Munich summarily and without proper reason withdrew recognition of Nationalist China and thereby excluded it as a participant in the Olympic Games.

WHEREAS, at a meeting of the Executive and Foreign Relations Committees of the Amateur Athletic Union of the United States of America, held at Boulder, Colorado this nineteenth day of June, all facts leading to this expulsion were reviewed and carefully considered.

BE IT RESOLVED, that the action of the International Olympic Committee in this regard be condemned, and that the Amateur Athletic Union of the United States of America demands that the International Olympic Committee rescind immediately its unjustified action against Nationalist China.⁹³

Prior to sending this message, the AAU had heard a report from an IOC member on the Munich Session.

In addition to these critical comments from government and sports officials, the media reported the feelings of the public and presented its own editorial viewpoint on several occasions. The New York Times urged action saying, "If there is a spark of courage left in our Olympic representatives they will make it clear that this bit of international chicanery was abhorrent, and not maintain their timorous silence."⁹⁴ In a lengthy article, UPI correspondent Peter

Uebersax questioned the structure and procedures of the IOC, noting that voting was usually by show of hands and that any doubts were clarified after-the-fact by publishing the results in Congress Minutes.⁹⁵ Other reports equated the Munich vote with the sellout which paved the way for Hitler's rise to power prior to World War II.⁹⁶ Sports Illustrated magazine accused Brundage of reaching a political decision where diplomats had been unsuccessful for several years and suggested that the IOC adopt the policy of admitting both Chinese committees allowing them to use whatever names they chose. The editorial also recommended that the IOC remain aloof from political squabbles, as it had done at the 1932 [sic] Berlin Games.⁹⁷

Thus, reactions from both government and private sources were swift, usually scathing, seldom unemotional, and often irrational. It was not without reason, then, that support for Brundage and the IOC could be expected. What was surprising, considering the intensity of feelings in the United States on the issue of relations with China, was the number of statements of support received and the diversity of backgrounds and the status of individuals and groups providing this support. As noted previously, however, support for the IOC decision could not be construed as being in support of the Chinese position that the matter was an internal one to be decided by the Chinese alone, but rather that individuals merely saw the IOC as acknowledging the reality of two separate sports organizations each claiming jurisdiction over the entire Chinese territory. (The issue becomes debatable at

this point, as neither of the two Chinese groups would ascribe to this interpretation since both claimed to legitimately represent the entire Chinese nation.)

Nevertheless, there did emerge from each of these groups, government, sports bodies, the media and the public, support for Brundage and the IOC. The first to respond to the attacks being directed at the IOC was Avery Brundage himself. Returning to IOC headquarters in Lausanne following a brief vacation, the President rejected charges that the Committee had bowed to Soviet pressure and cited the precedent established in 1958 at the Asian Games where the Taiwan delegation, after having been informed that it could not enter claiming to represent China, altered its name and participated.⁹⁸ On his return to Chicago, and in response to the charge that the Nationalists had been expelled, Brundage declared:

We didn't expel Nationalist China. We didn't take in Red China. The committee's action was solely to identify properly those athletes who would compete under the control of the Olympic Committee on Taiwan (Formosa).

It confirmed the stand, taken by the International Amateur Athletic Federation in 1954, that Nationalist China cannot represent that it controls sport on the Chinese mainland.⁹⁹

Brundage later noted that the IOC position had been "fantastically distorted, misunderstood and misrepresented--particularly in the United States, where some ridiculous statements have been published."¹⁰⁰ Again citing the IOC's avowed disinterest in political questions, he wrote, in the Christian Science Monitor:

Never has a subject been more garbled, and one wonders what was behind the widespread circulation of misinformation, much of which plays into the hands of the Communists.

We did not 'oust' the Formosa Chinese; we merely asked them to submit a name more in accord with the facts (we are concerned only with sport not with politics and must recognize facts, not claims). We did not recognize the Communist Chinese (as a matter of fact they dropped out because we refused to recognize their claim to Taiwan) and there was no Communist pressure. Our critics are wrong on all three counts [emphasis added].¹⁰¹

He also stated that the IOC "cannot recognize a Chinese Committee in Taiwan any more than we could recognize an Italian Committee in Sicily or a Canadian Committee in Newfoundland."¹⁰²

The President replied not only to the general attacks being made against the IOC, but also to those criticisms directed at him personally. To the editor of Sports Illustrated, he wrote:

As a sport magazine you will surely not hesitate follow your own prescription. From SPORTS ILLUSTRATED issue of August 3, 1959 - "As Confucius say, 'A man who has committed a mistake and does not correct it is committing another mistake'."¹⁰³

Clearly Brundage expected the magazine to correct its mistake and retract its statements of condemnation. Also, from Brundage to Senator Warren Austin, Honorary Chairman of the Committee of One Million:

It is unfortunate that your Committee did not ascertain the facts before mailing its circular letter of June 3, signed by Marvin Liebman. Contained therein are certain statements which are not true. As a result, you have done the Olympic Movement in the United States grave damage. Moreover, many of the proposals that have been made, as a result of your letter, would play right into the hands of the enemies of this country. Also, it is not improbable that you have damaged your own case, judging from the reaction in some quarters. . . .¹⁰⁴

In an attempt to clarify further the IOC's position, Brundage also sent a statement to all IOC members, the NOCs and the IFs. His interpretation of the history underlying the problem was outlined as follows:

After the war the Chinese National Olympic Committee which had been in Nanking moved to Taipei. In due time another Olympic Committee was organized in Peking and after some delay was recognized by the International Olympic Committee, which has as one of its fundamental principles "No discrimination is allowed against any country or person on grounds of race, religion or politics." After its recognition this Peking Olympic Committee made repeated demands for jurisdiction over sport in Taiwan. This was always firmly denied by the International Olympic Committee, because this Peking Committee could not possibly exert any authority over sport in Taiwan at this time. As a result the Peking Olympic Committee refused to participate in the 1956 Olympic Games at Melbourne and finally last year withdrew entirely from the Olympic Movement and from the International Sport Federations.¹⁰⁵

Brundage received the support of several sports bodies, including the International Amateur Athletic Federation. A statement issued on June 25 by Lord Burghley, President of the Federation and an IOC Vice-President, noted that the body had, in 1954, recognized the track and field association in Peking as legitimately and effectively controlling and administering the sport in China and had required that the Taiwan association be affiliated as 'Taiwan' and not 'Taiwan China.'¹⁰⁶ United States Olympic Association Counsellor John T. McGovern attacked as "brutal, inaccurate and designed to mislead the public" the New York Times editorial of June 2.¹⁰⁷ John D. Norton, President of the United States Olympians, an association of former Olympic athletes which included Jesse Owens and John B. Kelly, supported Brundage and in a critical rebuff to Sports

Illustrated chided the magazine for publishing two caricatures of Brundage which were described as "a disgrace . . . (and) an affront to the members of our Olympian Association."¹⁰⁸ Norton went on to suggest:

To so lampoon and hold up for public ridicule a man who has dedicated the greater part of his life fighting for, and upholding the basic principles and ideals of amateur sportsmanship, and by so doing has preserved the integrity of the Olympics, is to say the least, a very careless appraisal of the facts.¹⁰⁹

For as many detractors and critics as he had, so too did Brundage have backers.

While the China Lobby effectively mobilized support from selected sectors of the American government, not all Senate and Congressional representatives were critical of the IOC's decision regarding Taiwan. Democratic Senator Thomas J. Hennings of Missouri, citing his previous experience as an athlete, supported the IOC and noted that the Taiwan committee had not been expelled. Hennings felt that although political issues were at the root of the controversy, the IOC had not been guilty of introducing politics into the affair. Regarding the question of the Defense Department appropriation, he noted that only the Taiwan committee had been invited to the Winter Games and thus there was little need to discuss withholding the \$400,000 allocation. Summarizing his feelings, Hennings remarked to the Senate:

The entire question boils down to international bickering over which committee controls what, even though the entire world knows full well that the Red Chinese control nothing on the island of Formosa and the Nationalist

Chinese control nothing on the mainland. It is a question of names, and I wonder just what Chinese athletes think of this bickering, obviously originated and sustained by some fat bureaucrats whose sole athletic efforts consist of revolving their swivel chairs.¹¹⁰

Additional support was forthcoming from the California Federation of Young Democrats. Research Committee Chairman Marshall Windmiller encouraged the IOC to sustain its action in light of the attacks being mounted by the Committee of One Million. He noted that the IOC was attempting to remain aloof from political issues, but added that since the Liebman forces were attempting to exert political pressure it did not seem inappropriate to make some effort to counteract these challenges.¹¹¹ Oregon Congressman Charles O. Porter also wrote to Brundage enclosing a copy of the Liebman letter and requested a reply from the President so that he might "have some idea of what actually did happen in connection with Red China."¹¹² A reflection of the Cold War era was the fact that seldom, if ever, even among those not identified with the extreme political right, was China correctly referred to as the People's Republic.

Brundage and the IOC also received encouragement from influential Americans, the media and the general public. Individuals who replied to the Liebman circular included the noted legal expert, Quincy Wright;¹¹³ the Field Secretary of the Board of World Peace of the Methodist Church, Carl Soule;¹¹⁴ and an author who had spent

four years in a Chinese prison shortly after liberation, Allyn Rickett.

The latter writer felt

. . . strongly that it would be a crime to deprive the 600 million odd Chinese on the mainland of their right to compete in the Olympic Games simply to preserve the political fiction that the Kuomintang Government on Taiwan represents China.¹¹⁵

Several other individuals corresponded directly with the IOC President, while some expressed their disagreement with Committee of One Million's letter by writing to Liebman.¹¹⁶ In addition to supporting the IOC's stand on politics and sport, these writers often added comments on the world situation, nuclear disarmament and the American education system.¹¹⁷ As he did with his critics, almost without fail Brundage replied personally to each piece of correspondence which offered support.

As the weeks passed in the summer of 1959, the media came more and more to agree with the initial stand adopted by the IOC. Although the harshest critics continued to flay Brundage, several columnists began to point out the irrational nature of the government's response. Writing in the New York Herald Tribune, Red Smith, referring to Brundage's handling of the issue, remarked: "He is dead right, a weird thing to say about Slavery Avery."¹¹⁸ Another columnist bemoaned the growing tendency to "frighten us into action by rattling the Communist Russian skeleton over our bedsteads" and quoted a letter from General Douglas MacArthur on behalf of the 1960 Olympic Businessman's Committee which encouraged the perpetuation of this tactic:

You've repeatedly read of the determined and unrelenting efforts of Soviet Russia to defeat the United States in all sports in the 1960 Olympic Games. We believe you will want to join with us right now to prepare to repel this threat. . . .¹¹⁹

Noting that the issue before the IOC was "exceedingly simple" (identifying who controlled sport in China) but that "the decision required courage, integrity and a sense of justice"¹²⁰ the Illustrated Weekly of India joined the growing ranks of IOC backers in late June, while the Times of India suggested that it was ironic that the US State Department would accuse the IOC of taking a political stand in the matter.¹²¹ Another paper characterized as too strong "the old legacy of 'see no China, hear no China, speak no China--except Chiang',"¹²² while the Miami News suggested that sooner or later American foreign policy would have to catch up with reality and recognize the legitimate existence of the People's Republic, although it stopped short in being in favor of seating China in the United Nations.¹²³ Representative of the general opinion that sport and politics should remain separate was the following editorial in the Guardian of London which, rather than being critical of the IOC, directed its attack against the US government:

Question: When are politics non-political?

Answer: When they happen to be your own. It is always the other fellow who defiles the purity of your organization by being partisan. . . . What is perplexing to those who are not Americans is the innocent conviction that it is not political to be loyal to your ally, but it is political to admit that a committee in Formosa cannot send any athletes from the mainland. . . . the State Department has largely itself to blame for making it a political instead of merely a sporting issue.¹²⁴

Echoing these sentiments, Red Smith posed a similar question:

Yet suppose the positions in Asia were exactly reversed. Suppose the Communist government had been chased to Formosa and the Nationalists held the mainland. Would it then be political discrimination if the IOC recognized Nationalist China and insisted that the Commies could represent only Formosa? The State Department . . . wouldn't think so, for we never call a decision discriminatory when it favors our side.¹²⁵

The extent to which these public expressions of either condemnation or support for the IOC and Avery Brundage affected the organization is difficult to assess. The deliberations of the IOC, although seldom recorded and only occasionally made public, do provide some indication of the nature of the potential problems generated by the IOC decision to require a name-change by the Taiwan committee.

In addition to the several statements released to the press by Brundage, the IOC polled the International Federations on China's membership status;¹²⁶ produced a statement for release by the Squaw Valley Organizing Committee;¹²⁷ and informed its members in August, through Chancellor Otto Mayer, that the Executive Board was discussing the problem of "Formosa - China" and requested that members "not negotiate with politicians, even on the Ambassador level, on this subject, as it already happened."¹²⁸ Brundage himself was subpoenaed to appear before the Senate Internal Security Committee on July 15, although the investigation was dropped at the last minute when it appeared that adverse publicity would result, thus possibly harming the scheduled Winter Games. At the urging of Senator Hennings and Vice-President Nixon's former chief assistant, Bob King, the hearings

failed to convene because Brundage was reportedly prepared to embarrass the Senate by systematically refuting the allegations prepared against the IOC.¹²⁹

In spite of attempting to separate the name issue from political considerations, Brundage met with a Nationalist Chinese diplomat in Lausanne in mid-June to discuss the problem, prior to which the President and the Chancellor had been accused by a spokesman for the Nationalist NOC of finding it "sporting to dabble in political semantics but nothing can alter the fact that we are Chinese."¹³⁰ Later, following Brundage's statement of support for the recognition of the Taiwan committee, he received a letter of thanks from the Secretary General which cited the committee's "rightful name--the Republic of China Olympic Committee."¹³¹ Adding to the dilemma, on July 8, 1959, Brundage received a letter from Frank S. Lim, Chairman of the Formosan Olympic Committee. Speaking on behalf of the Tokyo-based organization, Lim requested that his group, eight million strong, be recognized as the true representatives of the Formosan people.¹³² There is little to indicate, however, that the IOC took the claims of this Formosan independence organization seriously and one can only speculate as to the reaction of IOC members when confronted by yet a third claimant in the dispute for recognition!

The publicity generated by the dispute resulted in concern being expressed by 1960 Winter Games officials. Following a discussion

with Brundage, Prentis C. Hale of the Games Organizing Committee issued a two-point statement intended to clarify the situation:

- (1) The Olympic Committee of the Republic of China (Nationalist China) has been invited to participate in the Squaw Valley Games by the VIII Olympic Winter Games Organizing Committee; the Republic of China's Olympic Committee has accepted and will have an opportunity to appear.
- (2) The Olympic Committee of the Chinese Democratic Republic (Red China) was not recognized by the I.O.C. at the time the Organizing Committee issued its invitations to participate; it is not recognized by the I.O.C. at present and it will not be permitted to participate in the 1960 Winter Games.¹³³

The response from the committee in Peking to these developments was, of course, not transmitted directly to the IOC since the ACSF had withdrawn some 18 months previous. Nevertheless, news releases from the Chinese capital continued to attack Brundage as "rendering service to the U.S. political scheme to create 'two Chinas'."¹³⁴ Notwithstanding the controversy in which the IOC found itself, the Winter Games took place without incident in February as athletes from neither of the two Chinese organizations competed. The issue, if not resolved, was temporarily in hibernation.

The question of the recognition and designation of a name for the Taiwan committee blossomed again in the spring and summer of 1960 at the IOC meetings in California and Italy. Following a decision made in San Francisco to permit entries from the Olympic Committee of the Republic of China, the IOC Executive Board recommended that, for the coming Games in August, the team be designated as "TAIWAN."¹³⁵

This change caused concern amongst the Rome Organizing Committee which issued the following statement:

The Organizing Committee of the Olympic Games in Rome received from the International Olympic Committee a list of the Olympic Committees to whom it should send an invitation, and in this list the country you propose to call TAIWAN or FORMOSA figured as National Republic of China. Meanwhile, the International Olympic Committee had taken decisions which invalidate this appellation. Our Organizing Committee maintains that the decision in question can only be effective in the future: the athletes and participants of the National Republic of China came to Rome as guests under this designation. It is very difficult for us to change this name. At all events, we shall leave it to the International Olympic Committee to take the final decision with the consequence and eventual repercussions it may bring.¹³⁶

In a direct act of political interference, U.S. Deputy Under-Secretary of State Raymond A. Hare wrote to Brundage:

This Government would view with regret any apparent association of the International Olympic Movement with steps derogatory to the Republic of China. Because of the deep concern of the Department of State, I am writing to you in your capacity as President of the International Olympic Committee in the hope that you will use your influence to the end that the Chinese athletes may without further question, parade, compete, and participate in all functions and events of the forthcoming Rome Games under their name of the Olympic Committee of the Republic of China.¹³⁷

Shortly afterward, Brundage sent a letter to IOC members, NOCs and the IFs in which he again referred to the continuing misinformation being circulated and presented the following explanation of the IOC's position regarding the recognition of governments and geographical areas:

Governments are sometimes recognized by parts of the world but not by all of it, thus raising political questions. The International Olympic Committee does not deal with Governments and does not propose to become involved in political controversies. Its Executive Board has therefore recommended that its rules indicate more clearly that Olympic Committees present the geographical areas in which they operate, about which there can be no dispute, and not Governments.¹³⁸

In what was thought to be the final motion on the matter, passed 35:16 with 2 spoiled ballots, the decision was announced that:

According to the resolution taken by the International Olympic Committee at its Munich Session in 1959, the contingent of athletes coming from TAIWAN will participate in the parade at the Opening Ceremony and in the events under the name of the 'territory' where its Olympic Committee controls Olympic sports, namely TAIWAN. Due note is taken of the fact that the name of the Olympic Committee of TAIWAN which is essentially an internal concern, shall be called in future: Olympic Committee of the Republic of China.¹³⁹

The Nationalist delegation competed in the Games "under protest" at being assigned the designation "Formosa" as a spokesman maintained that the team represented all of China.¹⁴⁰ In 1963, the IOC passed a motion permitting the team to wear the insignia ROC (Republic of China) on their uniforms for the 1964 Tokyo Summer Games.¹⁴¹ This action drew the criticism of the ACAF in Peking which accused the IOC of adopting "a refurbished version of the U.S. imperialist scheme to create 'two Chinas'"¹⁴² by now supporting the concept of 'one China, one Taiwan.' The Tokyo Games were noteworthy in the history of the triangular relations between China, Taiwan and the IOC. Two members of the ROC, citing personal family reasons, defected in Tokyo and returned to China to a warm reception from former IOC member Dong Shou-yi and officials of the recently renamed

All-China Sports Federation (Chinese Olympic Committee).¹⁴³ ROC officials protested to the Japanese, but were unsuccessful in preventing the return to China of the two team members.¹⁴⁴

In November 1965, Avery Brundage visited with officials in Taiwan to discuss the name question. In an "aide memoire" to the President, the ROC outlined its position for wishing to be identified as the Republic of China, but conceded that it would be willing to accept the designation "China (Taiwan)" but not "Taiwan, China" or "China, Taiwan."¹⁴⁵ On November 16, a letter was sent from Taiwan to IOC member H. Weir of Australia which indicated that Brundage felt Weir to be the most appropriate member to present the issue at the next IOC Session scheduled for Rome in April 1966.¹⁴⁶ Weir's motion to designate the ROC team as "China (Taiwan) and, if in future the People's Republic of China should rejoin the Olympic Movement, it should be called 'China'" was defeated 30:26 at the 64th Session.¹⁴⁷ The motion raised speculation that the ACSF was about to re-enter the Games. This was soon denied by authorities in Peking who, citing the discussions taking place in government circles in the United States (see Chapter II), accused the IOC of pursuing a policy of "containing but not isolating China."¹⁴⁸ An article in China Sports reaffirmed the determination of the Chinese Olympic Committee to resist any attempted compromise on the question of recognition:

. . . the IOC has constantly carried on a hostile and reactionary policy towards the Chinese people. In recent years its methods have become more and more venomous. Now it would suddenly have it that it had changed its reactionary policy and "opening the door wide" to China and welcoming China's "return" to the IOC. This is impossible!¹⁴⁹

Soon afterwards, China entered the period of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and limited its contact with the outside world.

In 1968, Brundage wrote to the ROCOC stating:

I herewith have the pleasure to inform you that the I.O.C., during its 67th Session in Mexico City, has decided that your Olympic Committee will be named "Republic of China Olympic Committee," and will be listed under "China R.O." effective November 1, 1968.¹⁵⁰

After several years of confusion, the change was approved (32:10) with little discussion.

New Chinese Initiatives: the 1970s

The spring of 1969 saw the Cultural Revolution enter a new phase and as foreign observers speculated on its impact and influence on sport, China prepared to receive and send abroad athletic delegations once again. In commemoration of the 18th anniversary of the publication of Mao Zedong's directive, issued June 10, 1952, "Promote Physical Culture, Build Up the People's Health," a series of exhibitions was held throughout China in 1970. In addition to performances of gymnastics, table tennis, basketball and swimming, a new sporting philosophy was unveiled which emphasized, in dialectical terms, learning from others and striving for excellence. The world was soon to experience this new wisdom of the East: "Friendship First, Competition Second." On June 6 a table tennis delegation travelled to Nepal, in July a high jump of record calibre was achieved in Peking, and on August 13 a table tennis delegation from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) arrived in the Chinese

capital.¹⁵¹ The following spring China participated at the 31st World Table Tennis Championships in Nagoya, Japan, and later hosted teams from Canada, Colombia, England, Nigeria and the United States ushering in what was dubbed by the western press, the era of "ping pong diplomacy."¹⁵²

Meanwhile, at the 69th IOC Session in Amsterdam Avery Brundage presented the name of Xu Heng (Henry Hsu) to the Executive Board for consideration as an IOC member. According to Monique Berlioux, the Board

. . . performed its traditional role of vetting--and rejected Hsu, not on any ground of personal integrity but in the belief that his election would do damage to the attempt to bring mainland China back to the (Olympic) Movement. Contrary to the unwritten Rule to elect only those people approved by the Executive Board, Brundage put forward Hsu's name to the Assembly and he was accepted.¹⁵³

The new IOC member had been an active supporter and officer of several sports organizations in Hong Kong while maintaining extensive business contacts in both the British Crown Colony and Taiwan.¹⁵⁴ In addition, Henry Hsu was the President of the Republic of China Olympic Committee in Taiwan.¹⁵⁵

At the same Amsterdam Session a bid from the city of Montreal to host the 1976 Olympics was accepted. In support of the application, Mitchell Sharp, Secretary of State for External Affairs, remarked:

I would like to assure you that all parties representing the National Olympic Committees and international sport federations recognized by the IOC will be free to enter Canada pursuant to the normal regulations.¹⁵⁶

In September 1971, at the 71st IOC Session in Luxemborg, Reginald Alexander, IOC member from Kenya, raised the question of China's membership and received the response that the IOC was ready to welcome all NOCs whose statutes conformed to IOC rules.¹⁵⁷ In November, following China's admission to the United Nations, Brundage was interviewed on Finnish radio:

Mr. Brundage, according to some press reports, you have stated previously that the People's Republic of China would not be--perhaps--welcome to the Olympic Games. Is this really your opinion, especially now that mainland China has become a fullfledged [member], and [the] only representative of the Chinese people in the United Nations?

To which the IOC President replied:

No, no, no, no. I've never made such a statement. I've said that the objective of the Olympic movement is to unite the youth of the world, and all countries are welcome, including the People's Republic of China--with the proviso that they must agree to follow the Olympic code and to abide by the Olympic rules and regulations.¹⁵⁸

Regarding the possibility of China's re-entry to the Olympic Movement and participation at the 1972 Munich Games, Brundage continued:

I do not know whether they will be able to compete in the Munich Games because they have to reapply for membership, and they have to agree to comply with Olympic rules and regulations. The National Olympic Committee of Taiwan is recognised and will be eligible to compete, it has followed Olympic rules and regulations and is eligible and will undoubtedly compete. So, if the PRC National Olympic Committee adheres to its stand that it will not compete if Taiwan competes, I don't think they will be there.¹⁵⁹

On August 1, the ACSF received a message from Willi Daume, President of the Games Organizing Committee, inviting China to send an observer delegation to Munich. Song Zhong (Sung Chung), Secretary-General of the Federation replied on August 22, thanking Daume for

his invitation but noted that because of the continued presence of the ROCOC in the IOC, no observers would attend.¹⁶⁰ The ROCOC sent a delegation of 34 athletes, 42 officials and 7 observers to the Games in Germany.¹⁶¹

The Munich Session was particularly noteworthy in the history of both China-IOC relations and the Olympic Movement in general. Following 20 years of service as President, Avery Brundage stepped down and was succeeded by the Irishman Michael Morris, third Baron of Killanin. A riding, boxing and rowing enthusiast, 58 year old Lord Killanin had served as President of the Olympic Council of Ireland prior to being elected to IOC membership in 1952. Elected Chief of Protocol in 1966 and 1967, the new President had also served as head of the Commission for Press and Public Relations, as a member of the Executive Board, and as IOC Vice-President since 1968.¹⁶² Killanin's cautious reply when queried on the issue of China's admission differed little from that of his predecessor, although he did suggest that the question was open and that "no doubt further information will be received."¹⁶³

In his final speech as President, Brundage reviewed the turbulent years which marked his tenure and, remaining true to his idealistic belief in the value of the Olympic Movement and in the private nature of the Games, remarked "No one is required to, and no one has the right to, participate. This is a privilege confined to those who comply with the Olympic Code."¹⁶⁴

Under the direction of its new chief executive officer, the IOC convened the 10th Olympic Congress in 1973 in Varna, Bulgaria. The intent of the Congress, the first held in 43 years, was to receive proposals and deliberate on the future of the Olympic Movement. Questions of protocol, membership, award ceremonies, increasing costs, the size of the Games, and political issues punctuated the agenda of one of the few IOC sponsored meetings relatively open to non-members and the media.¹⁶⁵ In his closing address, Killanin remarked

We have had no application from the People's Republic of China for admission to the Olympic Movement. As soon as there is an Olympic Committee formed there we will face that issue, but, gentlemen, I would like to point out that I personally do not think it is the task of one Olympic Committee to take upon itself to write around asking to recommend the suspension of another Olympic Committee, however well intended that may be [emphasis added]. We all want China but it must come in under the proper rules. If there are problems we will face them round a table and not by pressure.¹⁶⁶

Killanin's displeasure was directed at the growing number of committees, including Japan and Iran, who pressed for recognition of the ACSF and the expulsion of the ROCOC.¹⁶⁷ In January 1974, the President met with representatives of the ACSF at the 2nd African Games in Lagos, Nigeria, although no substantial progress was to accrue from the discussions.¹⁶⁸

The question of China's re-entry into the Games remained uncertain in yet another regard. Without first being recognized by the appropriate international sports federations, China would be unable to send competitors to the Olympic Games even if its NOC was recognized by the IOC. Furthermore, recognition by the IOC could not occur until China first had a NOC composed of five internationally recognized

sports federations (see Rule 24, Appendix B). The situation undoubtedly posed a problem for the ACSF similar to the dilemma of the cart-before-the-horse or the question of which came first, the chicken or the egg. Notwithstanding these difficulties, China refused to compromise its position of opposing any attempted recognition of 'two Chinas' by any of the international federations. The Volleyball Association of the People's Republic withdrew from the IVBF on October 27, 1970 and similar action was taken by China's archery and lawn tennis associations in March 1971 (see Chapter IV). It was not until 1973 that China obtained the required number of international affiliations to pursue in earnest its claims for recognition in the IOC.

During this period China was also granted membership in the Asian Games Federation (see Chapter V). The expulsion of the ROC and the recognition of the ACSF as the sole representative of China caused concern within the IOC regarding its possible sanctioning of the Games. After deliberating on the question, the IOC decided "unanimously that in the interests of the development of sport in Asia"¹⁶⁹ that it would give its recognition and patronage to the AGF.

The Iranian Proposal: 1975

The question of China's IOC membership gained prominence in 1975 when, on April 9, the ACSF made a formal application for recognition as "the sole sports organization representing the whole

of China in the IOC."¹⁷⁰ An 11-nation joint proposal supporting the Chinese position was also submitted to the IOC by Algeria, Iran, Romania, Tanzania, Senegal, Albania, the DPR of Korea, Pakistan, Japan, Kuwait and the Congo.¹⁷¹ Backing from the Asian Games Federation and Abraham Ordia, President of the Supreme Council for Sports in Africa, was also forthcoming.¹⁷² The spring of 1975 also saw another event rock the Olympic Movement.

On May 8, 1975, the former Olympic decathlon athlete who became in turn, Vice-President of the IAAF, member of the Board of the International Handball Federation, President of the AAU, President of the USOC, IOC member and then President, Avery Brundage, died at the age of 87. The man who had been called 'Slavery Avery, Avery Bondage, Mr. Misery and Old Ironsides,' and who had once successfully sued a French magazine for one franc symbolic damages for libel, was eulogized by his successor, Lord Killanin:

He was an idealist to whom Olympism was a religion. He never wavered from his deep conviction that the Olympic Movement could be the greatest social force in the world. He never ceased in his efforts to try to keep sports above political intrigues.¹⁷³

In an unrelated but eventually significant example of "political intrigue," Acting Canadian Prime Minister Mitchell Sharp had remarked in the House of Commons in Ottawa on April 23, in response to a question as to whether or not the government would support the participation of both Chinese committees at the 1976 Summer Games, that "these decisions have to be made by the International Olympic Committee. We are the host for the Olympic games but we do not

decide who participates."¹⁷⁴ Two months later the issue was raised again, this time as to whether or not the Chinese embassy had approached Canada to support its application for recognition in the IOC and for the expulsion of the Taiwan committee, to which then Secretary of State for External Affairs Allan MacEachen replied:

I have had no consultation on this point with the embassy at all. I understand the matter of membership is entirely within the jurisdiction of the International Olympic Committee. My understanding is that the application that has been made is under review and has not been finally dealt with by the International Olympic Committee.¹⁷⁵

Meanwhile, at IOC meetings in Rome in May, representatives from nine nations, Iran, Albania, Iraq, Morocco, Ethiopia, Somali, Zambia, Yugoslavia and Japan, spoke in favor of admitting China and, concurrently, expelling the ROCOC.¹⁷⁶ Later, a formal request was presented to the IOC by the Iranian NOC, which cited the fact that China had been recognized by the AGF in November 1973 and had participated in the international symposium held under the auspices of the IOC's Olympic Solidarity Committee. A statement issued to the press by the Iranian representative reviewed the history of the China-IOC dispute and concluded:

. . . the Iranian National Olympic Committee respectfully believes that it is now time for this muddled and illogical situation to be clarified, and for the I.O.C. to recognize that the All-China Sports Federation (Chinese Olympic Committee) is the official representative of China, as was decided at the 49th Session of the I.O.C. in Athens in 1954.¹⁷⁷

In his speech on the matter, IOC member from Taiwan, Henry Hsu, dwelt on two aspects. First, in regard to the ACSF application,

he was in favor of admitting China provided that it met the provisions of the Olympic Rules. Second, on the question of the ACSF demand that the ROCOC be expelled, Hsu reminded his fellow IOC members of several points: that never before had an applicant set prior conditions for acceptance by the IOC; that the ACSF did not control sport in Taiwan; that the IOC had granted recognition to other divided states (Germany and Korea); and that only when a NOC had broken the rules could it be expelled.¹⁷⁸ In closing, he added:

I wish to remind my colleagues once again of the pledge that all of us made when we became I.O.C. members, that we have bound ourselves to guard and preserve the fundamental principles as conceived by Baron Pierre de Coubertin, to whom we paid homage the other morning. The present moment is a crucial test as to whether we are able to live up to our pledge or not.¹⁷⁹

In May the ACSF also issued a statement which reviewed the history of the dispute and refuted several of the "many fallacies" it felt were being used to justify the creation of 'two Chinas' and 'one China, one Taiwan.' A spokesman reiterated that any attempt to resolve the conflict by changing the name of the ROC committee, or keeping Taiwan in the IOC as an area, or by inviting the ACSF and yet not expelling the ROCOC would be unacceptable interference in the internal affairs of the Chinese people¹⁸⁰ (see Appendix G). Yet another fallacy was seen to be the belief held by some that athletes from Taiwan would be unable to compete in the Olympic Games should the ROC be expelled. In response to this viewpoint, the ACSF recalled that it had, on numerous occasions, invited athletes from Taiwan to enter national and international competitions and had often formed

teams composed of athletes of Taiwan province origin.¹⁸¹ The designation 'Taiwan province of origin' was applied to Chinese living abroad, normally in Japan or North America, or to those living in China who once resided in Taiwan, as competitors who had lived on the island since 1949 have never been permitted to accept the invitations from Peking.

Following the deliberations in Lausanne it was announced that the IOC "agreed to the Chinese Olympic Committee's participation in the I.O.C. but disapproved the expulsion of Taiwan as a price."¹⁸² Five months later, at its October meetings in Montreal, the Executive Board announced only that requests for recognition from several NOCs, including China, "were proceeding."¹⁸³

On November 1, the Iranian NOC intensified its campaign, distributing to the Asian NOCs a brief similar to that presented at the 76th Session the previous spring. In addition to a lengthy review of IOC Rules and an interpretation of their application in regards to the China problem, the document listed several reasons in support of the ACSF's claims:

- (1) In November 1973, the Asian Games Federation, now consisting of 29 Member Organizations, recognized that only the All-China Sports Federation (Chinese Olympic Committee) should occupy the existing "China" seat in the Asian Games Federation. This was a decision taken on the question of representation, not expulsion [emphasis added].
- (2) This decision did not prevent athletes from Taiwan from competing in the 7th Asian Games because the All-China Sports Federation (Chinese Olympic Committee) invited athletes from Taiwan to compete in trials for selection in the Chinese team. The same would happen when the All-China Sports Federation (Chinese Olympic Committee) became the only representative of China in the I.O.C.

- (3) The President of the I.O.C. and other members of the Executive Committee of the I.O.C. were present at the 7th Asian Games, which were held under the patronage of the I.O.C., when athletes from the All-China Sports Federation (Chinese Olympic Committee) were competing.
- (4) With the approval of the relevant International Sports Federations, these Chinese athletes took part in all 14 sports in which they wanted to participate in these Games.
- (5) On the eve of the 7th Asian Games, the All-China Sports Federation (Chinese Olympic Committee) was represented at the International Symposium, held by the Olympic Solidarity Committee of the I.O.C. in Tehran, as the only representative of China. The President of the I.O.C. and other members of the Executive Committee of the I.O.C. attended this Olympic Solidarity Symposium.
- (6) The People's Republic of China is a member of nine Olympic International Sports Federations.
- (7) Lord Killanin said in Bulletin 1 of the Winter Olympic Games in Innsbruck that "It is absolutely necessary to bring the Games into context with the social and political advancements of our century." Indeed, the establishment of the People's Republic of China and her recognition by the United Nations as the only representative of China is one of the more profound "social and political advancements" of the 20th century. Furthermore, Lord Killanin was quoted in the illustrated London News as saying: "I fail to see how we can hold a truly world-wide Olympic [sic] and not include athletes from a country of 800 million people."¹⁸⁴

The key point appears to have been that the China problem was seen not as one of expulsion, but of representation. The eighth point in the Iranian publication sought to document the case for 'representation' by citing several historical instances of misinterpretation of IOC Rules as recorded in official IOC bulletins. No vote was ever held on the acceptance of a NOC in Taiwan during the early years after the founding of the People's Republic. In July 1951, it was merely

announced that the one committee recognized by the IOC was located in Taiwan. The Iranian thesis concluded that three factors contributed to the decision: first, the impact of the Cold War, including the fact that China had been branded the aggressor in Korea effectively guaranteed that China would not receive much support or sympathy from the conservative IOC membership; second, the administrative headquarters of the IOC were, during this period, located in the back of a jeweller's shop, a situation which probably resulted in many decisions and rule changes never going through "normal democratic process"; third, the autocratic nature of Avery Brundage, especially in regard to the manner of presenting the name of Henry Hsu for election to the IOC in 1970.¹⁸⁵ This latter reason, while not directly related to the original decision to recognize the Taiwan committee, was cited as an example of the continuing anti-China attitude of the former President. The argument concluded with a discussion of the 76th IOC Session held in Lausanne, at which time Henry Hsu concentrated on the issue of expulsion rather than that of representation, a move seen by the Iranian NOC as an attempt to appeal to the emotions of IOC members. A more logical analysis of the situation was felt to have been put forward by the Rumanian IOC member, S. Siperco, who remarked:

There is only one China. This is not a statement made solely by the Chinese People's Republic which asserts that it represents the whole of China including Taiwan. It is also the official position of the authorities on the island of Taiwan which calls itself the 'Republic of China' and claims to represent China in its entirety, including the mainland part of the country. . . .¹⁸⁶

In summary, the argument was presented that the question before the IOC was one of representation, not expulsion.

The ROCOC was, however, all too aware of the growing acceptance and recognition of the People's Republic in world circles and, foreseeing future difficulty in its attempts to retain membership in the Olympic Movement, prepared a lengthy booklet for distribution at the 1976 Innsbruck Winter Games scheduled to begin in February.¹⁸⁷ The publication contained a series of statements and copies of IOC documents and minutes which outlined the history of the China question and sought to refute the arguments presented by the Iranian NOC. The ROCOC accused those favoring China's position of having "fabricated (several) arguments to confuse the issue."¹⁸⁸ In summary, the ROCOC position was enunciated as follows:

- (1) To equate UN membership with IOC recognition is an illogical and unconstitutional approach . . . [as] there are 16 NOCs whose countries are not UN members.
- (2) The question lies, not in whether the ROCOC can represent Mainland China, but in whether the latter can effectively control and represent sports in Taiwan. . . . In truth, China being in a divided condition, neither of the two separate parts of the country can validly claim to represent the other.
- (3) The sportsmen on both sides of the Straits of Taiwan are decidedly under two different sports organizations and two different systems of amateur status and training. . . . As a matter of fact, no athletes in Taiwan are willing to participate in the qualifying tryouts on Mainland China on account of the above-mentioned basic differences.
- (4) It is mere childish talk for the Iranian NOC to insist that the NOC in Taiwan should lose its IOC status because of its change of address in 1951. In the first place, this change of address was duly noted by the IOC and published in the IOC Bulletin. Furthermore, the IOC has never taken upon itself the duty of ruling the NOCs' changes of address, and there is no IOC rule requiring that such changes be put to a vote.

- (5) The Iranian NOC also states that Hong Kong and Puerto Rico can have their own NOCs because they do not claim political control over Great Britain and the United States respectively, and therefore Taiwan should not be represented in the IOC on account of its political views. This is a preposterous argument for the simple reason that the IOC Spirit is above politics.
- (6) The notorious record of the Asian Games is also well-known to the world. How could a decision illegally arrived at and deplored by the IOC itself be presented by the Iranian NOC as a basis for IOC action?¹⁸⁹

On the basis of its interpretation of the issue, the ROCOC concluded that:

- (1) The ROCOC has always observed and promoted the spirit and principles of the Olympic Movement and has abided by the decisions and rules of the IOC. An active NOC can be expelled only when it is found to have violated Rule 25. To expel an NOC of good standing in order to accommodate an applicant who has had a history of stirring up political controversy is not Olympic in spirit. There is no justification whatsoever to subject the ROCOC to a political blackmail as now demanded by the All-China Sports Federation (Peking).
- (2) The so-called China (Peking) question is, in essence, a simple matter of Peking's re-application for recognition, which should be judged solely on the basis of the IOC Rules and Peking's own merits, without any regard to extraneous side issues or preconditions. The ROCOC has no objection to any application being thus recognized [emphasis added].

The Republic of China Olympic Committee has presented its case in the hope that judgment will be passed in accordance with the Olympic spirit of justice and fair play.¹⁹⁰

Regardless of the efforts put forward by the various parties, the China issue appears to have received little official attention in Austria.

The weeks following the Winter Games saw preparations continuing apace for the opening of the Montreal Summer Games. That IOC President Killanin was addressing himself to more pressing problems in the spring

of 1976 than the continuing controversy over Chinese participation was evident. Concern had been raised both in Canada and abroad on questions of Games security, inflationary building costs, readiness of the many facilities, and political intervention over press accreditation for Radio Free Europe personnel. It was to these problems that the IOC directed its attention throughout most of 1975 and early 1976, not the question of China. But the issue was to break full force on the IOC and on its President.

The 'Taiwan Incident' at Montreal

On May 28, Killanin received word from James Worrall, IOC member in Canada, that the Canadian government would refuse entry to athletes from Taiwan who claimed to represent China.¹⁹¹ Emblems, anthems and flags of the Republic of China would all be unacceptable to Canadian authorities and, citing its letter of 1969 which stated that entry to Canada was 'pursuant to the normal regulations,' the government indicated that it did not intend to alter its position.

The extent to which negotiations were to take place behind closed doors during this period remains unknown. The ROC, however, fully intended on taking part in the Games and, after finalizing its delegation of 9 officials and 43 athletes, submitted entry forms for 10 events on June 10. The first group of ROC athletes entered Canada on June 29 and took up residence at the official sites in Montreal and Kingston. Included in this small group were individuals holding

dual US-ROC passports. Two days later, the potentially explosive issue became public, sparking one of the most intense, worldwide three-week debates in recent history.

Whereas the order of events which surrounded the 1959 controversy resulting from the IOC decision to require a name-change for the Taiwan committee was relatively unimportant, the timing and sequence of the dispute at Montreal was significant in the final outcome. In order to permit a later, more thorough analysis of this phase of China-IOC relations, a brief chronology of the media coverage of the controversy follows. While the 'Taiwan Incident' drew global attention to the dispute, one must note that, again, China's involvement was peripheral, indirect and limited.

Thursday,

July 1 - The IOC protests Canada's decision to ban ROC athletes.

The IOC is said to be "considering dissociating itself from the games by insisting the word 'Olympic' be removed and banning medal awards."¹⁹²

- Henry Hsu, IOC member from Taiwan, returns to Taipei following meetings with Lord Killanin in Munich.

Friday,

July 2 - United States Olympic Committee (USOC) President, Philip Krumm, cables Roger Rousseau, president of the Canadian organizing committee, threatening a pull out by the American team saying,

If the Games are declared by the IOC not to be official, we seriously question the United States of America participation. The Games must remain free from international politics.¹⁹³

- Lord Killanin denies press reports on possible IOC sanctions.
- Shen Chia-ming, president of the ROCOC, issues a statement saying that "Taiwan will defy Canada and fly its flag at Montreal, taking part in the Games as usual."¹⁹⁴
- The ACSF sends a wire from Peking to the IOC stating that:

The usurpation of China's representation by the so-called sports organization of the Chiang clique is entirely illegal. The I.O.C. must not allow the Chiang clique's so-called sports organization to participate in the coming I.O.C. Session and Olympic Games activities.¹⁹⁵

- Press coverage predicts a troubled future for the Olympic Movement if the IOC backs down and accepts Canadian demands. Concern is expressed regarding admission of Israeli and Chilean athletes to Moscow for the 1980 Games.

Sunday,
July 4

- IOC spokesman in Montreal, Monique Berlioux, says that an official statement can be expected from Lord Killanin on his arrival in Canada on Monday.¹⁹⁶

Monday,
July 5

- Lord Killanin issues a statement saying "I am not interested in the politics of two Chinas but in getting the maximum number of participants in the Olympics."¹⁹⁷

- In the House of Commons in Ottawa, Otto Jelinek (member for High Park-Humber Valley) questions the government's stand and moves:

That this House instruct the minister of external affairs to abide by the official letters of support of May 21, 1969 and November 28, 1969 and leave the handling of the rules and regulations, including participation, in the hands of the International Olympic Committee where they rightfully belong.¹⁹⁸

The motion fails to gain unanimous consent, thus being defeated. In response to further questions, Allan MacEachen (Secretary of State for External Affairs) justifies the stand taken by the government saying that the statement 'pursuant to the normal regulations' indicated that, at no time, was Canada prepared to "relinquish its sovereignty to an international organization, no matter how respected that international organization may be."¹⁹⁹ Prime Minister Trudeau supports MacEachen's proposal that the IOC use the formula applied to the athletes from Taiwan who competed in the 1960 Rome Olympics.

Tuesday,
July 6

- Western press coverage is critical of Canada's stance and IOC member from France, Count Jean de Beaumont, suggests that the Games should either be moved elsewhere or cancelled.²⁰⁰

- Debate on the government's handling of the issue continues in the House of Commons. Otto Jelinek proposes:

That this House instruct the Secretary of State for External Affairs to convey his apologies on behalf of the Liberal administration to the city of Montreal, to the province of Quebec, and at the same time for the sake of not only the Olympic ideal but more importantly for Canada's pride, follow the conditions outlined in the original Olympic bid as presented by the city of Montreal. (Defeated).²⁰¹

Walter Baker (Grenville-Carleton) questions the government on its policy regarding the admission of members of the Palestine Liberation Organization to Canada for the U.N. Habitat Conference and suggests that a similar ministerial permit be issued in the Taiwan situation.

- Zhao Zheng-hung (Chao Cheng-hung), ACSF Chairman and member of the executive committee of the Asian Games Federation, leaves Peking to attend meetings of the Federation and other international sport governing bodies in Montreal.²⁰³

Wednesday,
July 7

- The Vancouver-based Chinese Benevolent Association calls on Prime Minister Trudeau to abandon the government's "totally unreasonable"²⁰⁴ attitude in preventing athletes from Taiwan from competing in the Games.
- Paul Lin, McGill Professor of Asian Studies, appears on the CTV network program 'Canada AM' supporting the government's stand.

- Harold Wright, President of the Canadian Olympic Association (COA), condemns the government saying "political recognition by Canada of the People's Republic of China in 1970 cannot alter the firm undertaking given by the Canadian government in 1969."²⁰⁵

Thursday,
July 8

- In the House of Commons a lengthy debate takes place between former Prime Minister John Diefenbaker (Prince Albert) and Prime Minister Trudeau in which Diefenbaker comments:

May I ask the Prime Minister if he has forgotten the contribution made by the Republic of China whose government through the years stood with us for freedom against the surrender to communism. Are they now to be thrown overboard?

To which the Prime Minister replies:

I think the right hon.(orable) gentleman believes there is only a one-China policy but he still thinks Taiwan is the government of China. The world has moved on since the right hon.(orable) member --- ²⁰⁶

Friday,
July 9

- Twenty-nine members of the ROC delegation are refused permission to board an Allegheny Airlines flight from Detroit to Montreal because they lack visas. Two former Olympians, C. K. Yang and Chi Cheng, are, however, given permission to travel to Montreal to join the negotiating team of Lawrence Ting and C. M. Ching.²⁰⁷

- The Olympic Tripartite Commission issues a formal statement declaring that the IOC "would have no alternative"²⁰⁸ but to cancel the Games unless Canada relented.
- In Ottawa, Acting Prime Minister Mitchell Sharp responds to questions from opposition Members of Parliament. The Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs are both absent from the House.²⁰⁹
- Zhao Zheng-hung arrives in Montreal with members of the ACSF delegation.²¹⁰

Saturday,
July 10

- Lord Killanin meets for over two hours with leaders of the Taiwan delegation and, later, with officials of the Canadian government. IOC officials express optimism that a solution will be reached by the evening.²¹¹
- Former Canadian Olympic athlete Harry Jerome voices support for the Canadian government's stand.²¹²
- The Canada-China Society of Montreal holds a 'Canada-China Friendship Night' and "supports the position that only athletes from the PRC have any legitimate claim to represent the Chinese people."²¹³

Sunday,
July 11

- Leaders of the Taiwan delegation reject Lord Killanin's compromise solution which would have Taiwanese athletes march under the Olympic flag--nameless.²¹⁴

Monday,
July 12

- The IOC Executive Board prepares to present its compromise solution to the 78th Session of the full assembly and issues an appeal to the government "to review its attitude in keeping its word and holds it (Canada) entirely responsible for any harm which the Olympic movement may suffer."²¹⁵
- U.S. President Gerald Ford phones USOC head Philip Krumm and criticizes the IOC's decision.²¹⁶
- Niu Ping-yi, General Secretary of the ROCOC, announces that his delegation will make no further comment until after the IOC general session on Tuesday.²¹⁷
- Lord Killanin denies that he will retire in light of the crisis.²¹⁸
- The House of Commons defeats a motion by Claude Wagner (Saint Hyacinthe):

. . . that this House extend its apologies to the International Olympic Committee for the way Canada has intervened in its internal administration and has compelled it to meet its requirements, thus jeopardizing the time-honoured principle of the non-political character of international olympic events.²¹⁹

In reply to a question from Robert Coates (Cumberland-Colchester-North), Prime Minister Trudeau tells the House:

. . . that it is not our policy nor our practice to bar any athletes from the games. We welcome the athletes from Taiwan. We hope they will compete. We do not discriminate on the basis of sex, race or, indeed, national origin.

All we are saying . . . is that we will not let athletes come into Canada under false representations and that to pretend that they represent a country, China, that they do not represent. That is all we are saying.²²⁰

Tuesday,
July 13

- C. K. Yang suggests that Taiwan ought to request a refund of the costs incurred in preparing its team for the Olympics.²²¹
- Prime Minister Trudeau and Lord Killanin meet for the first time since the Taiwan issue became public. The occasion is the formal opening of the IOC general session at which Killanin says that "this is a time when we should remember that the Olympic Games are about individual athletes and not about politics and money."²²²
- Allan MacEachen accuses U.S. President Ford of 'political interference' regarding Ford's comments on Canada's stand.²²³
- Prime Minister Trudeau, speaking in Halifax after greeting Queen Elizabeth, repeats his stand that Taiwanese athletes are welcome in Canada as long as they do not claim to represent China.²²⁴

Wednesday,
July 14

- Philip Krumm is quoted as saying that the U.S. is seriously considering withdrawing from the Games and that it would be "a shame to have all of this wiped

out (the time, money and dedication of the athletes) by the dictatorial decision of one man, acting against the will of his people."²²⁵

- American Garry Davis, self-styled World Citizen #1, offers the Taiwan team citizenship in his movement as a possible solution to the team's non-recognition by Canadian officials.²²⁶
- An Olympic attendant carries the controversial "Chine (Rep. De.)" sign in the rehearsal for Saturday's opening ceremonies.²²⁷
- Taiwan rules out accepting the compromise suggested by the IOC.²²⁸

Thursday,
July 15

- Prime Minister Trudeau announces that the delegation of athletes from Taiwan may use the flag and anthem of the ROC in the upcoming Games, but must not call themselves the representatives of China.²²⁹
- The Montreal press carries a large advertisement sponsored by the many branches of the Chinese Benevolent Association across Canada which supports the pro-ROC stance taken by MP John Diefenbaker. A portion of the text reads:

It is regrettable that the Canadian government should yield to the pressure from the Chinese communists who are the most ruthless tyrants in the history of China: - over twenty million innocent Chinese have been killed including those murdered as late as the Tien An Men uprising on April 5, 1976.²³⁰

Friday,
July 16

- By a vote of 48 to 2, with 6 abstentions, the IOC amends its regulations to change the name of the Republic of China Olympic Committee to the 'Olympic Committee of Taiwan' for the two-week duration of the Games.²³¹
- Radio broadcasts from Moscow accuse the People's Republic of supporting the 'two China policy' in international affairs.²³²
- The ROCOC delegation formally withdraws from the Games saying "since our counter-proposal to the IOC to use the name 'Taiwan - ROC' was not accepted by the Canadian government, we deeply regret we have no alternative but not to participate in the Games."²³³

Saturday,
July 17

- The Games of the XXI Olympiad of the modern era are officially opened by Queen Elizabeth II.
- U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger declines an invitation to attend the Games saying that the official U.S. position is that politics should not be involved in any way in deciding who participates. His wife, Nancy, however attends.²³⁴

With the Games officially under way the Taiwan issue, somewhat surprisingly, received little further attention. The withdrawal of a number of African nations over the question of New Zealand's continuing

sporting ties with South Africa undoubtedly contributed to a shift in focus following the departure from Montreal of the Taiwan contingent. Press coverage continued to respond to the Taiwan incident but generally only in the form of 'letters to the editor' from around the world and, after having accepted enough from "misguided buffoons,"²³⁵ from Canadians who supported the government's stand. Critics cited the supposed sanctity of sport and abhorred the penetration of politics into the world of the athlete and his games. Numerous writers also picked up on the American suggestion that Canada's actions had been predicated on trade considerations, specifically the sale of wheat to the People's Republic.²³⁶

Meanwhile, the ROCOC delegation returned to Taipei on July 19 to a welcome from over 2,000 well-wishers, including several high-ranking Americans who lived and worked in Taiwan.²³⁷ Ten days later the ACSF delegation headed by Zhao Zheng-hung returned to Peking.²³⁸

In the weeks which followed statements were released by the ROCOC, the Department of External Affairs of the Canadian government, and the IOC, each of which offered an interpretation of the Montreal incident. Citing the "inability of the IOC to enforce its Rules,"²³⁹ the ROCOC document listed six reasons in support of its decision to withdraw from the Games:

- (1) ROCOC has for decades controlled the sports activities over the area of Taiwan & other Island groups. It has never claimed control of sports activities over the area of Mainland China [emphasis added]. Reference ROCOC and All China sports Federation (Peking) representation in IOC & ISFs during the fifties.

- (2) ROCOC is the name of the NOC having control of the area of Taiwan & other Island groups. NOC is a non-government organization. The so-called "China Question" by IOC definition, does not and should not exist in the world of sport.
- (3) The question of the name of ROC is analongous [sic] to the name "Federal Republic of Germany vs German Democratic Republic" and "Republic of Korea vs Democratic People's Republic of Korea." This type of division among Nations in Modern History has become common place. Selection of names is purely a government issue & should never be discussed by sports bodies.
- (4) ROCOC is truly a non-political sports organization. We deplore any organizations who refuse to participate in world sports simply because their political enemy is a member. Reference IOC Rule I (Fundamental Principles).
- (5) The timing of [the] Canadian government's interference made it physically impossible to bring our athletes who have been scattered all over the United States and other parts of the world to Montreal in any shape to compete in the games.
- (6) When the head of one nation tells another in the most insulting manner in front of the world that one must change it's [sic] country's name, nation's anthem and flag in order to participate in [the] Olympic games, the principle of [the] Olympic movement & pride of the people of that country was at stake.²⁴⁰

Included in the statement, which was cabled to the IFs, was a plea "to use your influence to ensure that such tragedy will not repeat itself in the future Olympic Games."²⁴¹

The statement issued by the Canadian government, entitled "The Olympics and Taiwan," sought to clarify several disputed issues. First, the government noted that since it had recognized the People's Republic as the sole legal government of China it followed that state-to-state

contacts with the Republic of China would be discouraged; however it was also the practice

. . . not [to] restrict people-to-people contacts between Canadians and Taiwanese. We are prepared to have Taiwanese come to Canada on private visits, business, and to take part in conferences, meetings and cultural and sports events, provided they do not come as representatives of the so-called "Republic of China" and provided their presence in Canada does not give rise to circumstances in which the Canadian Government can be held to have accepted, overtly or by implication, the political and territorial claims of the ROC. We intend to treat the athletes from Taiwan coming to the Olympics in exactly the same way that we treat all other Taiwanese coming to Canada. We saw no reason to change our normal regulation simply because the IOC recognizes the athletes from Taiwan as representatives of the Republic of China. The Canadian government had no intention of relinquishing its sovereignty to a private organization such as the IOC, however respected internationally.²⁴²

Second, in regard to charges that Canada had failed to live up to its obligations to the IOC to admit athletes from Taiwan and that it had shown "bad faith" by not informing the IOC of its decision until the last moment, the government's position was enunciated as follows:

For years the IOC has been trying to solve its own political problem of whether the Republic of China or the People's Republic of China would participate in the Olympic movement. This was--and is--an issue that only the three parties involved can settle among themselves. . . . As we had heard nothing from Lord Killanin about progress on the resolution of this issue, Canadian Government officials sought a meeting with him.

On April 23, 1975 officials . . . met with Lord Killanin in Toronto. It is absolutely clear from the Departmental memorandum . . . that Lord Killanin had been made well aware that there was a real policy problem for Canada.²⁴³

Third, Ottawa maintained that the IOC was well aware of Canada's position as a result of a previous incident involving ROC athletes, when:

In November, 1975, in an application of normal policy on Taiwanese entry, we indicated we would allow a group of Taiwanese boxers to attend a pre-Olympic competition in Montreal provided they did not claim to represent the Republic of China. They declined to come. On December 8, 1975 the IOC representative in Canada raised this case with us indicating that Lord Killanin was aware of it. He was told that we had applied our normal regulation and if there was to be a change this would require a ministerial decision, the implication being that such a change was most improbable.²⁴⁴

Fourth, the government also refuted charges that it was guilty of political interference in Olympic sports:

The fact is that the Olympics are by their very nature political. So long as Olympic members participate in the Games with flags, anthems and names of states it is impossible for the IOC to avoid political issues brought about by the use of national symbols. . . . The Republic of China recognized the political nature of the Olympic Games--an international event of the first magnitude providing a unique opportunity for the assertion of its political identity. We were not prepared to have this happen in disregard of our policy on China and the terms of our recognition of the People's Republic of China.

As we had made clear repeatedly, we were prepared to have the Taiwanese athletes compete under any designation other than one including the word "China."²⁴⁵

Suggesting that no precedent had been set which might endanger the 1980 Moscow Olympics, the government doubted "that it would require Canada to establish a precedent for the Soviet Union; the USSR will carry out its foreign policy as it sees fit without the benefit of any

alleged precedent-setting assistance from Canada."²⁴⁶ In conclusion, the lengthy statement noted that the Canadian government's position:

. . . represented the application of certain basic features of our China policy for the first time in a unique area of international activity, the Olympics. It was a forum in which our action was highly visible, and inevitably in collision with the general, firmly held but unfounded belief that politics plays no part in the Games. Criticism from the information media, at home and abroad, was therefore not surprising. The pressure from this quarter to change our stand was very great.²⁴⁷

The government later reiterated these feelings when a letter was sent on September 10 from the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to those who had expressed support for the government during the crisis. Outlining the government's position, the letter concluded:

If we are to continue to take an independent line that meets our particular foreign policy requirements as we perceive them, we must be prepared for, and be willing to resist, the pressures for change such as were exerted by the information media at home and abroad in the case of [the] Olympics/Taiwan issue.²⁴⁸

Lord Killanin, on behalf of the IOC, responded to the incident and presented his interpretation of several of the controversial points.²⁴⁹ First, Killanin maintained that the April 1975 meeting was only an informal luncheon which MacEachen did not attend and at which no indication of concern regarding Taiwan had been expressed by those Canadian government officials present. (Killanin inferred that, considering the construction delays at the time, had the Taiwan question been raised the IOC would certainly have entertained withdrawing the Games from Montreal.) Second, the President maintained that the status quo situation regarding the ROC at the time of the

Innsbruck Winter Games also drew no indication from Canadian authorities of possible future difficulties. Third, the fact that immigration officers confirmed all identity cards as travel documents in April 1976 appeared, to the IOC, to suggest that, for the time being, the issue was no longer problematic. Summarizing his feelings, Killanin added:

It is surprising, if the Canadian Government intended to refuse admission to a recognized National Olympic Committee for the Olympic Games, that they did not inform the President of the Organizing Committee, an Ambassador seconded from the Department of External Affairs, who was correctly issuing accreditations to Republic of China (Taiwan) Olympic Committee nominees up to 22 June 1976.²⁵⁰

At the fall meetings of the IOC Executive Board and the IFs in Barcelona two major problems were discussed: (1) the withdrawal of several African NOCs and (2) the Taiwan Incident. Following closed-door deliberations, no action was taken on either case as it was felt "that retroactive sanctions would be counter-productive, which would be most especially harmful to the athletes."²⁵¹ The Executive Board did recommend that IOC Rules be reviewed and amended so as to guard against similar situations arising in the future and referred the matter to its 1977 meetings with the NOCs, with a final report to be submitted to the 1979 Session in Prague. On December 23, 1976, a circular was sent over the signature of the President to all IOC members and organizations in the Olympic Movement which reviewed the problem of political incidents in sport. While announcing no new IOC initiatives, Killanin expressed the view that

. . . It is realistic to state that from the earliest days of the revival of the Olympic movement and Games there has never been an Olympiad without political problems. There is however a difference between political problems which may affect the Olympic movement and the use of the Games or sport for political or other purposes.²⁵²

In April 1977, the Executive Board met with the NOCs in Abidjan, Ivory Coast and shortly after returning to Ireland, Lord Killanin suffered a heart attack on April 11 and was forced to curtail his activities²⁵³ and postpone a planned trip to China, his first since serving as a correspondent in 1937 and 1938 during the Sino-Japanese war.

In September, Killanin and a small party of IOC officials arrived in Peking for discussions with members of the All-China Sports Federation and Wang Meng, Minister in charge of the Physical Culture and Sport Commission. No substantial progress appears to have been made regarding China's readmission to the IOC, although Killanin did announce that the matter would be discussed by the Executive Board in October and by the full IOC membership at its May 1978 session in Athens.²⁵⁴

Following meetings of the Tripartite Commission in Tunisia in January it was decided that the question required still further study and would be reported on before the 1979 IOC Session. At the spring meetings of the IOC in Greece the issue which had plagued the Olympic Movement for a quarter century was referred to a committee.²⁵⁵

Summary

The International Olympic Committee, the 'supreme authority' in the Olympic Movement, established relations with China soon after World War I and later recognized a Chinese National Olympic Committee which responded by entering athletes in the Olympic Games of 1932, 1936 and 1948. In addition, three Chinese citizens were elected to membership in the IOC between 1922 and 1947.

The civil war which resulted in the defeat of the Chiang government and its subsequent retreat to the island of Taiwan in December 1949, led to confusion within the IOC. The status of its three members in China was in doubt, two sports organizations emerged, each claiming to represent the athletes of China, and contact between the IOC and China was limited during the first months following Liberation.

The developing East-West Cold War polarized attitudes and influenced the rhetoric which prevailed in discussions within the IOC. The Committee's avowed disinterest in political questions, while often applied to the decision making process, did not reflect the reality of the alliances which formed within the IOC. The stature and impact of Avery Brundage, IOC President from 1952 to 1972, was significant in that his uncompromising idealism on the question of the non-political nature of sport was also ascribed to by a sufficient number of IOC members so as to assure the continuation of the status quo in spite of the alliances and blocs which emerged between the members from socialist and capitalist nations.

Relations between the IOC and the All-China Sports Federation (Chinese Olympic Committee) of the People's Republic of China focused almost entirely on the singular issue of the recognition of the Taiwan-based Republic of China Olympic Committee. Several attempts to resolve the impasse were unsuccessful and the ACSF withdrew from the IOC in August 1958. Subsequent efforts by the IOC to effect a name-change for the Taiwan committee received both criticism and acclaim and its President was both pilloried and praised for his actions. In seeking a 'non-political' solution to the problem he drew the attention of governments, sports bodies, the media and the public. For 20 years, Brundage, an American, was attacked for being both an instrument of U.S. imperialism in denying China's demands for the expulsion of the Taiwan committee from the IOC and a traitor to the western democracies, especially his own, for supposedly refusing to support the Taiwan organization, a close ally and friend.

Following China's admission to the United Nations in 1971, several IOC members and NOC delegations (notably Iran) lobbied actively for the expulsion of the ROC and the affiliation of the ACSF. At the 1976 Montreal Olympics Canada refused to permit the entry of athletes who claimed to represent the Republic of China. These actions highlighted the IOC's increasing inability to effectively counteract the growing influence of political considerations in sport as the policies and actions of several governments and non-governmental sports organizations became more at variance with those of the IOC and its leadership.

Throughout the dispute between China and Taiwan one of the few points of concurrence was that there was but 'one China.' Only in the 1970s was this stance modified by ROCOC spokesmen who adopted the view that two Chinese sports organizations would be acceptable. On the other hand, the ACSF has refused to compromise on the position it adopted nearly three decades ago--there is one China, there can be only one Chinese Olympic Committee.

As the IOC once again in 1978 debated, without resolution, the ACSF's demand to be recognized as the sole representative of the athletes of 'one China,' the Chinese view that the restoration of its seat in the international organization was an "irresistible historical trend" was countered by the recollection of Avery Brundage's observation that only those who comply with the Olympic rules are permitted to participate.

FOOTNOTES
TO CHAPTER III

¹Speech at the Opening of the 73rd IOC Session in Munich, cited in Olympic Review, no. 59 (October 1972), p. 379.

²The International Olympic Committee, Olympism (Lausanne: The Committee, 1972), pp. 1-7.

³A comprehensive examination of the IOC and the concept of Olympism is provided in Jean M. Leiper, "The International Olympic Committee: The Pursuit of Olympism 1894-1970" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Alberta, 1976).

⁴The International Olympic Committee, Olympic Rules (Lausanne: The Committee, 1975), p. 5.

⁵IOC, Olympism, pp. 8-28. See also, Jean Leiper, "The International Olympic Association (Committee sic)," Journal of the Canadian Association for Health, Physical Education and Recreation, vol. 42 no. 4 (March-April 1976), pp. 12-18.

⁶IOC, Olympic Rules, p. 13.

⁷Leiper, The IOC, p. 12.

⁸Leiper, The Pursuit of Olympism, pp. 92-98.

⁹IOC, Olympism, pp. 13-15.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 12.

¹¹Ibid., pp. 15-16.

¹²Ibid., pp. 23-28.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Olympic Review, no. 123 (January 1978), back cover.

¹⁵"Chinese Who's Who," in China Handbook 1937-45 (New York: Chinese Ministry of Information, 1947). See also, Arthur N. Holcombe, The Spirit of the Chinese Revolution (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1930), pp. 157-59.

¹⁶Zhu Ming-yi, "Physical Culture," in The Chinese Yearbook 1935-36 (Shanghai: China Yearbook Publishing Company, 1936), p. 544.

¹⁷China Handbook 1937-45, p. 666. See also, Monique Berlioux, "Concerning China," Olympic Review, no. 66-67 (May-June 1973), p. 171.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 596.

¹⁹Berlioux, "Concerning China," p. 171.

²⁰Liu, nicknamed the "Chinese Lone Wolf," went on to star in many future competitions. See, for example, William Z. L. Sung, "The Sixth National Athletic Meet," The China Quarterly, vol. 1 no. 2 (December 1935) p. 135.

²¹The Foreign Affairs Association of Japan, The Japan Yearbook 1933 (Tokyo: The Kenkyushu Press, 1933), pp. 1032-34.

²²Zhu, China Yearbook 1935-36, p. 551.

²³Hao Geng-sheng (Gunsun Hoh), "Physical Education," in The China Yearbook 1937 (Nanking: Council of International Affairs, 1937), p. 1119.

²⁴"Athletes in China: Past and Present," China Reconstructs (December 1975), p. 10.

²⁵Zhu, China Yearbook 1935-36, p. 551 suggests that "approximately 50 athletes" were to be sent to Berlin, while Hao, China Yearbook 1937, p. 1119 lists the figure at "more than 70."

²⁶For details of the individual matches and games see, Frederick W. Rubien (ed.) Report of the American Olympic Committee - Games of the XI Olympiad, Berlin, Germany (New York: American Olympic Committee, 1936), pp. 172 and 256, and Olympia 1936: Die XI Olympischen Spiele in Berlin 1936 (Altona-Bahrenfeld: Cigaretten-Bilderdienst, 1936), p. 121.

²⁷Ta Kung Pao, 17 August 1936.

²⁸Hao, China Yearbook 1937, p. 1119.

²⁹Official Report of the Organizing Committee for the XIV Olympiad (London: The Committee, 1951), pp. 542-46.

³⁰China Handbook 1937-45, p. 596.

³¹Ibid.

³²"The Historical Background to the China Question and the IOC--As Presented by the Iranian National Olympic Committee," mimeographed paper, n.d., circa May 1975, pp. 4-6.

³³Ibid. See also, Republic of China Olympic Committee, "A Résumé of Historical Facts Concerning the Status of the Republic of China Olympic Committee in IOC--An Answer to the Peking Question," Taiwan: Republic of China Olympic Committee, January 1, 1976, p. 8. Available from the ROCOC, Taiwan.

³⁴Monique Berlioux, "The History of the International Olympic Committee," in Lord Killanin and John Rodda (ed.) The Olympic Games (London: Barrie and Jenkins Limited, 1976), p. 19.

³⁵Iranian NOC, "Historical Background," p. 6.

³⁶Renmin Shouce (People's Handbook), Peking, 1955, p. 395.

³⁷Otto Mayer, A Travers les Anneaux Olympiques (Geneva: Pierre Cailler, 1960), p. 44, cited in Leiper, The Pursuit of Olympism, p. 148.

³⁸International Olympic Committee, "Minutes of the General Assembly: Oslo, 1952" (Lausanne: The Committee, 1952), cited in Leiper, The Pursuit of Olympism, p. 275.

³⁹Cited in Iranian NOC, "Historical Background," p. 27.

⁴⁰IOC, "Minutes . . . Helsinki, 1952," p. 7.

⁴¹Cited in Iranian NOC, "Historical Background," p. 16.

⁴²For an account of the discussions, see Leiper, The Pursuit of Olympism, pp. 275-76.

⁴³Ibid., p. 9.

⁴⁴Ibid., pp. 9-10.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 12.

⁴⁶New China News Agency (NCNA), 30 July 1952, in Survey of China Mainland Press (SCMP), no. 388.

⁴⁷NCNA (Helsinki), 2 August 1952.

⁴⁸Ibid., 4 August 1952.

⁴⁹Ibid.

⁵⁰Ibid., 2 August 1952.

⁵¹Ibid., 10 August 1952 and 12 September 1952.

⁵²Bulletin of the IOC, no. 39-40, p. 26, cited in ROCOC, "A Résumé," p. 34

⁵³For a photocopy of the letter see, Jonathan Kolatch, Sport, Politics and Ideology in China (Middle Village, New York: Jonathan David Publishers, 1972), p. 175.

⁵⁴Iranian NOC, "Historical Background," attachment 3.

⁵⁵ROCOC, "A Résumé," Appendix 3, p. 10.

⁵⁶SCMP, no. 992.

⁵⁷IOC, "Minutes . . . Paris, 1955," p. 20.

⁵⁸New York Times, 22 November 1955.

⁵⁹NCNA (Peking), 18 March 1956.

⁶⁰"To the Olympic Meet," NCNA, 2 September 1956, in SCMP, no. 1367.

⁶¹NCNA (Peking), 2 September 1956.

⁶²New York Times, 19 October 1956.

⁶³"International Olympic Committee Asked to Exclude Taiwan," NCNA, 22 October 1956, in SCMP, no. 1397.

⁶⁴NCNA (Peking), 23 October 1956.

⁶⁵Oppose U.S. Occupation of Taiwan and "Two Chinas" Plot: A Selection of Important Documents (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1958), pp. 87-89.

⁶⁶Iranian NOC, "Historical Background," p. 32.

⁶⁷IOC, "Minutes . . . Melbourne, 1956," p. 12.

⁶⁸*Ibid.*, Sophia, 1957, p. 4.

⁶⁹New York Times, 11 September and 18 September, 1957.

⁷⁰Copies of the letters exchanged between Dong and Brundage appear in "All-China Athletic Federation Statement," NCNA, 20 August 1958, in SCMP, no. 1839.

⁷¹*Ibid.*

⁷²*Ibid.*

⁷³*Ibid.*

⁷⁴*Ibid.*

⁷⁵"Statement of the Chinese Olympic Committee (All-China Athletic Federation) on Severing Relations with the International Olympic Committee," in Important Documents, pp. 99-103.

⁷⁶NCNA (Peking), 21 August 1958.

⁷⁷*Ibid.*, 22 August 1958.

⁷⁸Phil Pilley, "Tragedy," World Sports, vol. 24, no. 11 (November 1958), p. 5.

⁷⁹*Ibid.*

⁸⁰The IOC's article, entitled "The Peoples' Democratic Republic [sic] of China Withdraws from the International Olympic Committee," appeared in the IOC Bulletin, no. 64 (November 1958), pp. 43-43, cited in ROCOC, "A Resumé," Appendix 5, pp. 15-20.

⁸¹Cited in Leiper, The Pursuit of Olympism, p. 283.

⁸²IOC, "Minutes . . . Munich, 1959," p. 12

⁸³Avery Brundage Collection (ABC), University Archives, University of Illinois, Scrapbook 38, p. 8.

On December 2, 1974, Avery Brundage presented his papers to his Alma Mater, the University of Illinois. Subsequent to Brundage's death, additional material was presented to the University Archives. Consisting of notebooks, press clippings, photographs, scrapbooks, correspondence, tapes and films, and subject files, the "Avery Brundage Collection" was catalogued by the staff of the University Archives and a finding guide produced. In cooperation with the University, the Bundesinstitut für Sportwissenschaft, Köln, Germany, published the detailed finding guide: The Avery Brundage Collection 1908-1975 (Schorndorf: Verlag Karl Hofmann, 1977). Cited hereafter as ABC.

⁸⁴*Ibid.*, sb. 38, pp. 53-54.

⁸⁵New York Herald Tribune, 29 May 1959, in ABC, sb. 38, p. 2.

⁸⁶"Ike Says Olympics Play Politics on China . . . Comes to Aid of Nationalists," ABC, sb. 38, p. 17.

⁸⁷H. CON. RES. 191 (86th Congress, 1st Session), in ABC, sb. 38, p. 3.

⁸⁸Indianapolis Times, 20 June 1959, in ABC, sb. 38, p. 16.

⁸⁹New York Times, 3 June 1959, in ABC, sb. 38, p. 5.

⁹⁰ABC, sb. 38, p. 27.

⁹¹ABC, sb. 38, p. 9.

⁹²Letter from Kenneth L. Wilson, President, and Asa S. Bushnell, Secretary, United States Olympic Committee to Avery Brundage, 31 July 1959, in ABC, sb. 38, p. 21.

⁹³Letter from Kellum Johnson, President, and Daniel J. Ferris, Honorary Secretary, Amateur Athletic Union, 23 June 1959, in ABC, sb. 38, p. 20.

⁹⁴New York Times, 30 May 1959.

⁹⁵A copy of the original press wire copy, dateline Frankfurt, June 12, is available in ABC, sb. 38, p. 22. See also, sb. 38, p. 23.

⁹⁶Burlington News, 5 June 1959, in ABC, sb. 38, p. 14.

⁹⁷"Brundage on a Cloud Above Politics," Sports Illustrated, 15 June 1959, pp. 30-31, in ABC, sb. 38, p. 19.

⁹⁸"Brundage Denies Pressure by Reds," in ABC, sb. 38, p. 40.

⁹⁹ABC, sb. 38, p. 40.

¹⁰⁰Daily News, 17 June 1959, in ABC, sb. 38, p. 27.

¹⁰¹Letter from Avery Brundage to Christian Science Monitor, in ABC, sb. 38, p. 39.

¹⁰²Cited in Iranian NOC, "Historical Background," p. 30.

¹⁰³Letter from Avery Brundage to Sidney L. James, 3 August 1959, in ABC, sb. 39, n.p.

¹⁰⁴Letter from Avery Brundage to Senator Warren R. Austin, 28 August 1959, in ABC, sb. 38, p. 46.

¹⁰⁵IOC Circular No. 136 from Avery Brundage to IOC Members, the NOCs and the IFs, in ABC, Box. 70.

¹⁰⁶News Release from Burghley House, Stamford, Lincs, 25 June 1959, in ABC, sb. 38, p. 42.

¹⁰⁷Letter from John T. McGovern to Avery Brundage, 2 June 1959, in ABC, sb. 38, p. 33.

¹⁰⁸Letter from John D. Norton, President, United States Olympians to Sidney L. James, 10 August 1959, in ABC, sb. 38, p. 18.

¹⁰⁹Ibid.

¹¹⁰"Chinese Participation in Olympic Games," Congressional Record, 10939, and letter from Thomas C. Hennings to Avery Brundage, 30 June 1959, in ABC, sb. 38, p. 38.

¹¹¹Letter from Marshall Windmillar, California Federation of Young Democrats, to Avery Brundage, 9 June 1959, in ABC, sb. 38, p. 33.

¹¹²Letter from Representative Charles O. Porter to Avery Brundage, 17 June 1959, in ABC, sb. 38, p. 33.

¹¹³Letter from Quincy Wright to Avery Brundage, 12 June 1959, in ABC, sb. 38, p. 33.

¹¹⁴Letter from Carl Soule to Avery Brundage, 10 June 1959, in ABC, sb. 38, p. 33.

¹¹⁵Letter from Allyn Rickett to Avery Brundage, 9 June 1959, in ABC, sb. 38, p. 33.

¹¹⁶See, for example, a letter to Marvin Liebman, 23 June 1959, in ABC, sb. 38, n.p.

¹¹⁷Several letters were received by Brundage which supported the IOC's action. See correspondence from Gordon Meier, Grenville Clark, Maolin Han and Max Paige, in ABC, sb. 38, p. 33.

¹¹⁸Red Smith, "Views of Sport," New York Herald Tribune, 12 June 1959.

¹¹⁹Sydney J. Harris, "Why are We So Afraid of Russia?", in ABC, sb. 38, p. 43.

¹²⁰Illustrated Weekly of India, 28 June 1959, in ABC, sb. 38, p. 29.

¹²¹Times of India, 1 June 1959, in ABC, sb. 38, p. 35.

¹²²Denver Post, 9 June 1959.

¹²³Miami News (Florida), 13 June 1959.

¹²⁴Guardian (London), 11 June 1959.

¹²⁵"Views of Sport," see f.n. 118 supra.

¹²⁶IOC Circular No. 137 from Otto Mayer to the IFs, 17 June 1959, in ABC, Box 70.

¹²⁷IOC Circular No. 140 (News Release) to IOC Members, the NOCs and the IFs, 15 July 1959, in ABC, Box 70.

¹²⁸IOC Circular No. 141 from Otto Mayer to IOC Members, 10 August 1959, in ABC, Box 70.

¹²⁹The subpoena, strangely, did not list "the matters under discussion" when served to Brundage, but merely commanded him to appear in Washington; see, ABC, sb. 38, p. 44. Further details appeared later which suggested that Brundage had planned to present four points: (1) the Nationalists were ousted because they claimed to represent the Chinese mainland; (2) the Nationalist Ambassador had acknowledged that the IOC was right; (3) that Nationalist athletes would probably be allowed to enter representing Formosa; and (4) that China had been ousted earlier for claiming to represent Formosa. While the last point would not have stood up to scrutiny, the others would have sufficiently negated government criticism and, hence, the Internal Security Committee was wise to drop the investigation (see, Drew Pearson, "Senate Committee Quietly Drops Probe of Olympics," Santa Barbara News-Press, 26 July 1959, in ABC, sb. 38, p. 45).

¹³⁰ABC, sb. 38, p. 23.

¹³¹Letter from Chinese National Olympic Committee (Taiwan) to Avery Brundage, 10 August 1959, in ABC, sb. 38, p. 50.

¹³²Letter from Frank S. Lim to Avery Brundage, 8 July 1959, in ABC, sb. 38, p. 49.

¹³³"News Release No. 150," Organizing Committee: VIII Olympic Winter Games, San Francisco, California, 20 June 1959.

¹³⁴"International Olympic Committee Plays New Tricks Using 'Two Chinas' Scheme," NCNA, 28 February 1960, in SCMP, no. 2209.

¹³⁵Leiper, The Pursuit of Olympism, pp. 284-85.

¹³⁶Cited in Bulletin of the IOC, no. 72 (November 1960), p. 64.

¹³⁷Letter from Raymond A. Hare, Deputy Under Secretary of State, to Avery Brundage, 8 June 1960, in ABC, Box 333.

¹³⁸IOC Circular No. 155 from Avery Brundage to IOC Members, the NOCs and the IFs, 5 July 1960, in ABC, Box 70.

¹³⁹Leiper, The Pursuit of Olympism, p. 285.

¹⁴⁰Japan Times, 26 August 1960.

¹⁴¹IOC, "Minutes . . . Baden-Baden, 1963."

¹⁴²"All-China Athletic Federation Denounces 'One China, One Taiwan' Plot," NCNA, 21 June 1964, in SCMP, no. 3246.

¹⁴³Japan Times, 25 October and 8 November 1964.

¹⁴⁴Ibid., 26 October and 3 November 1964.

¹⁴⁵Letter from Dr. L. K. Kiang to Avery Brundage, n.d.

¹⁴⁶Letter from Dr. L. K. Kiang to H. Weir, 16 November 1965.

¹⁴⁷Leiper, The Pursuit of Olympism, p. 286.

¹⁴⁸"All-China Sports Federation Spokesman Exposes New Plot of International Olympic Committee," NCNA, 14 August 1966, in SCMP, no. 3763.

¹⁴⁹"Completely Smash the IOC Trick," China Sports, no. 9 (September 1966), p. 37.

¹⁵⁰A photocopy of the letter appears in ROCOC, "A Résumé," Appendix 7, p. 23.

¹⁵¹For accounts of these first post-Cultural Revolution sporting events, see NCNA (Peking), 8 June, 10 June, 8 July and 13 August 1970.

¹⁵²Peking Review, no. 17 (23 April 1971), pp. 4-5.

¹⁵³Monique Berlioux, "The History of the International Olympic Committee," in Lord Killanin and John Rodda (ed.) The Olympic Games (London: Barrie and Jenkins Limited, 1976), p. 19.

¹⁵⁴Details of Henry Hsu's extensive background in sport may be found in China Yearbook 1976 (Taipei: China Publishing Company, 1976), p. 571.

¹⁵⁵Olympic Review, no. 80-81 (July-August 1974), p. 375.

¹⁵⁶Government of Canada, "House of Commons Debates," Queens Printer, Ottawa, 1976, p. 15005. Hereafter cited as "Commons Debates."

¹⁵⁷Olympic Review, no. 49 (October 1971), p. 551.

¹⁵⁸Ibid., no. 50-51 (November-December 1971), p. 576.

¹⁵⁹Ibid., p. 577.

¹⁶⁰"China Will Not Send Observer Delegation to the Olympics," Peking Review, no. 35 (1 September 1972), p. 23.

¹⁶¹ROCO, Amateur Sport in the Republic of China, p. 6.

¹⁶²"Lord Killanin, President," Olympic Review, no. 59 (October 1972), pp. 393-94.

¹⁶³Ibid., p. 399.

¹⁶⁴See f.n. 1 supra.

¹⁶⁵For the views of an outside observer, see Doug Gardner, "Winds of Change Blows Up a Storm," Sports World, vol. 2, no. 11 (November 1973), pp. 21-22.

¹⁶⁶Olympic Review, no. 72-73 (November-December 1973), p. 473.

¹⁶⁷Gardner, "Winds of Change," p. 22.

¹⁶⁸"Asian Games," Toronto Globe and Mail, 20 February 1974, cited in Rich Baka, "China on the International Sports Scene: An Historical Perspective," unpublished paper, University of Western Ontario, April 1974, p. 34.

¹⁶⁹Olympic Review, no. 76-77 (March-April 1974), p. 103.

¹⁷⁰Cited in "China's Legitimate Rights in the International Olympic Committee Must Be Restored," All-China Sports Federation, Peking, n.d., ca. May 1976, mimeographed paper.

¹⁷¹NCNA (Peking), 20 May 1975.

¹⁷²NCNA (Yaounde), 1 April 1975.

¹⁷³Olympic Review, no. 93-94 (July-August 1975), p. 237.

¹⁷⁴"Commons Debates . . . 1975," p. 5109.

¹⁷⁵Ibid., p. 6599.

¹⁷⁶NCNA (Peking), 20 May 1975.

¹⁷⁷NCNA (Geneva), 21 May 1975.

¹⁷⁸Cited in ROCOC, "A Résumé," p. 41.

¹⁷⁹Ibid., p. 43.

¹⁸⁰"China's Legitimate Rights," pp. 7-8. See also, NCNA (Peking), 3 June 1975.

¹⁸¹Ibid., p. 9.

¹⁸²Cited by NCNA (Peking), 3 June 1975.

¹⁸³Olympic Review, no. 97-98 (November-December 1975), p. 441.

¹⁸⁴Reprinted in ROCOC, "A Résumé," Appendix 8, pp. 24-32.

¹⁸⁵Iranian NOC, "Historical Background," pp. 35-40.

¹⁸⁶Cited by the Iranian NOC and printed in ROCOC, "A Résumé," Appendix 8, p. 31.

¹⁸⁷Republic of China Olympic Committee, "A Résumé of Historical Facts Concerning the Status of the Republic of China Olympic Committee in IOC - An Answer to the Peking Question," see f.n. 33 supra.

¹⁸⁸Ibid., p. 3.

¹⁸⁹Ibid., pp. 3-6.

¹⁹⁰Ibid., p. 7.

¹⁹¹Vancouver Sun, 6 July 1976.

¹⁹²The Province (Vancouver), 2 July 1976.

¹⁹³Vancouver Sun, 2 July 1976.

¹⁹⁴Ibid.

¹⁹⁵"All-China Sports Federation Reiterates China's Stand in Message to International Olympic Committee," Bulletin No. 5, Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Canada, Ottawa, 1976.

¹⁹⁶Edmonton Journal, 5 July 1976.

¹⁹⁷Vancouver Sun, 6 July 1976.

¹⁹⁸"Commons Debates . . . 1976," p. 15001.

¹⁹⁹Ibid., p. 15005.

²⁰⁰Vancouver Sun, 7 July 1976.

²⁰¹"Commons Debates . . . 1976," p. 15063.

²⁰²Ibid., p. 15068.

²⁰³"PRC Sports Leader Departs for Olympic Games," in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) (Springfield, Virginia: U.S. Department of Commerce, July 1976, A2).

²⁰⁴Vancouver Sun, 7 July 1976.

²⁰⁵Ibid., 8 July 1976.

²⁰⁶"Commons Debates . . . 1976," pp. 15159-60.

²⁰⁷Vancouver Sun, 9 July 1976.

- 208 Ibid.
- 209 "Commons Debates . . . 1976," p. 15202.
- 210 FBIS, 12 July 1976, A14.
- 211 Vancouver Sun, 10 July 1976.
- 212 Ibid.
- 213 FBIS, 14 July 1976.
- 214 The Province (Vancouver), 12 July 1976.
- 215 Vancouver Sun, 12 July 1976.
- 216 Ibid.
- 217 Ibid.
- 218 Ibid.
- 219 "Commons Debates . . . 1976," p. 15242.
- 220 Ibid., p. 15249.
- 221 The Province (Vancouver), 13 July 1976.
- 222 Vancouver Sun, 13 July 1976.
- 223 Ibid.
- 224 The Province (Vancouver), 14 July 1976.
- 225 Vancouver Sun, 14 July 1976.
- 226 Ibid.
- 227 Ibid., 15 July 1976.
- 228 The Province (Vancouver), 14 July 1976.
- 229 Vancouver Sun, 15 July 1976.
- 230 Montreal Star, 15 July 1976.
- 231 Vancouver Sun, 16 July 1976.
- 232 FBIS (USSR), 19 July 1976.
- 233 Vancouver Sun, 16 July 1976.

²³⁴Ibid., 17 July 1976.

²³⁵Ibid., 22 July 1976.

²³⁶One of the first articles to suggest that 'wheat sales' were behind the Canadian decision to ban athletes from Taiwan was written by syndicated U.S. columnist George F. Will. See, Vancouver Sun, 7 July 1976.

²³⁷Free China Weekly (Taipei), 25 July 1976.

²³⁸FBIS, 2 August 1976.

²³⁹Mimeographed paper provided by Republic of China Olympic Committee, 2 February 1977.

²⁴⁰Ibid.

²⁴¹Ibid.

²⁴²"The Olympics and Taiwan," mimeographed paper, Ottawa, 1976. A photocopy of the paper was provided by M.P. Douglas Roche (Edmonton-Strathcona), 7 September 1976.

²⁴³Ibid., p. 2.

²⁴⁴Ibid., p. 3.

²⁴⁵Ibid., pp. 3-4.

²⁴⁶Ibid., p. 5.

²⁴⁷Ibid., p. 6.

²⁴⁸Letter from the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 10 September 1976.

²⁴⁹"Clarification by the IOC," Olympic Review, no. 107-108 (September-October 1976), p. 460.

²⁵⁰Ibid.

²⁵¹Ibid., no. 109-110 (November-December 1976), p. 582.

²⁵²Ibid., no. 111 (January 1977), p. 49.

²⁵³Ibid., no. 114 (April 1977), p. 224.

²⁵⁴See, specifically, "Lord Killanin . . . Five Years of Presidency . . . and China," Olympic Review, no. 119 (September 1977), pp. 536-39. See also, Vancouver Sun, 16 and 19 September 1977.

²⁵⁵Vancouver Sun, 13 and 23 May 1978.

CHAPTER IV

CHINA'S RELATIONS WITH THE INTERNATIONAL SPORTS FEDERATIONS

The organizational structure of sport in China is, at the national level, similar to that found in most countries. Sports associations and federations, such as football, swimming and gymnastics, are affiliated to a national, multi-sport governing body which provides administrative, technical and, in the case of international multi-sport competitions, coordinating assistance to its member associations. The involvement of the designated umbrella organization--the All-China Sports Federation--and its relationship with the International Olympic Committee has been documented in the previous chapter.

As was noted in several instances, the interaction between the national sports associations in China and the international sports federations was integrally related to an analysis of Chinese involvement in the Olympic Movement. While the mandate for recognition of a National Olympic Committee, in this case the ACSF, rests with the IOC, the recognition of a national sports organization is the responsibility of the international federation concerned. For example, the Table Tennis Association of the People's Republic of China was recognized by the International Table Tennis Federation

(ITTF) in 1953.¹ Without such approved affiliation, member athletes of a national association cannot participate in sanctioned international events, nor can other member associations, without prior approval, compete against the non-member association. The significance of IF membership is likewise illustrated by the fact that, prior to acceptance into the IOC, a NOC composed of at least five national associations holding the franchise for that country granted by an IF recognized by the IOC must be established. As in the case of NOCs and the IOC, two national associations claiming to represent the same area cannot, in theory, be recognized simultaneously. Since 1949, then, where an IF has recognized a national sports association from Taiwan the issue has been crucial to China's relations in international sport.

This chapter discusses the role of the International Federations in the Olympic Movement; documents and identifies China's membership in the IFs; and analyzes and interprets the interaction between China and the IFs from 1949 to the present. Participation by Chinese athletes in international competitions held under the jurisdiction of the IFs will be outlined in Chapter V.

The International Sports Federations

The International Federations are autonomous organizations composed of affiliated national associations and federations responsible for the administration, promotion and control of a single sport. Although membership roles and geographical representation often vary

from one federation to another, several functions generally accrue to each IF according to the nature of its sport and the delimitations of its statutes, including:

- (1) the establishing of rules governing competition;
- (2) the approval of equipment and facilities;
- (3) the designation of age, sex, weight and performance categories;
- (4) the determination of medical standards and controls;
- (5) the setting of criteria regarding amateur status;
- (6) the certification of officials;
- (7) the supervision of international competitions, regional and world championships; and
- (8) the recognition of national associations as franchise holders in countries and territories throughout the world.²

Acknowledging the need to cooperate and share expertise on matters of mutual concern, more than 50 IFs formed the General Assembly of International Federations (GAIF) in 1967. Membership in GAIF may be categorized in one of three groupings: first, those federations whose role is supportive and facilitative, such as the International Sports Press Association (AIPS) and the International Federation of Sports Medicine (FIMS); second, those federations whose sport is not presently included on the Olympic Program, such as the International Badminton Federation (IBF) and the Fédération Internationale de Roller-Skating (FIRS); third, those federations whose

sport is included in the Olympic Games.³ Table 8 lists the IFs presently recognized by the IOC. Within the IOC, the IFs are represented on the 10-member Tripartite Commission, although the 'supreme authority' in all matters other than the technical arrangements associated with the Olympic Games remains with the IOC

Since 1949, China's relations with the IFs have served as an indicator of future Chinese actions within the Olympic Movement and have confirmed the resolve with which the People's Republic approaches the question of Taiwan's status in the international community.

Membership Patterns: 1949-1978

In many instances, the affiliation status of the sports associations on Taiwan has been the major determining factor in China's relationship with the IFs and, in this regard, the membership patterns of both the ACSF and the ROCOC require documentation. Other considerations such as climate, economics, and cultural and philosophical predisposition have also influenced the IF membership pattern of the two organizations claiming to represent China. For example, relatively expensive activities, in terms of capital construction costs and mass appeal, such as equestrian sports, luge and bobsleigh, have yet to be promoted and developed on a broad scale in China, while the temperate climate on Taiwan has not been conducive for the development of ice hockey. After enjoying some popularity in China prior to and in the first few years following liberation, boxing has since been looked

TABLE 8

INTERNATIONAL FEDERATIONS RECOGNIZED
ON THE OLYMPIC PROGRAM

International Federation		Founding Date
IAAF	International Amateur Athletic Federation	1912
FISA	Fédération Internationale des Sociétés d'Aviron	1892
FIBA	Fédération Internationale de Basketball Amateur	1932
FIBT	Fédération Internationale de Bobsleigh et de Tobogganing	1924
AIBA	Association Internationale de Boxe Amateur	1946
ICH	International Canoe Federation	1924
FIAC	Fédération Internationale Amateur de Cyclisme	1900
FEI	Fédération Equestre Internationale	1921
FIE	Fédération Internationale d'Escrime	1913
FIFA	Fédération Internationale de Football Association	1904
FIG	Fédération Internationale de Gymnastique	1881
IHF	International Handball Federation	1946
FIH	Fédération Internationale de Hockey	1924
IIHF	International Ice Hockey Federation	1908
IJF	International Judo Federation	1951
FIL	Fédération Internationale de Luge de Course	1957
FILA	Fédération Internationale des Lutttes Amateurs	1912
FINA	Fédération Internationale de Natation Amateur	1908
UIPMB	Union Internationale de Pentathlon Moderne et Biathlon	1948
ISU	International Skating Union	1892
FIS	Fédération Internationale de Ski	1924
UIT	Union Internationale de Tir	1921
FITA	Fédération Internationale de Tir a l'Arc	1931
FIVB	Fédération Internationale de Volleyball	1947
IWF	International Weightlifting Federation	1920
IYRU	International Yacht Racing Union	1907

Source: Adapted from Olympism, p. 22 and Olympic Review, no. 123 (January 1978), pp. 64-73.

upon as a cruel, demeaning sport. Likewise, judo, in its present form, has yet to generate mass excitement. Due to the continued influence of western culture in Taiwan, baseball remains exceedingly popular, although the game is now being played in the larger cities of China as well. Thus, while factors such as these have influenced the decision of several national sports associations in China in regard to membership in the parent IF, the major consideration has been the willingness of the IF to recognize only one Chinese association.

The issue is, however, not simply one of identifying those IFs which have recognized China and those which have recognized Taiwan, but also of accounting for the changes in membership which have occurred through withdrawal, expulsion and reaffiliation over the past quarter century. Prior to analyzing the interaction between China and the IFs, then, the affiliation patterns of the national sports associations of China and Taiwan require identification.

As of 1978, 9 Olympic sports federations recognized China, while 17 recognized Taiwan. Tables 9 and 10 identify the IFs which have maintained uninterrupted recognition of the national sports associations of China (ACSF) and Taiwan (ROCOC) respectively.⁴

TABLE 9

INTERNATIONAL FEDERATIONS MAINTAINING UNINTERRUPTED
AFFILIATION OF CHINA (ACSF) MEMBER ASSOCIATION

International Federation	ACSF Member Affiliated
FISA (Rowing)	1973
ICF (Canoeing)	1974
FIE (Fencing)	1974
IIHF (Ice Hockey)	1956
ISU (Skating)	1956
ITTF* (Table Tennis)	1953
FISU* (University Sports)	1975
ISF* (Interschool Sports)	1973
FIDE* (Chess)	1974
*Sport not on the Olympic Program	

TABLE 10

INTERNATIONAL FEDERATIONS MAINTAINING UNINTERRUPTED
AFFILIATION OF TAIWAN (ROCOC) MEMBER ASSOCIATION

International Federation		ROCOC Member Affiliated
FIBT	(Bobsleigh and Tobogganing)	1975
AIBA	(Boxing)	1949
FEI	(Equestrian Sports)	1973
IHF	(Handball)	1972
FIH	(Field Hockey)	1956
IJF	(Judo)	1959
FIL	(Luge)	1975
UPIMB	(Modern Pentathlon)	1972
FIS	(Skiing)	1967
IYRU	(Yachting)	1970
IBF*	(Badminton)	1957

*Sport not on the Olympic Program

The combined totals of the uninterrupted affiliations listed in Tables 9 and 10 account for only 15 of the 26 IFs whose sports are included on the Olympic Program. Between 1958 and 1971 China withdrew from the remaining 11 federations in protest over the granting of recognition and affiliation to Taiwan. Table 11 identifies those IFs which have subsequently expelled the Taiwan association and reaffiliated the People's Republic of China association, while Table 12 lists those which continue to recognize only the Taiwan association.⁵

TABLE 11

INTERNATIONAL FEDERATIONS REAFFILIATING
THE CHINA (ACSF) MEMBER ASSOCIATION
AND EXPELLING THE TAIWAN (ROCOC)
MEMBER ASSOCIATION

International Federation		Taiwan Affiliated	China Withdraws	China Reaffiliated
FIBA	(Basketball)	1952	1958	1974
FILA	(Wrestling)	1962	1958	1974
IWF	(Weightlifting)	1952	1958	1974
FIVB	(Volleyball)	1970	1971	1974

TABLE 12

INTERNATIONAL FEDERATIONS CONTINUING TO
RECOGNIZE AND REFUSING TO EXPEL THE
TAIWAN (ROCOC) MEMBER ASSOCIATION

International Federation	Taiwan Affiliated	China Withdraws
IAAF (Track and Field)	1955	1958
FIFA (Football)	1954	1958
FIAC (Cycling)	1963	1958
FIG (Gymnastics)	1964	1964
FINA (Swimming and Diving)	1954	1958
UIT (Shooting)	1958	1958
FITA (Archery)	1969	1971
ILTF* (Lawn Tennis)	1970	1971
*Sport not on the Olympic Program		

The greatest number of withdrawals by sports associations affiliated with the ACSF occurred in 1958 when China severed relations with the IOC, eight IFs (Football, Swimming, Basketball, Track and Field, Weightlifting, Shooting, Wrestling and Cycling) and the regional (Asian) section of the International Table Tennis Federation.⁶ In the case of the four IFs (Basketball, Wrestling, Weightlifting and Volleyball) which subsequently expelled Taiwan and reaffiliated China, such action was taken only after the United Nations had taken a similar step in 1971. Although the data presented in the above tables reflects the present status of China's individual sports associations, due to the record keeping procedures, changes in executive officers and other factors unique to each IF there occasionally exist differing opinions as to the exact dates of affiliation, withdrawal, reapplication and reaffiliation. Furthermore, both the quality and quantity of data available vary immensely from federation to federation with the result that no definitive analysis which employs standard variables is possible. For example, some IFs readily provide copies of internal correspondence and minutes of official Congresses, while others respond only to requests from their affiliated member associations. It is possible, however, to present a "case study" of one IF whose dealings with China offer several examples of the issues, claims and tactics which have characterized relations between China and many of the IFs for the past two decades. Before proceeding, then, with specific details of China's interaction with the major international sports federations, the following analysis should provide insight into the relations between the football association in China and its parent IF.

"The Mantis and the Chariot"

A Case Study: FIFA and the Football Association
of the People's Republic of China

The Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), having recognized nearly 150 national associations, ranks second only to the IAAF in member affiliates. In addition to these national associations, FIFA deals with six Continental Confederations: Africa, North-Central America and Caribbean, South America, Asia, Asia-Oceania, and Europe.⁷ Founded in 1904, FIFA serves as the international governing body for both amateur and professional football. Its membership is global; its services range from youth programs to the World Cup; its followers number in the millions.

Football has been known in China, in one form or another (see pages 15) for 3,000 years. At the beginning of the 20th Century, the modern version of the game was introduced and became popular in Meixian (Meih sien) County in southern Guangdong province (often referred to as 'the football county' or 'the home of football,' Meixian now boasts over 2,000 teams, 200 playing fields, and has provided more than 100 players for national teams in recent years).⁸ Chinese teams competed in all 10 Far Eastern Championship Games football competitions from 1913-1934, winning the title 8 times.⁹ Following participation in the 1936 and 1948 Olympic Games tournaments, albeit without the success enjoyed previously, China looked forward to the continued growth of the sport during the early years of the People's Republic.

The first national championships were held in Tianjin in December 1951 and the second, a nine-day program which also featured a junior cup tournament, in Shanghai in 1953.¹⁰ International competitions were also promoted during this period as matches were held with several teams from fraternal socialist bloc countries.¹¹ More recently, China hosted an Invitational Friendship Football Tournament in July 1977 (see Chapter V) and later competed against the New York Cosmos of the North American professional league in a series of matches held in both China and the United States. An analysis of relations between the Chinese Football Association and FIFA must, however, begin a quarter century earlier.

As a result of China's growing involvement in international sport in the early 1950s, and in preparation for the 1952 Olympic Games, ACAF officials wrote to FIFA on April 8, 1952, informing the federation of the reorganization of the former China National Amateur Athletic Federation into the ACAF.¹² Further correspondence was exchanged in May and June and a cable was sent from FIFA headquarters in Zurich, followed by a letter on June 19 which stated

. . . that the Emergency Committee of F.I.F.A. has agreed to the recognition [sic] of the new direction of the All China Athletic Federation having taken over the activities of the former China National Amateur Athletic Federation. We have taken note that you are willing to fulfil all obligations as a member of the F.I.F.A.¹³

Two years later, at its 29th Congress, FIFA entertained applications from four associations, including the 'China National Amateur Athletic Federation, Taiwan.' Citing article 1, paragraph 1 of the FIFA Statutes which stipulated that only one association could

be recognized in each country, Chinese representative Li Meng-hua (Li Mun-hwa) opposed the CNAAF application.¹⁴ FIFA President Jules Rimet responded by expressing the view that it was a FIFA tradition not to allow political questions to be discussed during its debates, and added that he felt the Taiwan application was in order. As recorded in the minutes of the Congress, the CNAAF was seen to be an association "which had jurisdiction over a determined territory in a country which had sovereignty over this territory."¹⁵ Noting that the discussions "had to remain in the sphere of football," Rimet called for the vote on the admission of the Taiwan association which was passed by 31 votes.¹⁶ Li later repeated his claim that the decision was in violation of the Statutes and informed the assembly that he intended to pursue the matter at a future date.¹⁷

On June 9, 1956, ACAF representative Zhang Lian-hua walked out of the 30th Congress session in Lisbon when new FIFA President Arthur Drewry refused to permit discussion of a Chinese proposal to exclude the Taiwan association. Following his walkout Zhang handed a written protest to the President which repeated the stance adopted earlier that the Taiwan organization could only be recognized as a provincial branch under the ACAF and, thus, could not enter international competitions independently.¹⁸ No action was taken on Zhang's protest note nor on his request that the text of his speech and the letter be distributed to Congress delegates and be included in the official minutes of the session.¹⁹ The dispute, briefly rekindled, died only to re-emerge again at the next FIFA Congress in Stockholm.

In 1958 the question of the exclusion of the Taiwan association appeared on the agenda of the 31st Congress. Speaking in favor of the motion were Zhang and the Soviet delegate V. Antipenok, while the representative from Taiwan was opposed. President Drewry reported that the Executive Committee did not recommend acceptance of the motion and in the subsequent voting the proposal was defeated by 41 votes.²⁰ A heated argument then arose between Zhang and Drewry and, according to the minutes:

The delegate of the All China Athletic Federation who continued to protest was invited to leave the conference room for the morning session. The delegate retorted that the Chinese delegation would leave the Congress upon which the President answered that they had been asked to leave.

The delegation of the All China Athletic Federation, Peking, left the Congress room.²¹

Two days later, Zhang announced the withdrawal of the ACAF from FIFA. It is difficult to ascertain what, if any, discussion occurred in private prior to China's withdrawal; however the official Chinese statement issued on June 10, 1958, clearly linked the repeated refusal of FIFA officers to consider the question with a plot, engineered by the United States, to create 'two Chinas' (see Appendix H). The anti-American tone of the message reflected the rhetoric common to both sides during this period (see pages 38-42). Reiterating the position adopted in its dealings with the IOC, the ACAF accused FIFA of aiding the United States in attempting to create 'two Chinas' under the pretext that "politics is irrelevant to sports."²² If China's withdrawal from the football federation was seen as merely an isolated incident born of recurring frustration,

and there is little to indicate this, the announcement in August 1958 that China was severing relations with the IOC and several other international federations surely convinced the sporting community of China's determination to resolve the issue without compromise. It should also be recalled that at no time during this period did the authorities on Taiwan retreat from their claim to be the government of China, a regime only temporarily in exile.

Having severed all ties with FIFA, China had made its point but lost its voice in the assembly. Speaking at the 32nd Congress in 1960, the Bulgarian delegate Michael Daphinoff proposed that the Taiwan group be expelled, while President Thommen suggested that the China-Taiwan situation was the same as that of the two Germanys and the two Koreas and informed the delegates of the Executive Committee's decision to recommend rejection of the Bulgarian proposal. Thommen was supported 45 votes to 8.²³

The following year, the question of participation by FIFA member associations with the non-member Chinese football association was raised. In reviewing the situation, a FIFA official noted:

This Association has, unfortunately, not been with us since the Stockholm Congress. We do not have to deal with the political aspect of this matter. We are, however, very concerned about the sport of this country, and we can only hope that this Association with its hundreds of thousands of football players will soon show more interest in our organisation. A few of our Member Associations wish to carry out friendly matches with the People's Republic of China. The Executive Committee is of the opinion that these football relationships cannot be prohibited and the principle: 'All in good time' should apply [emphasis added]. This would not be the first time that F.I.F.A., acting with generosity and toleration has re-registered a dissident Association.²⁴

While the intent and interpretation of 'All in good time' was not clear, it was a significant departure to refer to China by its correct name rather than the commonly used, incorrect appellation 'People's Democratic Republic.' The issue of competition with China appears to have received little attention at subsequent Congress sessions until 1973 when, in a "general mood of increased strictness in the application of FIFA's Rules and Regulations,"²⁵ the Executive Committee adopted a policy of refusing to authorize competitions between national associations and China. Threatening to suspend any transgressors, and obviously in response to an increasing number of queries, the federation presented its views in July 1973:

From all that has been heard or written in connection with the re-affiliation problem of China DPR [again a reversion to the incorrect name!] to FIFA, it seems quite obvious that the reasons which made officials of that country's Football Association refrain from re-affiliating to FIFA are of a political nature, connected with the existence of National China and its membership with FIFA. For FIFA, however, which is a non-political, non-religious, non-racial body, these reasons are not sufficient to allow affiliated National Associations to play against non-affiliated Chinese teams [emphasis added]. From the sporting point of view also, the reasons evoked for non-re-affiliation are not valid. Some reproaches which have been made to FIFA in different quarters saying that many hundreds of thousands of football players from a country with 800 million inhabitants are being prevented from joining the international football events, are not justified: FIFA is not preventing them from meeting footballers from other countries--but their own football authorities are doing just that by not rejoining FIFA.²⁶

Support for China continued to be expressed in the months following and at the 39th Congress held in 1974 at Frankfurt/Main a two-part motion presented by Kuwait appeared on the agenda:

- a) That the membership of the Football Association of China National in the FIFA shall be cancelled; and
- b) That the Football Association of the People's Republic of China shall be called up to resume its membership in the FIFA.²⁷

In the lengthy discussion which followed the major point of contention was the position adopted by the Executive Committee that the question would require a three-quarters majority for acceptance. Following statements from President Sir Stanley Rous and by delegates from Kuwait, Fiji, Tanzania, Albania, Ethiopia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Guatemala, the Congo, Iran, Jamaica, Algeria, Brazil, Switzerland, and the Republic of China, the Executive Committee's proposal was passed 67:50.²⁸

The President of the African Football Confederation then presented a lengthy statement which was not accepted as it obtained only 58 votes, less than the required three-quarters majority:

Considering:

- that the People's Democratic Republic of China is recognised by international decision as the only Chinese representative;
- that Taiwan, by international decision, has been recognised as a province of Chinese territory;
- that as a result of this decision, there is legally only one China;
- that FIFA may only recognise one National Association from one country;
- that of the two National Associations in existence, the one which, in accordance with FIFA Statutes, effectively controls football in the country, is the one set up in the People's Republic of China;

- that FIFA cannot continue to recognise a National Association set up in a province without interfering in the internal political affairs of a country;

the FIFA Congress decides to re-establish the Football Association of the People's Democratic Republic of China with all its rights as the only organisation governing football in its country, including the Province of Taiwan, and authorises its returning as a full member of FIFA, the Football Association of Nationalist China thus losing its rights to FIFA membership.²⁹

The Kuwaiti proposal was likewise defeated 59:47.³⁰

On June 24, an official of the Chinese Football Association noted the growing influence of Third World nations in international sport and criticized the tactic of implementing a three-quarters majority rule to 'wilfully obstruct and sabotage' the proposal.³¹

The 39th Congress also saw the election of Dr. Joao Havelange as President over the incumbent Sir Stanley Rous. The first ballot, requiring a two-thirds majority (in this instance, 79 votes) saw the Brazilian lead 62:56, while the second, requiring only a simple majority, resulted in his election with a poll count of 68:52.³²

Less than a month later, at the first meeting of the new Executive Board, the decision banning competitions with China was revoked in a move that was closely tied to China's admission to the Asian Games Federation and which then opened the way for the People's Republic to enter the 1974 Games in Teheran (see Chapter V).

In April 1975, the Executive Committee of the Asian Football Confederation, meeting in Kuwait, renewed demands for China's restoration in FIFA.³³ A month later, FIFA President Havelange and the General Secretary Helmut Kaser travelled to Peking to meet with

leading members of the Chinese Football Association.³⁴ Later in July, reflecting on his first year in office, Havelange listed among the 10 tasks requiring continued attention the 'return of China.'³⁵

At the 40th FIFA Congress, held in conjunction with the 1976 Olympic Games at Montreal, the readmission of China was a major agenda item. Adopting a different stance to that taken previously, the Executive Committee recommended that the Congress admit the football association of the People's Republic.³⁶ This proposal was countered by one from the African Football Confederation which requested, first, that the ROC football association be expelled and, second, that the decision on the admission of the PRC association be decided by a simple majority vote.³⁷ A lively debate followed with members disagreeing on the procedural format to be adopted. The Fijian delegate, S.M. Singh, pointed out

. . . that it was impossible to deal with the exclusion of Taiwan by merely making it an addendum to the proposal of the FIFA Executive Committee to readmit the DPR China, but that in order to be able to discuss it and decide upon it validly, it was first of all necessary to include the matter on the Agenda as stipulated in the Statutes.³⁸

Delegates from the Congo and Pakistan disagreed with this interpretation and suggested, instead, that the expulsion of Taiwan was directly correlated with the readmission of China.³⁹ Speaking in turn, several individuals stated that it would, procedurally, be impossible to consider the matter of expulsion since the item on the agenda mentioned only admission. Speaking on behalf of the South American Confederation,

the delegate from Uruguay hoped to see China readmitted but not at the expense of Taiwan and he demanded that strict adherence to FIFA Statutes be maintained.⁴⁰

As the President moved to close the debate, further discussion arose concerning the Fijian proposal to have the Congress decide whether or not the question on the expulsion of the ROC association should be placed on the agenda (any alteration of the agenda required a three-quarters majority). From this point on, the Minutes are quoted in full:

He (the President) asked the General Secretary to repeat the motion.

Dr. Kaser recalled that the motion put forward by Fiji was that the Congress should decide whether the question of the expulsion of the Republic of China Football Association should be put on the agenda or not.

He also reminded the Congress of what Dr. Goni had said, that this change to the Agenda could only be made with a 3/4 majority.

Before a vote was taken the following delegates were permitted to speak:

- Dr. Halim (Sudan) considered that the vote was unnecessary as the question had in fact already been discussed.

- Mr. Ganga (Congo) supported the opinion of Dr. Halim. He failed to see why the matter should be rediscussed, whether or not it were added to the Agenda.

The motion which had been handed in writing was read by the General Secretary:

"Mr. Chairman, Fédération Internationale de Football Association. We being members of FIFA hereby request that the voting in respect of the readmission of the Football Association of the People's Republic of China be taken by calling the roll pursuant to Article 10, para. 2 of the Standing Orders of Congress of FIFA, in view of the importance of the issue."

Dr. Kaser recalled the motion which had been put forward by Fiji and which he had just repeated, which was: "Does Congress agree, yes or no, to discuss the expulsion of Taiwan?" As this point was not included on the Agenda it would have to be dealt with according to the Statutes. If it was included on the Agenda, then it should be discussed and a decision taken.

At this point the General Secretary proceeded to take the vote, according to the following account and in these words:

"Those who are in favor that the point expulsion of Taiwan be placed on the Agenda are requested to raise the green card." We just want to know if Congress agrees to include this point on the Agenda.

Mr. Ganga and Mr. Tessema complained that they did not know what the vote was about, the General Secretary therefore repeated it in English. . . . Mr. Ganga complained once again that he did not know what the vote was supposed to be for.

5 delegates voted in favor of placing the proposal to expel Taiwan on the Agenda and 51 delegates voted against.

The Chairman confirmed that the Congress had clearly decided against the question of Taiwan being placed on the Agenda and declared that the DPR China had been readmitted purely and simply to FIFA.⁴¹

The issue was, however, still far from resolved. As the delegates moved on to discuss the proposed expulsion of the South African Football Association which had been under suspension since the 1964 Tokyo Congress, Richard Avory of Iran challenged the approach which had been used by the General Secretary in presenting the previous motion. This action angered the Chairman who, noting that Dr. Kaser was a man of integrity who had worked conscientiously for the Federation for 16 years, interrupted Avory and observed that there was absolutely no confusion or reason to rediscuss the issue.⁴²

On September 20, the General Secretary cabled the Football Association of the People's Republic informing it of the decision reached in Montreal. In a response sent to Dr. Havelange on October 6, the uncompromising position adopted nearly two decades before was reaffirmed:

- (1) FIFA . . . is flagrantly creating a situation of 'two Chinas' and grossly interfering in China's internal affairs. Our Association expresses its great indignation against and strongly condemns this action of the FIFA.
- (2) . . . The decision of the Montreal Congress of the FIFA is entirely illegal and in violation of Article One of the FIFA Statutes which stipulates that only one Association shall be recognized in each country.
- (3) The Football Association of the People's Republic of China will not accept FIFA's erroneous decision until the FIFA withdraws its recognition from the so-called football association of the Chiang clique.⁴³

Expressing surprise and shock, the President replied on December 18, 1976:

The terms of your letter dated October 6, 1976 make it clear that your Association does not accept FIFA's decision and considers it "wrong" and contrary to the Statutes. I have no choice but to accept your decision and in return to ask you to also accept FIFA's decision.

Nevertheless I hope your Association will reconsider its point of view and become a member of FIFA, thus acquiring the right to present proposals and defend its convictions specifically concerning football and matters concerning the Rules and FIFA Statutes.⁴⁴

Having failed to resolve the impasse, FIFA then turned its attention to the Asian Football Confederation which was threatened with suspension unless it reinstated the associations from Taiwan and Israel which had been expelled in 1974 prior to the 7th Asian Games.

(The latter association had been banned from the AGF ostensibly on the grounds of potential security problems and the high associated costs.) Following discussions between Havelange and AFC representatives, FIFA agreed to extend the deadline to January 1978 for resolution of the issue.⁴⁵ The question was later discussed by AFC delegates in December and although the Confederation upheld its earlier decision, the organization was itself divided and as the year ended China's future in the Olympic Movement remained uncertain.⁴⁶

Further proposals to expel Taiwan and readmit China were presented at the 41st FIFA Congress held in Buenos Aires in May 1978. By a vote of 57:46, the President and Executive Committee were requested to resolve the impasse before the next Congress in two years time.⁴⁷

Interaction With the International Federations

The preceding case study outlined the relations between the football association of the People's Republic and FIFA from 1949 to 1978 and documented several factors in the 'two-China' controversy. Noteworthy points included: the Chinese position vis-à-vis Taiwan's status as a province of China; the recognition by FIFA of football associations from both the PRC and the ROC; the withdrawal of the ACAF member association from FIFA; and the subsequent attempts by FIFA and its member affiliates to resolve the conflict.

The interaction between other Chinese national sports associations and the parent International Federation followed a similar pattern during this period, especially where the question of the recognition of 'two Chinas' arose. The following section focuses on the relations between China and these IFs, beginning with China's first contact prior to the 1952 Olympic Games.

On April 8, 1952, the ACAF notified the international swimming federation (FINA) of the reorganization of the China National Amateur Athletic Federation into the All-China Athletic Federation with its headquarters in Peking.⁴⁸ A reply from the Honorary Secretary of FINA, R.M. Ritter of the United States, on April 25, noted that the dues of £6 per year were in arrears for 1949 to 1952 and requested payment "so that our FINA Congress, which will be held in July in Helsinki, Finland, will not cancel your affiliated membership. . . ."⁴⁹ Chinese representative Sheng Zhi-pai attended the FINA Congress meetings in Helsinki and opposed the presence of a delegate from Taiwan.⁵⁰ China's relations with FINA in 1952 were noteworthy in another aspect in that, in spite of the late arrival of the Chinese delegation in Helsinki, one swimmer did enter the Olympic competitions (see Chapter III) and became the first and only representative of the PRC to ever compete in an Olympic event.

In 1954, FINA accepted an application for membership from the swimming association in Taiwan. China protested this action without success and eventually withdrew from FINA in August 1958.⁵¹

At the FINA Congress in September 1974 held in Cairo, the Swimming Association of the PRC was readmitted to membership in the federation.⁵² However, as the resolution did not also expel the ROC Swimming Association, China refused to accept the offer of reaffiliation.

In subsequent months FINA took action against member associations which competed against the non-affiliated Chinese association. Following a two-week tour of China in November 1974 by a Canadian goodwill swimming delegation, FINA suspended the coach, the swimmers and a broadcaster! The initial twelve-month suspension was increased to two years at its meetings in Cali, Colombia in July 1975.⁵³

Similar steps were taken following an Invitational Swimming Meet held in Peking in August as two-year suspensions were handed out to more than 80 swimmers from African and Asian countries in November 1975. This action led to the following response from Chinese swimming officials:

We always hold that sportsmen of all countries have the right to make friendly contacts according to their own will. . . . On the basis of equality, friendship and mutual respect, they learned from each other to jointly raise their swimming skill. . . . Yet a handful of FINA leaders went so far as to mete out "punishment" to FINA member associations for taking part in the Peking meet. It is not difficult to see that in taking this action the real aim of these persons is to undermine the sports exchanges and development of friendly relations between peoples of all countries and China, and to continue their absurd stand of creating "two Chinas." Such practice completely runs counter to the tide of history. It is very unpopular and resolutely opposed by us and all justice-upholding sports circles throughout the world.⁵⁴

FINA's stance remained a source of irritation to China as the federation threatened to suspend swimmers from any member associations who participated against China at the 1976 School Sports Association Games held in Paris in June. A spokesman for the Chinese delegation bitterly attacked the FINA declaration that its member swimmers risked sanctions and suspensions if they entered the meet and noted that the Interschool Sports Federation (ISF) was an independent international organization and not a subordinate of FINA.⁵⁵ The dispute resulted in the withdrawal of the Chinese middle school delegation from all events in the Games' program of track and field, swimming and gymnastics.

Little progress was made towards the readmission of China at the 1976 FINA Congress in Montreal, but in a related matter, a request from Canada for authorization to send a swimming delegation to China in the fall was refused. A Canadian spokesman was quoted as saying:

FINA is hoping to have China in the association before too long. But they want the negotiations to proceed in an orderly fashion and until everything is settled they don't want any tours.⁵⁶

As of 1978, the Fédération Internationale de Natation Amateur continued to recognize the Swimming Association of the Republic of China, Taiwan.

China's relations with the international track and field federation followed a similar pattern from 1952 to 1978. Chinese representative Sheng Zhi-pai attended the 1952 Helsinki Congress of the International Amateur Athletic Federation (IAAF) and requested that the membership of the People's Republic be accepted. IAAF President Lord Burghley expressed the opinion that the PRC should be

recognized since the Taiwan association operated in the territory beyond that where the majority of Chinese lived, while an American delegate favored the admission of the ROC association.⁵⁷ In response to further discussion, including an Australian proposal to admit both associations, newly-elected IOC President Avery Brundage joined the American delegate in suggesting that the question be postponed for two years. The motion passed 105:83.⁵⁸

The IAAF admitted the Chinese track and field association in 1954 and a year later also recognized the Taiwan association. Recalling these events several years later, the Marquess of Exeter (Lord Burghley) noted that the decision was based on the need to solve the problem which arose at the end of World War II regarding the divided states of Germany, Korea and China. Citing the desire of the federation to separate sport and politics, Exeter stated:

We were most anxious too that the youth from the other halves should not be debarred from world athletics. With violent disagreement, however, on (the) top political level on their status, it was not for us to take a decision appearing to do so.

Under our rules we can affiliate Members not only by countries but by territories too if they de facto control amateur athletics there. We therefore affiliated them under the name of the geographical area in which they actually were: Formosa as Taiwan, the other half of Germany as East Germany and of Korea as North Korea.⁶⁰

As it was in all other instances, this step was unacceptable to the ACAF in Peking and, following unsuccessful attempts to resolve the dispute, it also withdrew from the IAAF in August 1958.⁶¹ In defense of the recognition of the Taiwan association, Exeter remarked on behalf of the IAAF:

I think perhaps a misunderstanding may have arisen, probably through the language problem, for I do not think that it was fully appreciated that the IAAF had not recognized a second China but had affiliated the body in a geographical territory which alone could control and administer athletics in their area of some 20 million people [15 million, sic] and ensure that IAAF rules were kept. I should emphasise that there were no sporting disagreements between the IAAF and our Member for China.⁶²

Little contact ensued between the IAAF and the Chinese track and field association in the following decade and only in 1974 was any concrete action taken by either side. In May a sub-committee was established to "look for a compromise solution"⁶³ taking into account the existing affiliation of the Taiwan association. At the full Congress session in August the federation amended its rules and authorized competitions between its member associations and the non-member Chinese association. This step enabled Chinese competitors to enter the athletic events at the 7th Asian Games in Teheran in the fall of that year.⁶⁴

Prior to the 1976 Montreal Olympics, Exeter noted that the IAAF had not received an application for affiliation from the Chinese association (undoubtedly because the IAAF continued to recognize the ROC). Two years later, IAAF General Secretary John Holt announced that several resolutions had been passed by the Council in an effort to resolve the lengthy dispute between China and the largest of the international federations:

- (1) A proposal to invite China to join the IAAF.
- (2) A proposal that would change the name of the Republic of China association to 'Taiwan.'
- (3) A proposal that would withdraw recognition of the Taiwan association if the Chinese association applied for membership.⁶⁵

The first two resolutions were passed unanimously, while the third passed with seven members in favor, five opposed and two abstentions. Holt stated that because there was not consensus on the proposed expulsion, the Council would not place the item on the agenda of the fall meetings of the full Congress, but that the first two items would be forwarded to the Congress when it met in Puerto Rico in October 1978.⁶⁶

One need only return to the year 1952 to again discover the beginnings of the 'two China' controversy in yet a third international federation, as Sheng Zhi-pai attended the Congress meetings of the international basketball federation (FIBA) in Helsinki. Unlike the meetings of FINA and the IAAF which initially left open the possibility of China's affiliation as the sole national representative for the entire nation, the deliberations of FIBA foreshadowed the future troubles which would characterize Chinese interaction with the IFs when FIBA recognized both the Peking and Taiwan associations.⁶⁷ As early as 1952, then, the question of 'two Chinas' became a concrete issue.

Six years later, China withdrew from FIBA in protest over the continued recognition of the Taiwan association.⁶⁸ In 1959 at the 3rd World Basketball Championships in Chile the 'two Chinas' issue arose again when teams from the Soviet Union and Bulgaria refused to play matches against the team from Taiwan. In so doing, the Soviet Union forfeited the championship won on the strength of a 5:0 record which included a victory over the previous champions from the United States.⁶⁹

The reaction from the ACAF to these events was enunciated by a Chinese spokesman on February 3, 1959:

This was a naked exposure of the true imperialist features of Greim [American President of FIBA, Willard N. Greim] and his like when we resolutely withdrew from the International Amateur Basketball Federation, they continued their sophistry while rejecting the Soviet demand to expel the so-called sports organization of the Chiang Kai-shek clique. . . . This further exposes the fact that the International Amateur Basketball Federation, under the manipulation of the American imperialists, has become a tool of the American imperialists in their conspiracy to create 'two Chinas.'⁷⁰

Following China's admission to the United Nations and in order to permit the participation of Chinese athletes at the 7th Asian Games in 1974, the FIBA Central Board approved the affiliation of the PRC and suspended the ROC on July 9, 1974.⁷¹ In May 1975, the General Secretary of FIBA, William Jones, held further discussions with Chinese officials in Peking⁷² and in November the Asian Basketball Confederation confirmed the expulsion of the Taiwan association during its meetings in Bangkok.⁷³ The only remaining step in the approval of China's reaffiliation, ratification by the full membership, took place on July 13, 1976 in Montreal.⁷⁴

Three other IFs (Weightlifting, Volleyball and Wrestling) also responded to the problem of 'two Chinas' in a similar way in 1974. China had severed ties with the International Weightlifting Federation (IWF) in 1958 as a part of the ACAF's mass withdrawal in protest over the 1954 recognition of Taiwan.⁷⁵ In subsequent years, relations between China and the IWF were further strained when, in 1965, the IWF issued one-year suspensions to its member associations from

Romania, Pakistan, Indonesia and North Korea as a result of their participation in competitions with China. A response to these sanctions which appeared in Tiyu Bao charged that the decision to suspend the four associations was directed by the IWF's American President Clarence Johnson:

It only goes to show the complete reactionary character of the international sports organizations under U.S. imperialist manipulation which have come more and more the tools of the United States to push ahead with its reactionary foreign policy, monopolise international sports, sabotage the friendship and solidarity among peoples and hatch political intrigues. Our peoples should wage a relentless struggle against such international sports organizations.⁷⁶

Several months later, ACSF Secretary General Zhang Lian-hua replied to a proposal from IWF official Oscar State that China re-enter the federation. Zhang wrote on May 19, 1966:

The Chinese people and sportsmen will never abandon their principled stand of resolute opposition to imperialist monopoly in international sports affairs and support for the people of various countries in their struggle to safeguard their independence and sovereign rights, and will never allow any 'two Chinas' situation to arise in international sports activities.

As for your so-called 'world championships,' we are not in the least interested. The Chinese people and weightlifters have friends all over the world and have a broad horizon for the exchange of technical experience with friends of various countries to learn from each other for common progress.⁷⁷

Whereas the emphasis in letters and statements issued by the ACSF in 1958 was primarily on China-US relations, by the mid-1960s the focus had shifted to reflect the growing ties between China and the Third World countries which had recently gained or were in the process of gaining independence from their former colonial masters (see Chapter V). The major point of contention remained, however, the question of 'two Chinas.'

In May 1974, the IWF Executive Board accepted the provisional affiliation of the Weightlifting Association of the People's Republic and proposed that the question be placed before its next Congress for ratification.⁷⁸ On September 20, 1974, Oscar State announced that the Congress which was meeting in Manila had approved the admission of the PRC and the expulsion of the ROC.⁷⁹ Seven months later, State and two IWF representatives met with officials of the ACSF in Peking and conducted a brief training course for coaches and referees as an indication that relations between China and the IWF had come full circle and had returned to normal after 16 years.⁸⁰

The controversy over 'two Chinas' in the international volleyball federation did not emerge until 1970. At its 12th Congress, the Fédération Internationale de Volley (FIVB) accepted the membership application of the Republic of China Volley Association (ROCVA), an action which drew the following response from the Volleyball Association of the PRC:

There is only one China in the world, and that is the People's Republic of China. Taiwan province has always been an inalienable part of Chinese territory. The Chiang Kai-shek clique entrenched in Taiwan province is but a political corpse under the protection of U.S. imperialist bayonets. Its so-called "Volleyball Association" has no right whatsoever to join any international sports organization.⁸¹

Signifying that there had been no change in the Chinese position regarding 'two Chinas' as a result of the Cultural Revolution (1966-69), the Peking association withdrew from FIVB on October 27, 1970.⁸²

China's withdrawal was short-lived as in 1974 at the 14th FIVB Congress in Mexico City a 17-nation draft resolution which proposed

that the ROC be expelled and the PRC admitted "as the sole national association in charge of this sport on the whole Chinese territory" was adopted 54:18 with 3 abstentions.⁸³ This change had undoubtedly been anticipated some months in advance as FIVB President Paul Libaud announced, in an unusual move considering that the Congress had yet to consider the draft resolution, that both men's and women's teams from China had been entered for the World Championships in October.⁸⁴

1974 also saw the Wrestling Association of the People's Republic of China admitted to the parent IF. Following discussion of the issue of 'two Chinas' by the Executive Board in Budapest, the decision was ratified at the Fédération Internationale de Lutte Amateur (FILA) Congress meeting in Istanbul on August 28, 1974.⁸⁵

China's Uninterrupted Affiliations

By the end of 1975, 13 international federations recognized the People's Republic including 9 which, having never affiliated a Taiwan association, had maintained uninterrupted ties with China (see Table 9, page 162). Where the question of 'two Chinas' was never an issue, relations between the Chinese member association and the parent IF have been cooperative and mutually beneficial. For example, the Table Tennis Association of the People's Republic was recognized by the International Table Tennis Federation (ITTF) in 1953 and teams from China entered the World Championships in Bucharest in the same year.⁸⁶ Except for the period of the Cultural Revolution, Chinese teams have dominated the sport ever since (see Chapter V).

The ROC association attempted to secure recognition in 1956, but the application was rejected at the ITTF Congress in Tokyo as neither the association's Title nor Constitution met federation requirements stipulating that the territory over which jurisdiction was claimed be clearly identified.⁸⁷ (In 1956 the ROC still claimed, in the case of table tennis, to be the sole legitimate governing body for the whole of China.)

In 1963 the Chinese Table Tennis Association found it necessary to respond to another challenge made on behalf of the ROC when the President of the U.S. Table Tennis Association distributed a paper entitled "Politics and the ITTF" (see Appendix I). The Chinese reply refuted suggestions that Taiwan was a separate political entity and that the issue of membership for the ROC association should be considered in the same category as that of the Guernsey and Jersey islands.⁸⁸ Little was to materialize from the American challenge and China's relations with the ITTF have remained positive for nearly a quarter century.

China's formal relations with both the International Skating Union (ISU) and the International Ice Hockey Federation (IIHF) began in 1956.⁸⁹ In the early 1970s the ROC applied for membership in the ISU and was informed that an application would be considered only under the name 'Taiwan,' a condition that was rejected in 1974.⁹⁰ A year later the ISU recognized 39 national associations from 32 countries, a somewhat unique situation which undoubtedly arose due to the ISU organizational sub-groupings for speed skating, figure

skating and ice dancing. Most probably due to geographic and climatic considerations, the question of 'two Chinas' in the IIHF has not been a significant issue. As the 'Taiwan problem' did not arise between China and the Table Tennis, Skating and Ice Hockey federations, normal relations were maintained even after the August 1958 major break by China from the IOC and the eight IFs.

Of the remaining six federations (Chess, Interschool Sports, University Sports, Rowing, Fencing and Canoeing) which recognized the member association from China, the latter three have sports which are contested on the Olympic Program. These three all approved the affiliation of China after the People's Republic was admitted to the United Nations in 1971. The Fédération Internationale des Sociétés d'Aviron (FISA) recognized the Rowing Association of the PRC at its Congress meeting in Lucerne, Switzerland on October 25, 1973.⁹¹ As rowing was not widely practiced in Taiwan, there was little potential for conflict in regards to a similar request being made by the ROC.

During the summer of 1973, two Chinese representatives attended the World Championships of the Fédération Internationale d'Escrime (FIE) in Sweden to request recognition of the Fencing Association of the PRC.⁹² In the months which followed, FIE officials were divided on the question as a similar request was received from the Taiwan association. Some members favored admitting both, while others proposed waiting until the IOC resolved the dispute over recognition of the 'two Chinas.'⁹³ At the 55th FIE Congress, held in Monte Carlo in May 1974, the membership rejected the application from

Taiwan in favor of recognizing the national association from China.⁹⁴ In October, the International Canoe Federation (ICF) unanimously ratified the membership application from the Chinese association at its Congress in Mexico City bringing to five the number of Olympic sport IFs which had recognized China during 1974.⁹⁵

The People's Republic was also recognized by three other international sports bodies between 1973 and 1975. The Fédération Internationale des Echecs (FIDE) affiliated the China-member association to the world body governing Chess in December 1974,⁹⁶ while the Interschool Sports Federation (ISF) and the Fédération Internationale du Sport Universitaire (FISU) recognized China in October 1973 and September 1975 respectively.⁹⁷ The latter two federations govern the multi-sport competitions held in the form of 'Student Games' for high school and university level athletes. In the case of FISU, the voting was noteworthy in that only Indonesia, in an expression of discontent over its experience with China (see Chapter V), abstained in the otherwise unanimous decision by FISU member associations to admit China.⁹⁸

Federations Affiliating Taiwan Member Associations

Notwithstanding the affiliations held by national sports associations from China in the international federations, as of 1978 the Taiwan sports associations continued to enjoy membership in 19 IFs (see Tables 10 and 12).⁹⁹ Of the 11 federations which have maintained uninterrupted recognition of the Taiwan member associations, only three (Boxing, Field Hockey and Badminton) recognized the ROC prior

to China's 1958 withdrawal, while two (Judo and Skiing) recognized the ROC during the period of China's isolation from 1958 to 1969, and six (Bobsleigh, Equestrian, Handball, Luge, Modern Pentathlon and Yachting) recognized the ROC following China's re-emergence on the international sports scene in the 1970s. Two factors undoubtedly influenced China's non-membership in these organizations: first, where the Taiwan association had been recognized, China refused to join the parent IF and, second, in the case of such sports as modern pentathlon, yachting, skiing and equestrian sports which had yet to develop a popular following due to either limited prior exposure or economic constraints, no application for membership was made.

Only in the case of China's interaction with the International Badminton Federation (IBF) were relations strained to the degree seen elsewhere. The results of this tension split the IBF and threatened to lead to the formation of a rival body, the World Badminton Federation (see Chapter V). Among the contentious issues was a 1977 decision to admit the Badminton Association of the People's Republic and expel the Taiwan association. The proposal was approved by a simple majority vote rather than the three-quarters majority specified in the IBF statutes and a subsequent British High Court decision which ruled the vote invalid left unresolved the question of China's membership.¹⁰⁰

The eight federations which, following China's withdrawal, have refused to expel the Taiwan member association as a prior condition for the reaffiliation of China (see Table 12) have provided the most

comprehensive examples of China-IF interaction since 1958. Relations between China and three of these federations (FIFA, FINA, and IAAF) have been documented above. As for the federations which govern Shooting, Cycling, Gymnastics, Archery and Lawn Tennis, a discussion of their relations with China will complete this analysis of China's interaction with the international federations.

The Union Internationale de Tir (UIT) accepted the application of the Taiwan association in 1958 which resulted in the withdrawal of the China member association in August.¹⁰¹ In 1968, the Taiwan association changed its name to Republic of China Shooting Association (ROCSA) in response to the IOC decision to require a name-change for the Taiwan NOC (see pages 105-07).¹⁰² An application for reaffiliation by the Chinese association and the concurrent expulsion of the ROCSA in 1976 was not accepted by the UIT.

China joined the Fédération Internationale Amateur de Cyclisme (FIAC) in March 1954 and first attended meetings of the federation two years later in Paris.¹⁰³ The ROC applied for recognition in March 1959 but did not receive full membership status until 1963, a decision which precipitated China's withdrawal two years later.¹⁰⁴ The FIAC Executive Committee granted provisional membership to the PRC Cycling Association in August 1974 which allowed Chinese cyclists to enter the 7th Asian Games; however as the federation continued to recognize the Taiwan association, China rejected FIAC membership in November 1974.¹⁰⁵

Founded in 1881, the Fédération Internationale de Gymnastique (FIG) is the oldest of the Olympic sports federations. China held

membership in FIG from 1956 to 1964 when, at the 43rd Congress session, the Taiwan association was also given recognition.¹⁰⁶ China's protest was immediate:

Article I . . . provides that "the International Gymnastics Federation is composed of the national gymnastics federations of the various countries" and Article II provides that "one single federation is recognized in each country." Therefore, apart from accepting China's sole national gymnastics organization, the Gymnastics Federation of the People's Republic of China, the IGF has no right to accept any other gymnastics organization of China as member. Now, in violation of its statutes, the IGF has illegally accepted the Gymnastics Organization of Taiwan as member. This is unacceptable to us. We hereby formally declare our withdrawal from the IGF.¹⁰⁷

Following China's readmission to the United Nations and appearance in several international gymnastic exhibitions in the early 1970s, overtures were made to rejoin the federation. In 1974, FIG President Arthur Gander noted that progress had stalled:

The Gymnastics Federation of the People's Republic of China has informed the FIG that it would like to resume its place within the FIG on the express condition that the federation of Taiwan be excluded.

The FIG sent out official admission forms but up to the Congress in Rotterdam (1973), no official application has yet been received. There was therefore no reason to discuss a case for admission and there have thus never been grounds for rejection.

The FIG will gladly welcome the People's Republic of China among its members, provided that a correct and proper application for admission is submitted and that no condition is stipulated regarding the expulsion of another affiliated federation.¹⁰⁸

Three years earlier, on March 31, 1971, the Lawn Tennis Association of the PRC withdrew from the International Lawn Tennis

Federation (ILTF).¹⁰⁹ On the same day, the Chinese Archery Association severed relations with the Fédération Internationale de Tir à l'Arc (FITA):

L'Association de Tir à l'Arc de la République populaire de Chine condamne avec véhémence une poignée d'individus qui contrôlent la F.I.T.A. pour les actions méprisables qu'ils ont commises en suivant l'impérialisme américain dans sa machination de "deux Chine" et en se montrant hostiles au peuple chinois; elle déclare solennellement se retirer de la F.I.T.A. et rompre toutes ses relations avec cette organisation.

Regardless of the language, be it French, English or Chinese, the message was clear: international sports federations which recognized a member association from Taiwan were "lifting a rock only to drop it on their own feet":

Notre grand dirigeant, le président Mao, a indiqué: "Un proverbe chinois qualifie l'action de certains sots en disant qu' ' ils soulèvent une pierre pour se la laisser retomber sur les pieds'." Tout complot destiné à créer "deux Chine" ou "une Chine et un Taïwan" se soldera inmanquablement par un échec total.¹¹¹

Summary

The conduct of international sport is governed by numerous autonomous organizations, the International Federations, composed of affiliated national associations responsible for the administration, promotion and control of a single sport in their country or territory. At present, the sports of 26 IFs are recognized on the Olympic Program.

Among the functions performed by each IF are the establishing of rules for competition, the certifying of officials, the supervising

of international competitions and championships, and the recognizing of national franchise holders throughout the world. In assuming responsibility for these tasks, the international federations play a vital role in the Olympic Movement as membership in the parent IF is a prerequisite for the entry of national association athletes in sanctioned competitions.

From 1949 to 1978 the individual associations affiliated to the All-China Sports Federation in Peking have held, at various times, membership in the IFs governing 16 Olympic sports, 3 non-Olympic sports and 2 multi-sport bodies. Where any of these federations recognized a national association from Taiwan, China either withdrew or refused to join the IF if the ACSF member association had not yet been recognized by the parent federation concerned. The sole criterion employed by the Chinese associations was whether or not the international federation recognized only 'one China' and not 'two Chinas' or 'one China, one Taiwan.' Where Taiwan was a recognized member of the IF, China refused to be associated. But for many of the IFs the conditional dimension which stipulated the expulsion of an affiliated federation was insuperable and China thus remained outside its membership.

FOOTNOTES

TO CHAPTER IV

¹Letter from H. Roy Evans, President, International Table Tennis Federation (ITTF), 18 March 1978. See also, New China News Agency (NCNA), 5 April 1953, in Survey of China Mainland Press (SCMP), no. 546.

²For a description of the role of the International Federations in the Olympic Movement, including an overview by Thomas Keller, President of the General Assembly of International Federations (GAIF), see International Olympic Committee, Olympism (Lausanne: The Committee, 1972), pp. 18-22.

³For an analysis of international sport governing bodies see, James E. Harf, Roger A. Coate and Henry S. Marsh, "Trans-Societal Sport Associations: A Descriptive Analysis of Structures and Linkages," and Carol Oglesby, "Social Organization Theory and Sport Organization Systems," Marie Hart (ed.), Sport and the Sociocultural Process (Dubuque: Iowa: Wm. C. Brown Publishers, 1976).

⁴The dates of affiliation by China (ACSF) and Taiwan (ROCOC) member associations have been compiled from several sources, including letters from the All-China Sports Federation, 11 May 1977 and from the Republic of China Olympic Committee, 8 April 1977.

⁵Ibid.

⁶"China Withdraws from International Sports Organizations," NCNA, 20 August 1958, in SCMP, no. 1839.

⁷Union of International Associations, Yearbook of International Organizations (Brussels: The Association, 1977), A1856.

⁸Rewi Alley, "Meih sien: The Great Hakka Centre," Eastern Horizon, vol. xvi, no. 5 (May 1977), p. 22.

⁹Wu Wen-zhong, Zhongguo Jin Bainian Tiyu Shi (Taipei: Shangwu Yinshuguan Faxing, 1967), pp. 97-98.

¹⁰"The National Football Tournament," People's China, vol. 6, no. 7 (April 1953), pp. 34-36.

¹¹Of the many exchanges which occurred in the early 1950s, the five-week tour to China by a Hungarian football team received, perhaps, the most extensive coverage. See, for example, Jozsef Konya, "Our Football Tour in China," People's China, vol. 7, no. 9 (May 1954), pp. 33-35. In addition, teams from China participated against football delegations from the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Romania.

¹²Oppose U.S. Occupation of Taiwan and "Two Chinas" Plot: A Selection of Important Documents (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1958), p. 90.

¹³Letter from the Secretary General, Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), 19 June 1952.

¹⁴FIFA, "Minutes of the 29th Congress, 1954," as provided by FIFA Headquarters, Zurich, Switzerland, 11 January 1977.

¹⁵*Ibid.*

¹⁶*Ibid.*

¹⁷*Ibid.*

¹⁸"Protest at Football Federation Decision," NCNA, 11 June 1956, in SCMP, no. 1309.

¹⁹*Ibid.*

²⁰FIFA, "Minutes of the 31st Congress, 1958."

²¹*Ibid.*

²²"Statement of the All-China Athletic Federation on Withdrawal from the International Football Federation," in Important Documents, p. 92.

²³FIFA, "Minutes of the 32nd Congress, 1960."

²⁴Opening Speech, in FIFA, "Minutes of the 33rd Congress, 1961."

²⁵Olympic Review, no. 68-69 (July-August 1973).

²⁶*Ibid.*, no. 70-71 (September-October 1973).

²⁷FIFA, "Minutes of the 39th Congress, 1974," p. 5.

²⁸*Ibid.*

²⁹*Ibid.*, p. 6.

³⁰Ibid.

³¹NCNA (Peking), 24 June 1974.

³²FIFA, "Minutes of the 38th Congress, 1974," p. 7.

³³"Restoration of Legitimate Seat to Chinese Football Association in FIFA Demanded," NCNA, 7 April 1975, in Survey of China Press (SCP), no. 5835.

³⁴NCNA (Peking), 6 May 1975.

³⁵Olympic Review, no. 95-96 (September-October 1975), p. 419.

³⁶FIFA, "Minutes of the 40th Congress, 1976," p. 5.

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 6

⁴²Ibid., p. 7. See also, "Little Soccer Discussed at FIFA Congress," Canadian Soccer News, vol. 6, no. 4 (July-August 1976), p. 11.

⁴³Letter from Football Association of the People's Republic of China, 6 October 1976. See also, Olympic Review, no. 109-110 (November-December 1976), p. 648.

⁴⁴Letter from Dr. Joao Havelange, 18 December 1976.

⁴⁵Vancouver Sun, 6 August 1977 and 12 September 1977.

⁴⁶Ibid., 12 December 1977.

⁴⁷Ibid., 31 May 1978.

⁴⁸Letter from R.M. Ritter, Honorary Secretary, Fédération Internationale de Natation Amateur (FINA), 25 April 1952.

⁴⁹Ibid.

⁵⁰NCNA (Helsinki), 4 August 1952.

⁵¹"China Withdraws . . . ," SCMP, no. 1839.

⁵²Letter from Javier Ostos, FINA President, 17 January 1977.
See also, NCNA (Peking), 20 November 1974.

⁵³Vancouver Sun, 18 July 1975.

⁵⁴NCNA (Peking), 11 March 1976.

⁵⁵"China's Delegation to International Middle School Students' Games Denounce FINA's Truculence," NCNA, 22 June 1976, in SCP, no. 6125.

⁵⁶Vancouver Sun, 21 August 1976.

⁵⁷NCNA (Helsinki), 4 August 1952.

⁵⁸*Ibid.*

⁵⁹Letter from John Holt, General Secretary, International Amateur Athletic Federation (IAAF), 17 February 1977.

⁶⁰"China's Place in World Sport," Olympic Review, no. 44 (May 1971), p. 252.

⁶¹"China Withdraws . . . ," SCMP, no. 1839.

⁶²"China's Place in World Sport," p. 253.

⁶³Olympic Review, no. 80-81 (July-August 1974), p. 365.

⁶⁴*Ibid.*, no. 82-83 (September-October 1974), p. 474.

⁶⁵Vancouver Sun, 17 April 1978.

⁶⁶*Ibid.*

⁶⁷"Chinese Statement on Fantastic Basketball Federation Decision," NCNA, 3 February 1959, in SCMP, no. 1953.

⁶⁸"China Withdraws . . . ," SCMP, no. 1839.

⁶⁹NCNA, 3 February 1959, see f.n. 67 supra.

⁷⁰*Ibid.*

⁷¹Letter from Borislav Stankovic, Secretary General, Fédération Internationale de Basketball Amateur (FIBA), 25 April 1977.

⁷²NCNA (Peking), 6 May 1975.

⁷³*Ibid.*, 16 November 1975.

- ⁷⁴Letter, Stankovic, 25 April 1977.
- ⁷⁵"China Withdraws . . . ," SCMP, no. 1839.
- ⁷⁶"Peking Papers Condemn Arbitrary Decision of International Federation of Weightlifters," NCNA, 1 November 1965, in SCMP, no. 3572.
- ⁷⁷NCNA (Peking), 19 May 1966.
- ⁷⁸Olympic Review, no. 80-81 (July-August 1974), p. 374.
- ⁷⁹Letter from Tamas Ajan, General Secretary, International Weightlifting Federation (IWF), 14 May 1977. See also, NCNA (Peking), 20 September 1974.
- ⁸⁰NCNA (Peking), 19 April 1975.
- ⁸¹"I.V.B.F. Condemned for Tailing After U.S. Imperialism," Peking Review, no. 45 (6 November 1970), p. 31.
- ⁸²NCNA (Peking), 28 October 1970.
- ⁸³NCNA (Mexico City), 10 October 1974.
- ⁸⁴Olympic Review, no. 80-81 (July-August 1974), p. 374.
- ⁸⁵Letter from B. Dubosson of the Fédération Internationale de Lutte Amateur (FILA) Secretariat, 27 April 1977. See also, NCNA (Teheran), 5 September 1974.
- ⁸⁶See f.n. 1 supra.
- ⁸⁷Ibid.
- ⁸⁸NCNA (Peking), 27 August 1963.
- ⁸⁹Letter from Song Zhong (Sung Chung), General Secretary, All-China Sports Federation, 11 May 1977.
- ⁹⁰Letter from Beat Hasler, General Secretary, International Skating Union (ISU), 19 January 1977.
- ⁹¹Letter from Thomas Keller, President, Fédération Internationale des Sociétés d'Avion (FISA), 16 February 1977.
- ⁹²Olympic Review, no. 70-71 (September-October 1973).
- ⁹³Ibid., no. 78-79 (May-June 1974), p. 269.
- ⁹⁴Letter from Pierre Ferri, President, Fédération Internationale d'Escrime (FIE), 6 January 1977. See also, NCNA (Paris), 18 May 1974.

⁹⁵NCNA (Mexico City), 18 October 1974.

⁹⁶Letter, Song, 11 May 1977.

⁹⁷Ibid. See also, Letter from Claude Pineau, General Secretary, Fédération Internationale du Sport Universitaire (FISU), 7 February 1977.

⁹⁸Vancouver Sun, 17 September 1975.

⁹⁹For the purposes of this study only those international sports federations which are on the Olympic Program or which have had relations with China have been included. For details on the other federations to which member associations from Taiwan are affiliated see, Republic of China Olympic Committee, Amateur Sport in the Republic of China (Taipei: The Committee, 1976).

¹⁰⁰Vancouver Sun, 6 July 1977.

¹⁰¹"China Withdraws . . . ," SCMP, no. 1839.

¹⁰²Letter from Ernst Zimmerman, Secretary General, Union Internationale de Tir (UIT), 13 May 1977.

¹⁰³"China Cycling Delegation Leader Interviewed," NCNA, 17 March 1956, in SCMP, no. 1252.

¹⁰⁴Letter from Giuliano Pacciarelli, General Secretary, Fédération Internationale Amateur de Cyclisme (FIAC), 31 January 1977. FIAC records indicate that from March 1959 to March 1963 neither the PRC nor the ROC was affiliated to the cycling federation and that after both were accepted to membership the People's Republic withdrew in 1965. As China had withdrawn from the federation in August 1958 (see f.n. 101), this interpretation is open to question.

¹⁰⁵Ibid.

¹⁰⁶Letter from Max Bangerter, General Secretary, Fédération Internationale de Gymnastique (FIG), 15 April 1977.

¹⁰⁷NCNA (Peking), 24 July 1964.

¹⁰⁸Olympic Review, no. 76-77 (March-April 1974), p. 161.

¹⁰⁹Peking Review, no. 15 (9 April 1971), p. 22.

¹¹⁰Letter from the Archery Association of the People's Republic of China to M. Douglas Thomson, Secretary General, Fédération Internationale de Tir à l'Arc (FITA), 31 March 1971 (in French). See also, Letter from Francesco Gneccchi-Ruscone, FITA President, 1 February 1978.

¹¹¹Ibid.

CHAPTER V

CHINA'S INVOLVEMENT IN REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SPORTS COMPETITIONS

Since the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949 participation by Chinese athletes in international competitions has been both extensive, in regard to the range and scope of competitions entered, and limited, in regard to the number of competitions entered following China's withdrawal from the International Olympic Committee and the International Sports Federations in 1958. Only in the 1970s were Chinese athletes to be found travelling to competitions on all six continents. For example, in 1977 Chinese athletic delegations participated in such sports as gymnastics, volleyball, track and field, swimming, archery, weightlifting, football, basketball, badminton, table tennis and wushu in more than 75 countries around the globe.¹ In contrast to these recent figures, when China attempted to enter Regional Games and World Championships during the previous two decades complications often arose in instances where the PRC was not affiliated with the international federation responsible for the technical arrangements (see Chapter IV) or where the sanctioning body rejected the political arguments presented in defense of China's claim for recognition (see Chapter III). The question was more often

than not related to the statutes and regulations governing the participation by member associations in competitions against non-member associations, in this case China. The issue generally became problematic when the sanctioning body either refused to give its approval for the event or threatened to impose penalties, usually in the form of suspensions, on those who entered 'unsanctioned' competitions.

As was noted previously, the IFs have the responsibility for granting recognition to national sports associations and for determining criteria for international competitions. The 'supreme authority' of the IOC was likewise noted and, for example, in the case of Regional Games (see Appendix B, Section D) IOC regulations stipulate that:

Contestants must belong to National Federations which are members of International Federations recognized by the International Olympic Committee and participating countries must have National Olympic Committees recognized by the International Olympic Committee. Invitations to participate in the Games must be sent to these National Olympic Committees or other appropriate sport bodies by the Organizing Committee of the Games.²

Clearly, then, China's relations with the IOC and the IFs have been closely linked to the participation by Chinese athletes in international competitions beyond those directly associated with the Olympic Games.

This chapter documents China's interaction with the Regional Games organizations including the Asian Games and the Games of the New Emerging Forces; identifies China's attempts to overcome the problems associated with its non-member status through the hosting

of multi-nation, invitational tournaments and meets; and analyzes the impact of China's actions as an 'outsider' on several of the established international sports governing bodies.

The Asian Games

Following the demise of the Far Eastern Championship Games in 1934 and the failure of other Asian-based Games to survive World War II, a void existed in far eastern, multi-sport competitions until the 1947 Conference on Asian Relations.³ At the suggestion of Indian Prime Minister Nehru and under the guidance of G.D. Sondhi, IOC member from India, the Asian Amateur Athletic Association was formed shortly thereafter.⁴ Later reconstituted as the Asian Games Federation (AGF), this body has organized the Asian Games since its initiation in 1951 (see Table 13).⁵

TABLE 13
THE ASIAN GAMES SERIES

Meet	Date	Location	Chinese Delegation
1st	March 1951	New Delhi	---
2nd	May 1954	Manila	ROC, Taiwan
3rd	May 1958	Tokyo	ROC, Taiwan
4th	August 1962	Djakarta	---
5th	December 1966	Bangkok	ROC, Taiwan
6th	December 1970	Bangkok	ROC, Taiwan
7th	September 1974	Teheran	PRC, Peking
(8th	December 1978	Bangkok	PRC, Peking)

Early Relations

Undoubtedly due to pressing domestic demands at the end of the civil war and the uncertain political future of Taiwan province during 1950, neither China nor Taiwan sent athletes to the 1st Asian Games in 1951, although an observer delegation from the PRC was sent to New Delhi. The recognition of the Republic of China delegation prior to the 2nd Asian Games resulted in the refusal of the People's Republic to enter athletes in the 1954 competitions in the Philippines. The Manila Games were, nevertheless, noteworthy in that they heralded the first appearance of C.K. Yang, a native of Taiwan province who was to become a world record holder in the decathlon and a dominant figure in international track and field in the following decade.⁶

In light of China's withdrawal from the 1956 Melbourne Olympics in the dispute over the IOC's recognition of 'two Chinas,' it was not surprising that the All-China Athletic Federation refused to enter the 3rd Asian Games in Tokyo in 1958. Speaking to Japanese reporters in Peking in March 1958, ACAF General Secretary Zhang Lian-hua suggested that the Games could hardly be considered 'Asian' if China's 600 million people were not represented. Zhang also reiterated the position that "we deem it an unfriendly act toward the Chinese People's Republic to admit the province of Taiwan to these games as a separate nation."⁷ Ikkaku Matsuzawa, a leading official of the Japanese Olympic Committee and a member of the 3rd Asian Games Preparatory Committee, was quoted on his arrival in Manila to assist with the torch carrying ceremony as believing that

without China's participation the Games would lose their significance.⁸ Three months later, in August 1958, China withdrew from the IOC and several international federations.

The 4th Asian Games were awarded to Djakarta, Indonesia. As the government of President Sukarno began preparations to host the more than 2,000 athletes and officials expected to attend the 1962 Games, concern was expressed both in the country and abroad on a number of issues. The problems of selecting a Games site, building a 100,000 seat stadium, providing adequate hotel accommodations, and upgrading communication and transportation services were legion.⁹ In addition, the stance of the government in refusing to issue entry permits to athletes from Israel and Taiwan, combined with articles in the local press querying the problem of accrediting competitors from the divided countries of Korea and Vietnam and the issue of extending invitations to the Asian Republics in the Soviet Union, brought politics directly into the picture.¹⁰ Indonesia's status within the Asian Football Confederation was also in doubt and although a dispute over unpaid dues never came to a head, the possibility that the issue would boil at any moment caused further uncertainty.¹¹ Taking these several factors into account, three points of view were being expressed by Indonesians themselves as early as 1959: first, the Games were a wasteful extravagance which the country could hardly afford; second, the project was precisely the challenge the people needed to marshall their collective enthusiasm and push the nation forward; third, the foreign aid

required to complete the project would be a catalyst in improving not only the economic well-being of Indonesia but also the nation's image abroad and, thus contribute to an easing of international tensions.¹² That the Games were held, with the assistance of the Soviet Union, Japan, England, the United States and China, served as an indicator that the latter two views eventually prevailed.

On July 24, 1962, a spokesman for the ACAF noted that a common bond of anti-imperialist struggle existed between China and the host country.

The Chinese and Indonesian peoples have always supported each other in their struggles for safeguarding national sovereignty and territorial integrity and against imperialist aggression. At present, the Indonesian people are waging a valiant struggle for the liberation of West Irian and the Chinese people are engaged in a resolute struggle to smash the vicious scheme of U.S. imperialism which instigates and supports the Chiang Kai-shek clique for an invasion of the Chinese mainland. It is now the important moment for the Chinese and Indonesian peoples to stand more vigilantly on guard against the schemes of imperialism and to support each other still more. We hope that the Indonesian friends and government will see through the vicious manoeuvres of U.S. imperialism which is directing the Chiang Kai-shek clique to take part in the 4th Asian Games, and will take resolute measures to foil this scheme which endangers the interests of the Chinese and Indonesian peoples.¹³

A week later, an editorial in Tiyu Bao repeated China's demand for recognition as the sole representative of all Chinese athletes and reiterated the Chinese position that the belief that "sports has nothing to do with politics" was merely a pretext for anti-China action by the United States.¹⁴ On August 8, leading officials of China's national associations for track and field, swimming, football, basketball and weightlifting expressed similar views.¹⁵

During this same period, sports officials in Taiwan called upon Japan, the Philippines, Hong Kong, India, South Vietnam, South Korea and Iran for support and requested that the IOC withdraw its recognition of the Games if Indonesia refused to issue entry permits to athletes from the Republic of China.¹⁶ On August 11, a delegation composed of 80 athletes (recruited in Taiwan, the United States, the Philippines and Hong Kong), 14 staff members and media representatives was formed in Taibei.¹⁷

The Indonesian government refused to capitulate on the question of entry permits and the ROC delegation did not appear in Djakarta.

At the suggestion of G.D. Sondhi of India, the IOC considered the problem of "International Sports and Politics" in early 1963. In a lengthy proposal circulated to the Executive Board and the IFs Sondhi recommended changes in both ceremonial and constitutional procedures governing the conduct of international Games and Championships.¹⁸ Regarding ceremonies, he proposed that flags be permitted at the opening and in the stadium as decorations, but that anthems and flags be banned during the victory celebrations. More significant, however, was his second suggestion which charged that the existing IOC rules were inadequate and ineffective:

The present position is that it is the International Olympic Committee which lays down two directions for National Olympic Committees:

- (1) National Olympic Committees must not associate themselves with matters of political or commercial nature.
- (2) They shall enforce all the Rules and Regulations of the International Olympic Committee.

This is not enough. The International Olympic Committee must insist on it that:

- (1) There must be an express mention of the Principle of non-discrimination in the constitution of each National Olympic Committee.
- (2) Similar express mention of the Principle must be there in the constitution of each International Sport Federation recognized by it (the IOC). At present only some International Sport Federations have this Principle in their constitutions.

All must have it on pain of non-recognition by the International Olympic Committee.¹⁹

Sondhi also proposed stricter regulations with regard to the hosting of international competitions:

. . . another condition must be laid down for any National Olympic Committee or National Sports Federation to fulfil before it supports, or puts in, an application (to host) any International Games or Championships. The National Organization concerned, must produce a guarantee from its government that no discrimination will take place.

But even this may not be enough. Governments being what they are, they may allege Reasons of State, at a very late hour, to forbid the entry of a team or teams. In the meanwhile many other teams bearing heavy expenses, may have come to the city. This is what happened in the Djakarta Games.

In such a case very firm action is essential. The Games or Championship must be forthwith cancelled. In no case should a suggestion be made, (like the one made by the International Amateur Athletic Federation in the case of Djakarta Games), that the Games or the Championship may still be held, but under another name. Such a suggestion is tantamount to compounding a felony, and opens the way to endless representations and allegations. Along with the cancellation a heavy fine, (which may be shared pro rata among the teams that have come) must be laid on the organization concerned. And if the fine is not paid within a specific period, then all the country's teams for any international meet, should be debarred for ever afterwards.

Desperate situations call for desperate remedies.²⁰

How strikingly prophetic were Sondhi's observations! The situation that was to arise 13 years later in Montreal at the 1976 Olympics had been identified in detail in 1963.

The IOC subsequently banned Indonesia from the 1964 Tokyo Olympics, an action which added fuel to the movement to establish the Games of the New Emerging Forces (see pages 218-26).

The 5th and 6th Asian Games were both held in Bangkok, Thailand in 1966 and 1970 respectively. China again did not send delegations as the Republic of China retained its membership in the AGF and accepted invitations to participate. Although her performances in the Games were not outstanding due to injuries, the Taiwan-born sprinter Chi Cheng achieved international acclaim on being named 'World Athlete of the Year' and 'Woman Athlete of the Year' for 1970 in several press polls.²¹ Chi, married to her American coach, had lived in the United States for seven years prior to her participation in the Games.²²

China's Admission to the Asian Games Federation

As China returned to international sporting competition in the early 1970s following the Cultural Revolution, the question of its membership in the AGF was of increasing interest as the 7th Asian Games neared.

On September 18, 1973, the Executive Committee of the Federation passed a motion submitted by Iran, host nation for the upcoming Games, which proposed that the All-China Sports Federation of the PRC be admitted to the AGF and the ROC committee be expelled.²³

Reacting to these events officials in Taiwan turned to the IOC and the IFs for support. At the Olympic Congress in Varna in October 1973 both the IOC and the IFs expressed concern over the possible expulsion of the Taiwan committee. Although the IOC took no action and, indeed, later reaffirmed its patronage of the Games, the President of the IAAF, the Marquess of Exeter, circulated a letter to all Asian members of the track and field federation warning that sanctions would be imposed on member affiliates sending athletes to the Games if the ROC were expelled.²⁴ In November the ROC cabled the President of the AGF stating that it would not accept the draft agenda for the special meeting of the full Council and proposed a broadly phrased item entitled "Participation of China in the Asian Games Federation" in place of the third item on the tentative agenda entitled "Ratification of the Decision on China of the Executive Committee in Bangkok on September 17 and 18, 1973."²⁵ Noting that eight other countries supported this demand, the ROC issued a 'Position Paper' which maintained that

The decision to be taken by the Special Council Meeting on the China question will be a most crucial one. Unless representatives to the Meeting can strongly and effectively resist the interference of politics in sports and resolve the matter in accordance with the provisions of the AGF Constitution as well as the letter and spirit of the Olympic Charter, the consequences will indeed be most serious: At stake will not only be the membership of a loyal founding member of the AGF, but also the continued existence of the AGF as a whole.²⁶

The appeal was apparently viewed as being of little significance as at the special session held on November 14 and 15, 1973 in Teheran the AGF adopted the resolution of the Executive Committee (38 to 13

with 5 abstentions) to admit the PRC and expel the ROC.²⁷ On the following day the ACSF issued a statement in Peking expressing thanks for the support it had received and indicated its desire to further expand China's contacts in international sport.

The All-China Sports Federation as a member of the Asian Games Federation will send a sports delegation to participate in the Seventh Asian Games to be held in Tehran in September 1974 and will hold national heats for the Games. The All-China Sports Federation always shows deep concern for sportsmen in Taiwan province. We welcome the sportsmen of Taiwan province to take part in the national heats so as to enable them to participate in the Seventh Asian Games together with the sportsmen of other provinces and municipalities of China [emphasis added].

The Chinese people and sportsmen always stand for promotion of sports exchanges with other countries on the basis of equality, friendship and mutual respect. Chinese sportsmen, together with those of other Asian countries, will make joint efforts for the success of the Seventh Asian Games, for the promotion of friendship between and the development of sports activities of the peoples of Asia and other countries of the world.²⁸

With these remarks, the People's Republic entered its most significant athletic competition in 25 years. In regard to the IOC's subsequent decision to continue its patronage of the Games "in the interests of the development of sport in Asia,"²⁹ one writer noted "there's nothing so conducive to flexibility as being faced with a fait accompli."³⁰

China sent a delegation of 269 (182 men and 87 women) athletes to the Games which took place September 1-16, 1974 at the newly constructed Aryamehr Sports Centre (Stadium) in Teheran.³¹ PRC

athletes entered in all but 2 events (boxing and field hockey) on the 16 event program and finished third behind Japan and Iran, winning 106 medals including 33 gold.³²

Speaking at the Olympic Solidarity Symposium in Teheran on September 29, Zhao Zheng-hung, leader of the Chinese delegation, remarked:

We hold that the sports affairs of the world should be managed by the people and sports circles of the world. The sports affairs of Asia should be managed by the people and sports circles of Asia. International sports organizations should reflect the common aspirations of the people and sportsmen of the great majority of countries and territories in the world. In these organization member countries and associations, big or small, should all enjoy equal rights.

We hold that friendly sports exchanges among the people and sportsmen of all countries of the world are their internal affairs as sovereign states. All international sports organizations which are really concerned about the healthy development of sports in the world should support and encourage such exchanges and by no means obstruct them.³³

In this instance, Zhao's comments were directed specifically at FINA, as the aquatics federations still refused to expel the Taiwan association as a prior condition to admitting the Chinese association. Last minute discussions resulted in concessions being made by both sides which allowed China's swimmers to compete in the Games as non-members of FINA. A statement issued by a spokesman for the Chinese delegation noted:

According to the active suggestion by friendly personalities in Asian sport circles, the President of FINA Dr. Henning and the leading members concerned of the Sports Delegation of the People's Republic of China have had long and meaningful discussions and reached an agreement on the participation of the Chinese sportsmen in the swimming events of the 7th Asian Games. This is the

result of the joint efforts of the friendly personalities in Asian sports circles. Accordingly, in adhering to our consistent principled stand, the sportsmen of the swimming, diving and water polo teams . . . have decided to participate in the swimming, diving and water polo competitions at the 7th Asian Games.³⁴

Although the issue of China's membership in FINA remained unresolved, the agreement reached with FINA was a positive sign.

In negotiations with other sports governing bodies the Chinese were much more successful. As a result of meetings held in conjunction with the Games, China's membership was ratified in eight Asian sports organizations: The Asian Weightlifting Federation, the Asian Badminton Confederation, the Asian Shooting Confederation, the Asian Fencing Confederation, the Asian Cycling Federation, the Asian Committee of the International Wrestling Federation, the Asian Gymnastic Confederation and the Asian Track and Field Coaches Association.³⁵

China's strongest supporter throughout the meetings and events associated with the Games was Iran. Following the establishment of diplomatic relations in August 1971, the close ties which first began with the opening of the 'Silk Road' trading routes 2,000 years before were strengthened. The assistance provided by officials from Iran in regards to China's entry into the Asian Games was to continue in subsequent years in the IOC itself (see pages 112-21). For the People's Republic, the motto of the Asian Games symbolized the bright prospects for the future: "Ever Onward!"

Since the 7th Asian Games Chinese representatives have attended all meetings of the federation and have undertaken preparations to send a delegation to the 8th Asian Games. In keeping with

the longstanding practice of seeking to form a delegation composed of representatives from all provinces in China, ACSF Secretary-General Song Zhong sent the following notice on April 19, 1978, to athletes from Taiwan:

The 8th Asian Games will be held in Bangkok, Thailand, in December 1978. Our country will send a delegation to take part in the games. The All-China Sports Federation has decided that as of June 10 this year, nation-wide selective trials in various events of the 8th Asian Games will be held in Peking and elsewhere in the country.

We welcome sportsmen in Taiwan province and Taiwan-born sportsmen residing overseas to join us in a happy gathering with friends from Asian countries to promote friendship and exchange skills. For this, on behalf of the All-China Sports Federation, I would like to notify sportsmen in Taiwan province and Taiwan-born sportsmen residing overseas to come to Peking to take part in the nation-wide selective trials before June 10 this year. Please report to the All-China Sports Federation. Address: No. 9, Tiyyukuan Road, Peking.³⁶

As China prepared to enter the Games for the second time, the future of the movement was tenuous. Bangkok had accepted the Games for the third time after financial troubles had forced Pakistan to withdraw its offer to host the competitions and the AGF's decision to exclude Israel for "security reasons" again drew the attention of the IOC which threatened to withhold its patronage.³⁷ Should these issues continue to plague the AGF the role played by China in the future of multi-nation sporting competitions in Asia may prove to be as significant as was the involvement of the PRC in the establishment of another sports organization which emerged in the 1960s: GANEFO.

The Games of the New Emerging Forces

The refusal of the Indonesian government to grant visas to athletes from Taiwan and Israel at the time of the 4th Asian Games in 1962 and the subsequent withdrawal of Indonesia (in the face of its pending expulsion) from the IOC led to the formation of the Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFO) in 1963. China eagerly supported this move and, indeed, as early as the fall of 1962 an editorial in Tiyu Bao cited several reasons in favor of establishing the organization, as it was felt such action would

- (1) promote solidarity and friendship among the people of the various Asian and African countries;
- (2) help develop sports and raise the level of sports;
- (3) get rid of imperialist and colonialist pressure and influence.³⁸

On February 13, 1963, Indonesian President Sukarno, reacting to the pending challenge and expulsion by the IOC, remarked:

I now order Indonesia: Quit the IOC. . . . Brothers, besides my order to quit the IOC, I also order: Organize as fast as possible GANEFO, the Games of the New Emerging Forces--Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the socialist countries. . . .

Pak Bandrio [a familiar form of address used in referring to Subandrio, the Minister of Foreign Affairs] has clearly said that sports cannot be separated from politics. Therefore, let us now work for a sports association on the basis of politics. We do not want to put on any masks; let us create a sports association on the basis of the new emerging forces.³⁹

Two months later, a Preparatory Conference for GANEFO was held in Djakarta with representatives from 12 countries attending. The resulting communique proclaimed that

The Games of the New Emerging Forces are based on the Spirit of the Asian-African Conference in Bandung and the Olympic Ideals, and are aimed at:

- (1) encouraging the promotion of the independent development of sports and physical culture and of sports movements in all countries of the New Emerging Forces;
- (2) stimulating sports competitions among the youth of the New Emerging Forces in order to foster and consolidate the friendly relations between the New Emerging Forces in particular and to promote friendship and world peace in general.⁴⁰

More to the point were the statements of Sukarno at the Conference:

The International Olympic Games have proved to be openly an imperialistic tool. They (are) said to have sports without politics in the Olympic Games. . . . Let us better speak frankly. . . . When they excluded Communist China, is that not politics? When they are not friendly to the UAR, is this not politics? When they are not friendly to North Korea, is this not politics? When they exclude North Vietnam, is this not politics? I propose to be frank. Now let's frankly say, sports have something to do with politics. Indonesia proposes now to mix sports with politics, and let us now establish the Games of the New Emerging Forces, the GANEFO . . . against the Old Established Order [emphasis added].⁴¹

As a non-member of the IOC and most IFs, China gave its immediate attention to preparing a delegation to attend the 1st GANEFO competitions. Selective trials were held in Peking in September 1963 and on October 3 Rong Gao-tang was named to lead the 238-member delegation.⁴²

The Games took place from November 10-22, 1963 in Djakarta's Bung Karno Stadium (site of the 1962 Asian Games) and received extensive coverage in the Chinese press. A Renmin Ribao editorial noted:

We are confident that with the impetus given by the GANEFO, sports activities in the new emerging countries of the world will grow, the people's physical fitness will improve and friendship among the athletes and people of various countries will advance and strengthen. . . . The GANEFO represents the vigorous rising forces in international sports. Its torch, once lit, will never go out. However fervently the imperialists and reactionaries may pray for the failure of the GANEFO, it will shine ever brighter like the morning sun.⁴³

The convening of the Games had raised concern in several quarters, including the IOC which circulated to its members, the NOCs and the IFs a copy of a letter from the IAAF which stated:

Application for sanction to include athletics [track and field] in these games--which of course is necessary to regularize the entry of the athletic federations of the countries competing--has not yet been applied for, but if the promoting body undertakes to carry out fully the regulations of the I.A.A.F. such permission would not normally be withheld.

It is noted, however, that the countries mentioned as desirous of taking part in these games include some which have no national governing body affiliated to the I.A.A.F. and, therefore, their athletes are not eligible to take part in international competition with those of our members. From the list published in the Press these are:

CHINA

NORTH VIET-NAM (the member country affiliated is Viet-Nam).

It must be clearly understood that competition against non-members would render ineligible for further international competition athletes from our member countries and, therefore it is essential that before accepting any invitation to compete the latter should ensure that the meeting is confined to those countries who are members of the I.A.A.F.⁴⁴

In addition to 'official' reactions such as this, the editor of World Sports responded to the perceived threat posed by the GANEFO movement to the Olympic and British Empire (Commonwealth) Games.

I do not believe such a threat exists, and, for the good of world sport, sincerely trust I am correct in my assessment of the situation. The most powerful point in favor of the Olympic Games is that politics are never allowed to interfere with or prejudice the judgment of the International Olympic Committee. And--just as important to me--with the passing of the years the tremendous spirit of sportsmanship grows with the staging of every Olympic Games.⁴⁵

On the latter point, the growth and development of the movement, supporters of GANEFO were equally in agreement as to the benefits that resulted from the 1st Games which "brought into international sports activities a new look and a new spirit; that of democracy and unity, equality and mutual help, and learning from each other for common progress."⁴⁶ On the question of 'sport and politics,' they were poles apart:

The establishment of this new international sports organization in world sports is bound to make increasingly great contributions in strengthening solidarity among the peoples of Asia, Africa, Latin America and the rest of the world, in further waging the struggle against imperialism and old and new colonialism, and in consolidating and safeguarding the cause of world peace. Meanwhile, it also marks the end of the imperialist monopoly and manipulation of international sports activities.⁴⁷

The concern expressed by the IOC and the IFs was further translated into concrete action when suspensions were dealt out to athletes who had entered the GANEFO competitions. A threatened boycott of the 1964 Tokyo Olympics by 13 Arab League nations was averted when the IOC lifted its ban on Indonesia in July 1964 although several IFs refused to do so.⁴⁸

Returning to the 1963 Games themselves, several aspects of China's involvement were of importance to the growth of the GANEFO

movement. In order to further solidify GANEFO, and in an attempt to institutionalize the movement, Indonesia also convened CONEFO (The Conference of the New Emerging Forces) immediately following the closing of the Games.⁴⁹ Among the decisions reached was one which saw plans formulated for a GANEFO II in 1967. The site chosen was Cairo, with Peking as an alternate.⁵⁰ Enthusiastic receptions also followed on the return to China of the delegation and welcoming rallies were held for Korean and Vietnamese delegations during stopovers in China.⁵¹ On February 9, 1964, a photographic exhibition opened in Peking and in March a documentary film on the 1st GANEFO was released.⁵²

China continued to support the GANEFO movement and on August 4, 1964 a 23-member GANEFO national committee was established in Peking.⁵³ The following week, a five-member delegation left for the GANEFO Executive Board meetings in Djakarta.⁵⁴ The first anniversary of GANEFO was commemorated in Peking in November 1964 with press coverage, receptions and a mass rally highlighting the two-week celebration. Speaking at the rally, a leading Chinese GANEFO spokesman noted that the movement had continued to progress in spite of the setbacks encountered during the year.

The imperialists have engaged in sabotage against GANEFO from the very beginning and will not reconcile themselves to the great success which GANEFO has achieved.

On the instructions of that U.S. imperialist element Avery Brundage, the International Amateur Athletic Federation and the International Amateur Swimming Federation unreasonably barred competitors of Indonesia, the Korean Democratic People's Republic and other GANEFO participants from the recent Tokyo Olympic Games.

We firmly believe that in the face of the courageous struggle for victory of the people of the new emerging forces, all the imperialist intrigues and trickery to undermine the GANEFO will be completely defeated.⁵⁵

China was host to the second session of the GANEFO Council in September 1965, an event which coincided with the holding of the 2nd National Games in Peking. Delegates and observers representing 39 countries attended the sessions, meetings, receptions and banquets and restated their resolve to push the movement forward in keeping with the GANEFO motto: "Onward! No Retreat!"⁵⁶ Deputy leader of the Chinese delegation Huang Zhong (Huang Chung) suggested that there were three aspects which made GANEFO unique: first, it was the only sports organization to openly proclaim its political stand; second, in adhering to the principle of reaching unanimity through consultation there was no voting or use of the veto in decision making thus guaranteeing that all members, large and small, were equal; and third, the democratic spirit which prevailed assured that advancement through the exchange of experience and skill was possible for all members regardless of their athletic level.⁵⁷ Juxtaposing these points in relation to the 70-year history of the IOC, he went on to suggest that

. . . sports have never been separated from politics. The difference between us and the reactionary international sports organizations is that they carry out imperialist, anti-popular politics while our politics is to have sports serve the interests of the people of our own countries, to safeguard the peoples' rights to develop sports exchanges and hold international tournaments independently and to oppose imperialist interference and control.⁵⁸

As an example of "imperialist interference and control" Huang continued:

Another argument the IOC used to brand the GANEFO as 'illegal' was that some organizations not affiliated to international sports organizations had taken part in the GANEFO.

What arrogance and impudence! Who on earth ever conferred on the IOC the title of overlord of sports activities in the world? Why should Chicago, London or other places decide who may and who may not take part in sports sponsored by the new emerging forces themselves? Does not this practice of the IOC fully expose its own imperialist intentions?⁵⁹

Following the Council meetings it was announced that an Asian Committee of GANEFO had been formed.⁶⁰ In his closing speech at the session Rong Gao-tang, Chairman of the Chinese GANEFO Committee, said:

We are convinced that the founding of this Committee will play a positive role not only in promoting solidarity and friendship among people and sportsmen in Asia, but also in further consolidating and developing the GANEFO and helping the peoples of the new emerging forces in Asia to develop their sports activities independently.⁶¹

Five days later, on the evening of September 30, 1965, an abortive coup in Djakarta altered the political direction in Indonesia and weakened the ties between China and Sukarno which had been the keystone of the GANEFO movement to date.⁶²

Notwithstanding this setback, it was proposed that the 1st Asian GANEFO competitions be held in Phnom Penh, Cambodia from November 25 to December 6, 1966. In response to warnings from the International Weightlifting Federation to its member affiliates that they risked suspension if they entered the meet, a statement

issued in Peking on July 20, 1966 accused the IWF of brandishing a "big stick . . . (to) thwart people's desire for friendly interchange."⁶³

In preparation for the Games, a three-point resolution was adopted by the Chinese Preparatory Committee on July 25 which identified the organizing committee, accepted the political challenge offered by the Games, and announced that selective trials would be held in September to form a delegation which would compete in track and field events, football, basketball, volleyball, table tennis, badminton, swimming, shooting, archery, gymnastics, weightlifting and cycling.⁶⁴

On the eve of the opening of the Games Huang Zhong expressed the opinion that the sports meeting was indeed of specific significance to the revolutionary independence movement in Asia.

We Asian people share the same destiny. In our common struggle against US-led imperialism and for the independent development of sports, it is necessary for us to unite, and support and help one another. The united people are a true bastion of iron which no force on earth can possibly destroy. US imperialism and its followers have resorted to all kinds of maneuvers in an attempt to sabotage our Asian GANEFO. But their intrigues have met with ignominious defeat.⁶⁵

Similar views were repeated in the Chinese press and served to highlight the preoccupation during the mid-1960s with the perceived and real threat engendered by the presence of American troops in Southeast Asia. If the Chinese rhetoric of this era appeared overly militant, it was at least in part due to the 15 years of animosity which had existed between China and the United States and which had seen the

exchange of words escalate to involve large numbers of American forces being deployed near China's borders.

At the 1st Asian GANEFO Chinese athletes dominated the competitions winning 113 gold medals (to 30 for the second place DPR Korea) during the 11-day meet attended by more than 2,000 athletes representing 17 Asian delegations.⁶⁶ Although enthusiasm ran high, one of the major forces behind the GANEFO movement was absent: Indonesia. Subsequent to the political shift to the right which followed the 1965 attempted coup, Indonesia returned to the IOC and the Asian Games Federation and took part in the 5th Asian Games in Bangkok. The loss of the influential Indonesian voice in GANEFO and the withdrawal of China during the Cultural Revolution signalled the demise of the movement and the GANEFO II competitions failed to materialize in 1967.

As a closing comment on the GANEFO movement and the underlying attitudes which generated the polarization between the old and the new, the west and the east, the fact that the press was often still confused in its designation of the PRC and ROC was seen in a commentary on the Asian GANEFO which appeared in the west. According to the article, the "Republic of China" participated in Phnom Penh.⁶⁷

Invitational Competitions in China

Shortly after Liberation, Chinese athletes began entering international athletic competitions in earnest and by 1957 the exchange program included overseas visits by an estimated 50 Chinese

groups while more than 40 foreign delegations were expected to travel to the People's Republic.⁶⁸ The political climate during this period, precipitated to a large measure by the Cold War, resulted in the majority of China's international sporting contacts being with fraternal socialist nations. A survey of China's sports development in 1958 highlighted the year's progress and served to indicate that the number of exchanges were all but too numerous to document.⁶⁹ On August 18, 1958, the largest sports contingent to date from the PRC to travel abroad left for the Leipzig International Army Sports Meet where the 123-member delegation took part in track and field events, swimming, football, basketball, gymnastics, marksmanship, weightlifting and military sports.⁷⁰

The cooling of relations with the Soviet Union in the 1960s was offset by China's increasing contacts with the developing countries of the Third World (see GANEFO above).

As China emerged from the Cultural Revolution in the early 1970s international sporting contacts became ever more numerous, particularly where the ACSF gained recognition in the international sports federations (see Chapter IV). For example, during the month of June 1973 no less than 20 delegations from 11 countries visited China as a part of the growing program of athletic exchanges.⁷¹

Where the PRC either was not recognized by an IF or sought to further expand its friendly contacts around the globe, invitational tournaments and meets played an even greater role than in the previous two decades. Beginning first in 1955, China has hosted several

invitational tournaments that have served both to develop friendly relations around the world and to raise levels of performance through the mutual exchange of experience. Table 14 identifies those competitions which may generally be categorized as "Friendship Invitational Meets" and which have been often more substantially documented than other exchange tours between Chinese and foreign athletic delegations. Unless otherwise noted, the venue was always Peking.

TABLE 14
INVITATIONAL TOURNAMENTS AND MEETS
HOSTED BY CHINA

Event	Date	Participants
International Friendly Marksmanship Competition	1955 November 17-26	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, DPR Korea, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, USSR, China
Invitational Volleyball Tournament	1958 October 25-29	DPR Korea, Mongolia, DR Vietnam, China
26th World Table Tennis Championships	1961 April 5-14	More than 230 entrants from 30 ITTF member associations
Basketball Championships of the Armies of Socialist Countries	1963 August 24- September 3	Albania, Bulgaria, Czecho- slovakia, Hungary, DPR Korea, DR Vietnam, Mongolia, Romania, USSR, China
Peking International Table Tennis Invitational Tournament	1964 October 18-21	Cambodia, Ceylon, Indonesia, Japan, DPR Korea, Nepal, DR Vietnam, China
Peking International Table Tennis Invitational Tournament	1965 August 1-9	Cambodia, Ceylon, Indonesia, Japan, DPR Korea, Nepal, Pakistan, Syria, China

Event	Date	Participants
Invitational Weightlifting Tournament of the New Emerging Forces	1966 May 20-24	Albania, Cambodia, Ceylon, Japan, DPR Korea, Pakistan, Palestine, Syria, China
Peking International Table Tennis Invitational Tournament	1966 August 27- September 4	Cambodia, Ceylon, Japan, DPR Korea, Lebanon, Nepal, Pakistan, Palestine, Syria, DR Vietnam, Yemen, China
Afro-Asian Table Tennis Friendship Invitational Tournament	1971 November 2-14	More than 600 entrants from 51 countries and regions (jointly sponsored)
First Asian Table Tennis Championships	1972 September 2-13	31 countries and regions from Asia
Asian-African-Latin American Table Tennis Friendship Invitational Tournament	1973 August 25- September 7	More than 1,100 entrants from 86 countries and regions
Five-Nation Table Tennis Friendship Tournament	1974 May 14-18	DPR Korea, Japan, Sweden, Yugoslavia, China
Peking International Swimming and Diving Friendship Invitational Meet	1975 August 2-10	More than 300 entrants from 23 countries and regions
Peking International Women's Basketball Friendship Invitational Tournament	1976 August 15-27	DPR Korea, Japan, Mexico, Romania, plus three Chinese teams
International Table Tennis Friendship Invitational Tournament (Shanghai)	1976 September 12-18*	France, FR Germany, Japan, Nigeria, Romania, Sweden, Yugoslavia, China (inter- rupted on the death of Mao Zedong, September 9, 1976)*
Peking International Friendship Invitational Football Tournament (Peking and Shanghai)	1977 July 17-30	Ethiopia, Guinea, Hong Kong, Iran, Japan, DPR Korea, Mexico, Morocco, Zaire, plus three Chinese teams

Event	Date	Participants
Third Asian Badminton Invitational Championships	1978 April 15-21	94 entrants from 12 countries and regions, plus a junior division
Peking International Friendship Invitational Volleyball Tournament	1978 May 18-26	Brazil, Canada, Japan, Mexico, China
International Friendship Invitational Gymnastics Meet	1978 June 16-20	Canada, Egypt, France, Japan, DPR Korea, Holland, Romania, China
Peking International Men's Friendship Invitational Basketball Tournament	1978 August 5-13	Japan, DPR Korea, Holland, Mexico, Philippines, Romania, Yugoslavia, plus three Chinese teams

As in the case of the GANEFO movement, these international competitions were often held in response to what was seen as western domination and control of the majority of international tournaments. Thus, strengthening solidarity and friendship was usually seen as being equally as important as raising the standards of performance of Third World athletes. Cordial airport welcomes, gala banquet receptions, and casual social gathering of competitors have become a trademark of international events held in China. Since the 1970s, the concept "Friendship First, Competition Second" has punctuated all athletic exchanges involving athletes from the PRC. The following examples will serve to illustrate the application of this principle and the emphasis which has been placed on solidarity and mutual assistance.

Press coverage of the 26th World Table Tennis Championships in 1961, the first World Championship competition ever held in China, was extensive. President of the Games Organizing Committee, Rong Gao-tang, remarked in his opening address:

We feel especially happy that our friends have not only brought with them their fine skill in playing table tennis and valuable views on the promotion of the sport, but more important still, have brought us the precious friendship of the people of all countries.⁷²

Later, leaders of the various delegations were received by Chinese Premier Zhou En-lai and attended a banquet tendered in their honor by Vice-Premier He Long (Ho Lung). Noting the dual significance of the tournament, the Vice-Premier said:

We believe that, through this tournament and mutual study and exchange of experience between the players of various countries, we shall certainly be able to advance world table tennis to a still higher stage. . . .

It will certainly further promote friendship among table tennis players of all countries and thereby make a due contribution to the strengthening of the solidarity of the peoples of all countries and to preserving world peace.⁷³

Following the 1964 Peking International Table Tennis Invitational Tournament a liaison committee was formed

. . . to hold frequent friendly tournaments of this nature so as to have an extensive exchange of technical experience in table tennis, promote and develop table tennis in Asia and enhance the friendship among the peoples and sportsmen of Asian countries on the basis of the principles of friendship, solidarity, equality, mutual help and learning from each other for common advancement.⁷⁴

A year later, at the time of the second tournament, a commentary in Renmin Ribao characterized the 1965 competitions as being marked by unity, friendship and common progress.⁷⁵

In response to increasing American involvement in Vietnam and the unfolding of the Cultural Revolution in China the 1966 tournament saw greater emphasis placed on solidarity to fight imperialism. Among those delegations attending the tournament for the first time were Lebanon, Palestine and Yemen.⁷⁶ Citing the unity of the competing teams, a Xin Tiyu article noted that

The team from the Vietnam Democratic Republic in the frontline of resistance against the United States met with the brother team from Palestine in the sports stadium. Although these two teams met for the first time in the present tournament, yet a common will for resistance against imperialism closely bound them together.⁷⁷

As China expanded its international contacts and hosted an increasing number of invitational tournaments after the Cultural Revolution, similar sentiments continued to be expressed. The 1971 Afro-Asian Table Tennis Friendship Invitational Tournament was hailed as "a landmark in the solidarity and friendship of the peoples of the two continents."⁷⁸

When the tournament was expanded in 1973 to include teams from Latin America, a delegation composed of individuals from Taiwan province living in Japan and the United States was formed after the ACSF extended an invitation to attend the tournament on May 25.⁷⁹

Table tennis competitions have not been unique in providing opportunities to promote friendship and understanding between Chinese and foreign athletes. The 1975 Peking International Swimming and Diving Friendship Invitational Meet was noteworthy in that the international aquatics federation (FINA) threatened to ban athletes from its member associations who entered the meet and competed against the non-member Chinese association.⁸⁰ In response to this challenge, ACSF Chairman Zhao Zheng-hung remarked at the welcoming banquet:

At present, a few leaders in the FINA are resorting to 'punishment' at every opportunity to deal with those swimmers who have visited China, as if a country had no right even to choose its own partners of sports exchange but must subordinate itself to the decision by these overlords. This hegemonic behaviour cannot but meet with condemnation from swimming circles of various countries. . . . We are all from developing countries and share common experiences. Today we are all facing the common tasks of defending national independence and developing the national economy and culture. Therefore, we can best understand, sympathize with and support one another. We believe that, so long as we can unit closely and strengthen our cooperation--for unity means strength--sports will surely advance vigorously along the road of independence in our developing countries.⁸¹

Echoing similar sentiments, the then Minister in charge of the Physical Culture and Sport Commission, Zhuang Ze-dong, commented:

The independence of states and the liberation of nations have provided favourable conditions for friendly contacts. Despite the fact that at present certain people in international sport circles are still trying to obstruct the friendly contacts among the peoples and sportsmen of various countries, their tyrannical acts are just as futile as 'trying to cut water with a knife', for the historical current is irresistible, and the holding of our present invitational meet may well serve as an example.⁸²

At the conclusion of the meet, 15 FINA member countries wrote to the international body urging a change in the organization's position both in regard to China's membership and on the issue of competitions between member and non-member associations.⁸³ Although no change was to accrue (see pages 181-82), the Peking meet had provided yet another opportunity for China to state its case. Clearly, in instances where China was a non-member of an international federation the situation was capable of offering both problems and potential, and the hosting of invitational competitions often resulted in China's maximizing this potential in gathering support in its quest for recognition.

In the case of the 1977 Peking International Friendship Invitational Football Tournament the situation was somewhat different. As FIFA had amended its Constitution to permit contests between member and non-member teams, the possibility that punitive measures would be taken was not an issue. On the other hand, as China was still not a member of FIFA the opportunity existed to seek further support for its claims to represent all Chinese football players. Speaking at the closing banquet on July 31 an official of the ACSF remarked:

Enhancing friendship and promoting football are the common desire of football circles in Asia, Africa and Latin America. However, some leaders of the international federation of association football (FIFA) try in a crude way to obstruct and sabotage such efforts. It should be pointed out here that they have been bent on plotting to create 'two Chinas' and obstruct the restoration of the legitimate seat of the Football Association of the People's Republic of China in the international federation of association football. . . .

During this tournament many friends once again declared that the representatives of the Chiang gang, which was repudiated by the Chinese people long ago, should be expelled . . . and the legitimate seat of the Chinese football association in it restored. This constitutes a vigorous support for the Chinese people and their sportsmen and we express our deep gratitude for this. We are convinced that a just struggle is sure to win.⁸⁴

From these examples it is evident that the hosting of invitational tournaments has provided China a forum in which to express its views on relations in the global sporting community. In the case of international badminton, these relations led to the formation of an organization designed to rival the existing governing body.

Peking's Capital Gymnasium was the site of the 3rd Asian Badminton Invitational Championships in April 1978. Attended by representatives from 12 Asian countries and regions and several observer delegations, the matches were a preliminary to the 1st World Badminton Championships scheduled for the fall in Bangkok.⁸⁵ The evolution of the World Badminton Federation (WBF) was, similar to the emergence of the GANEFO movement, strongly supported by China. Although the question of membership for the Badminton Association of the PRC in the International Badminton Federation (IBF) was not the sole reason behind the establishment of the rival WBF, the issue did highlight the influence of the Chinese association as an 'outsider' and a non-member on an established IF, in this case the IBF.

Following China's admission to the Asian Badminton Confederation (ABC) during the 7th Asian Games in September 1974, the ABC actively supported the ACSF's application for membership in the IBF. At the 1975 IBF Congress in London a proposal to recognize the Badminton Association of the People's Republic and withdraw recognition of the Taiwan association passed 49 to 25 but was rejected as it failed to gain a three-quarters majority.⁸⁶ This decision sparked a bitter debate among the delegates. At issue was not only the question of the three-quarters majority but also the fact that the principle of one vote per country had not been accepted by the IBF Executive. Many delegates sought to overturn the longstanding procedure which saw the number of votes per country range from one to ten. A motion to this effect from the associations of Pakistan, Thailand and Czechoslovakia was defeated.⁸⁷

Reacting to these two situations, the Standing Committee of the ABC issued a directive to its members on July 3, 1975, not to send players to any tournament or championship organized by the Badminton Association of England.⁸⁸

Two years later, the question of China's membership arose again at the IBF Congress in Malmo, Sweden. By a simple majority vote of 49 to 32 the 20-year membership of the Taiwan association was terminated and the PRC admitted.⁸⁹ Stanley Jones, legal advisor to the ROC association, immediately announced that the issue would be taken to court in London, headquarters of the IBF.⁹⁰ On July 5, 1977, a British High Court ruled the decision invalid as the vote

had not been conducted according to the IBF's three-quarters majority rule.⁹¹ The Swedish President of the federation countered that only a simple majority was required since the proposal had been recorded in the Minutes of the 1975 Congress.⁹² In September the ABC threatened to break from the IBF if China was not admitted, saying "it is not a question of expulsion but one of representation. The word expulsion has been too freely used in this context."⁹³ With this polarization of views the IBF was further split at its London meetings as Asian delegates refused to vote, claiming the meeting was illegal since the decision to admit China had already been made in Malmo four months previous. The motion to expel Taiwan was defeated 36 to 19 with most ABC members abstaining.⁹⁴

Representatives of the Asian and African Badminton Confederations met in Kuala Lumpur in November 1977 and agreed to the formation of the World Badminton Federation with final details to await a subsequent meeting in February.⁹⁵ The widening split drew the attention of IOC President Lord Killanin who noted that the proposed inclusion of badminton on the Olympic program would undoubtedly be delayed pending resolution of the controversy.⁹⁶ Meeting in Hong Kong on February 25, 1978, the representatives of 19 countries and regions formally established the WBF.⁹⁷ Observers from Yugoslavia, Sweden, West Germany, France, Austria and Mexico also attended the inaugural session and indicated an interest in joining the breakaway organization. In anticipation of a growing membership, 7 of the 12 seats on the Executive Committee were left

unfilled so as to ensure broad future representation.⁹⁸ At the same time the Standing Committee of the ABC announced its withdrawal from the IBF and directed its energies towards the 1st WBF Championships scheduled for October 1978.⁹⁹ In April, China hosted the 3rd Asian Invitational Championships and further solidified its ties with the nascent WBF.

The World Table Tennis Championships

Of the many sports in which China participates on an international level none has attracted the attention of foreign observers more than table tennis ('pingpangqiu'). Although the game was first introduced in China 50 years ago, it was not until the mid-1950s that the activity gained mass appeal. The first national championships held in the PRC in 1952 drew only 62 participants who vied for titles in two events: men's and women's singles.¹⁰⁰ The following year China joined the International Table Tennis Federation and entered the world championships for the first time in Bucharest. Finishing tenth in the men's team competitions and third in the second division of the women's group, China did not again send teams to the world championships until 1956, this time placing sixth and eleventh in the first divisions respectively. Table 15 details the progress of Chinese performances at these championship tournaments from 1956 to 1977.

TABLE 15

CHINESE PERFORMANCE AT THE WORLD TABLE TENNIS CHAMPIONSHIPS: 1956-1977

Series	Date	Location	Placings of Chinese Players						
			Team		Singles			Doubles	
			Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Mixed
23rd	April 1956	Tokyo	6	11	-	-	-	-	-
24th	March 1957	Stockholm	4	3	-	-	-	-	-
25th	March - April 1959	Dortmund	3	3	1	3	3	3	3
26th	April 1961	Peking	1	2	1,2,3	1,3	3	2,3	2,3
27th	April 1963	Prague	1	3	1,2,3	3	1,2	3	3
28th	April 1965	Ljubljana	1	1	1,2,3	2,3	1,2,3	1,3	2,3
29th	April 1967	Stockholm		----	D I D N O T	P A R T I C I P A T E	----		
30th	April 1969	Munich		----	D I D N O T	P A R T I C I P A T E	----		
31st	March - April 1971	Nagoya	1	2	-	1,2	2	1	1
32nd	April 1973	Sarajevo	2	2	1	1,3	-	2	1,3
33rd	February 1975	Calcutta	1	1	-	2,3	-	2	3
34th	March - April 1977	Birmingham	1	1	2,3	2,3	1,2	2,3	3

At the 24th World Championships in 1957 China's team performances continued to improve; however it was to be another two years before singles and doubles players were to challenge the world's best. In 1959 China's Rong Guo-tuan (Jung Kuo-tuan) won the men's singles, leading to a major breakthrough in individual play.¹⁰¹ In the intervening year China had withdrawn from the Asian Table Tennis Federation (ATTF) in a dispute over the ATTF's continued recognition of the Taiwan association. China's withdrawal, coupled with its recognition by the ITTF, led to an unusual situation wherein Taiwan was recognized in Asia but could not enter the world championships and China competed in the world tournament but not in the Asian championships.

In 1961 the attention of table tennis followers around the world was focused on Peking as China hosted its first ever world championship. In preparation for the event a new 15,000 seat facility, the Workers' Gymnasium, was constructed in less than 16 months.¹⁰² The 26th World Championships saw the beginning of China's domination of the sport as its men's team captured the Swaythling Cup for the first time and swept the first three places in singles play while Qiu Zhong-hui (Chiu Chung-hui) won the women's singles.¹⁰³

The Chinese team was equally as successful in the 1963 Prague tournament setting the stage for the most awesome demonstration of skill and depth yet seen in international table tennis two years later in Ljubljana, Yugoslavia.

The 1965 Championships saw China's Zhuang Ze-dong (Chuang Tse-tung) win his third consecutive singles title in leading a victory parade that consisted of five championships, four runner-up and five third place finishes.¹⁰⁴ In addition, both team titles were won by China as the women won the Corbillon Cup for the first time and the men captured the Swaythling Cup for the third consecutive time. In barely a decade of international play, China had risen to a level of near invincibility.

Less than two years later, a spokesman for the Chinese Table Tennis Association announced that the nation would not enter the 29th World Championships in Sweden as its players were resolved to take an active part in the Cultural Revolution and "affairs of State."¹⁰⁵ When a Chinese delegation again did not enter the 1969 Championships in Munich rumors spread that several team members, including Zhuang, had died in the factional fighting.¹⁰⁶ In August 1970, the first sports delegation to visit the People's Republic following the Cultural Revolution arrived from the DPR of Korea for a 19-day tour and immediately renewed acquaintances with the former world champion.¹⁰⁷ Two months previous, China's first delegation to travel abroad in three years participated in an exhibition table tennis match in Nepal.¹⁰⁸ The question was would China now return to the world championships scheduled for the coming spring in Nagoya, Japan.

In preparation for the March 1971 tournament a Japanese delegation travelled to China to discuss the matter of cultural

exchanges in general and Chinese participation in the 31st World Championships in particular. A joint communique issued on February 1 carried the awaited news:

The Japanese Table Tennis Association states that it will promote friendly exchanges between table tennis circles of China and Japan on the basis of the three political principles governing the relations between China and Japan (one, not to pursue a policy of hostility towards China; two, not to participate in any conspiracy to create "two Chinas"; three, not to obstruct the restoration of normal relations between China and Japan). The Chinese Table Tennis Association appreciates and supports this.

On the basis of the above mentioned principles, the Japanese Table Tennis Association invites the Chinese Table Tennis Association to take part in the 31st World Table Tennis Championships to be held in Nagoya, Japan, between March 28 and April 7 this year. The Chinese Table Tennis Association accepts the invitation and will send a table tennis team to participate in the championships.¹⁰⁹

A written statement issued to the press on the arrival of the Chinese delegation in Tokyo identified the sporting philosophy that had emerged from the Cultural Revolution: "Friendship First, Competition Second."¹¹⁰ As a further indication of China's renewed interest in the ITTF, Federation President Roy Evans was invited to Peking in the week prior to the opening of the tournament.¹¹¹

The fact that political issues were still of major concern to the Chinese became apparent when representatives of the Table Tennis Associations of Romania, Egypt, DPR Korea and China submitted a resolution to ITTF Honorary Secretary General A.K. Vint on March 25 for consideration by the Congress.

The I.T.T.F. Congress hereby resolves:

- (1) To immediately drive out of the I.T.T.F. the 'representatives' sent by the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak traitorous clique and the Saigon puppets and declare that the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak traitorous clique and the Saigon puppets have no right to send table tennis teams to participate in the 31st World Table Tennis Championships;
- (2) To immediately invite the Table Tennis Federation of Cambodia under the leadership of the Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia to send people to participate in the I.T.T.F. Congress and the 31st World Table Tennis Championships.¹¹²

As China actively supported the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam and the exiled Cambodian head of state, Samdech Nordom Sihanouk, this action was not surprising. Furthermore, it served to indicate that China's position in regards to its own dispute over the recognition of Taiwan-based associations was unchanged. Indeed, if there was any doubt within the ITTF on China's position it should have been resolved when China withdrew on March 31 from the international federations governing Archery and Lawn Tennis (see Chapter IV). The four-party resolution was, however, defeated by the ITTF membership.

At the tournament itself, China won several titles and exhibited a level of skill which confirmed that little had been lost despite a six-year absence from the Championships.¹¹³ Following the matches in Nagoya delegations from Canada, Columbia, England, Nigeria and the United States accepted invitations to visit Peking thus opening, for the Americans, the era of 'ping pong diplomacy.'

Reacting to front-page coverage of the visit in Newsweek and Time magazines, officials in Taiwan cautioned the United States to be wary of Chinese intentions and quoted a Radio Moscow broadcast which lamented the fact that China was using sports for political purposes.¹¹⁴ In May 1972 China convened a meeting to organize the Asian Table Tennis Union, a body intended to overcome the problems associated with China's non-member status in the Asian Table Tennis Federation which continued to recognize Taiwan.¹¹⁵ Much of the energy of the Chinese Table Tennis Association during 1972 went into the organization of this meeting and the 1st Asian Table Tennis Championships which took place in Peking in September. Nevertheless, a delegation did tour North America in the spring.¹¹⁶

The performance of Chinese players continued to draw attention at the 32nd World Championships in 1973, although for the first time in many years a participating Chinese men's team did not win the team title. However, both singles titles were captured by Chinese players.

Two years later in Calcutta both the Swaythling and Corbillon Cups returned to Peking in a repeat of China's 1965 performance.¹¹⁷ The 1975 tournament was also significant in that at the ITTF Congress meetings held on February 8 the world body recognized the Asian Table Tennis Union, effectively diminishing the impact of the ATTF in Asia and further isolating the ROC association in Taiwan.¹¹⁸

At the most recent world championships in 1977 Chinese players again dominated the tournament winning three championships, four runner-up and four third place medals.¹¹⁹ The continuing success of competitors from the PRC at the 34th Championships prompted critics to suggest that China was quite capable of sweeping all seven titles were it not for the policy of "Friendship First, Competition Second." One analyst wrote:

Table tennis stars, particularly the Europeans, are beginning to squawk. The Chinese policy of "friendship first, competition second" has hurt their pride, mocked their skills and, they say, put the sport in jeopardy. Said a well-known Yugoslav, "When we beat the Chinese, as we sometimes do, our friends smile and say it was 'friendship first.' When we lose, they smile the same and say, 'But, of course, they are better.' These Chinese are wonderful players, but they are making a joke of the game."

No one would think it unfriendly if for a decade or two, the Chinese didn't lose a match.¹²⁰

In addition to participating in ITTF tournaments, China has sent teams to most of the major international competitions around the world since 1971. After hosting the 1st Asian Championships in 1972, China attended the 2nd and 3rd tournaments in Yokohama and Pyongyang in 1974 and 1976 respectively, and following the inauguration of the 1st Asian-African-Latin American Friendship Invitational Tournament (AAA) in August 1973, table tennis delegations were sent to the 2nd and 3rd tournaments in Lagos and Mexico City in 1975 and 1976.¹²¹

With the 35th World Championships scheduled for the Korean capital of Pyongyang in 1979, China's record-breaking performances are expected to continue.

Summary

The issue of the recognition of Taiwan as a separate entity in international sport affected China's involvement in several regional associations and multi-nation sports competitions.

Only after the People's Republic was recognized by the Asian Games Federation in 1974 did China send a delegation to compete in the Games. The PRC was also a major supporter of the Games of the New Emerging Forces movement in the 1960s. During this period, China expanded its sporting ties with the developing countries of the Third World as several exchange visits occurred with delegations from Africa, Asia and Latin America.

In cases where the PRC was not a member of a particular international sport governing body and therefore ineligible to enter meets and tournaments sanctioned by the organization the situation afforded China an opportunity to host "Friendship Invitational Meets." These competitions often stressed both the development of solidarity among the participating athletes and the improvement of skill through the mutual exchange of experience.

During the 1970s China's role in international competitions grew as the All-China Sports Federation sent delegations overseas and hosted foreign teams with increasing regularity.

Except for the period of the Cultural Revolution when China's participation in international sporting events ceased, international table tennis tournaments have been dominated by Chinese athletes for the past two decades. Competitors from the People's Republic appear destined to continue their mastery in the World Championships in the future.

FOOTNOTES

TO CHAPTER V

¹Tiyu Bao (Physical Culture News), 4 January 1978.

²The International Olympic Committee, Olympic Rules (Lausanne: The Committee, 1975), p. 74.

³"A Brief History of the Asian Games," Sports [Singapore Sports Council], vol. 1, no. 10 (July 1973), p. 33.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Compiled from Republic of China Olympic Committee, Amateur Sport in the Republic of China (Taipei: The Committee), n.d. and Ian Buchanan, A Handbook of Far Eastern and Asian Games Track and Field Athletics, compiled by the author, 1973.

⁶For details of Yang's decathlon performances see, China Yearbook 1958-1959 (Taipei: China Publishing Company, 1959), pp. 492-93, and Robert Creamer, "The Cobra and C.K. Yang," Sports Illustrated (23 December 1963), pp. 67-77.

⁷New China News Agency (NCNA), 15 March 1958, in Survey of China Mainland Press (SCMP), no. 1734.

⁸NCNA (Peking), 25 April 1958.

⁹Willard A. Hanna, "Bung Karno's Indonesia: Part XII - Sports, Aid, Tourism and Politics," American Universities Field Staff Report Service, 26 October 1959, pp. 2-7.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 8.

¹¹Ibid., p. 9.

¹²Ibid., pp. 1-2.

¹³NCNA (Peking), 24 July 1962.

¹⁴"U.S. Plot to Create 'Two Chinas' Denounced," NCNA, 30 July 1962, in SCMP, no. 2792.

¹⁵NCNA (Peking), 8 August 1962.

¹⁶NCNA (Peking), 10 August 1962.

¹⁷NCNA (Peking), 14 August 1962.

¹⁸For copy of the circular from IOC member Sondhi see, Avery Brundage Collection (ABC), University Archives, University of Illinois, Box 70, no. 213.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹China Yearbook 1976 (Taipei: China Publishing Company, 1976), p. 281.

²²Ibid. See also, "The Year of Chi Cheng," World Sports, vol. 37, no. 2 (February 1971), pp. 34-36.

²³Republic of China Olympic Committee, "Position Paper," mimeographed paper, n.d., ca. November 1973, p. 1.

²⁴Ibid., p. 2.

²⁵Ibid., p. 4.

²⁶Ibid., pp. 5-6.

²⁷NCNA (Teheran), 16 November 1973.

²⁸NCNA (Peking), 17 November 1973.

²⁹Olympic Review, no. 76-77 (March-April 1974), p. 103.

³⁰"New Slant on the Games," Sportsworld, vol. 3, no. 3 (March 1974), p. 36.

³¹Peking Review, no. 36 (6 September 1974), p. 10.

³²For details of China's performance at the Games see, "Suitably Inscrutable," Sportsworld, vol. 3, no. 10 (October 1974), pp. 38-39; "A Great Plunge Forward for China," Sports Illustrated (16 September 1974), pp. 32-39; and Peking Review, no. 39 (27 September 1974), p. 5.

³³Peking Review, no. 36 (6 September 1974), p. 9.

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Peking Review, no. 37 (13 September 1974), p. 17.

³⁶Ta Kung Pao, 27 April 1978.

³⁷Vancouver Sun, 25 June 1977 and 6 June 1978.

³⁸"China Supports Proposed Afro-Asian Games," NCNA, 4 October 1962, in SCMP, no. 2835.

³⁹Ewa T. Pauker, "GANEFO I: Sports and Politics in Djakarta," Asian Survey, vol. 5, no. 4 (April 1965), p. 173.

⁴⁰"GANEFO: To Build the World of Sports Anew," in Indonesia 1963 (Djakarta: Department of Foreign Affairs, 1963), p. 141.

⁴¹Cited in Pauker, "GANEFO I," p. 174.

⁴²NCNA (Peking), 3 October 1963.

⁴³Renmin Ribao, 10 November 1963.

⁴⁴IOC Circular No. 239 from Avery Brundage to IOC Members, the NOCs and the IFs, 25 August 1963, in ABC, Box 70.

⁴⁵"The Threat of GANEFO," World Sports, vol. 29, no. 11 (November 1963), p. 34.

⁴⁶GANEFO Opens New Era in World Sports (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1964), introduction.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*

⁴⁸NCNA (Peking), 24 May 1964. See also, "Thunderclouds Over Tokyo," World Sports, vol. 30, no. 1 (January 1964), p. 28.

⁴⁹Pauker, "GANEFO I," p. 179.

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, p. 180.

⁵¹NCNA (Canton), 12 December 1963.

⁵²NCNA (Peking), 9 February and 5 March 1964.

⁵³NCNA (Peking), 4 August 1964.

⁵⁴NCNA (Peking), 11 August 1964.

⁵⁵NCNA (Peking), 24 November 1964.

⁵⁶NCNA (Peking), 21 September 1965.

⁵⁷NCNA (Peking), 23 September 1965.

⁵⁸Ibid.

⁵⁹Ibid.

⁶⁰NCNA (Peking), 25 September 1965.

⁶¹Ibid.

⁶²The attempted coup, later referred to as 'Gestapu,' was followed by bitter reprisals directed against members and supporters of the Indonesian Communist Party. In October the Party was proscribed and its few surviving leaders, including Jusuf Adjitorop, went into exile in Peking further exacerbating relations between Indonesia and China.

⁶³NCNA (Peking), 20 July 1966.

⁶⁴NCNA (Peking), 25 July 1966.

⁶⁵NCNA (Peking), 24 November 1966.

⁶⁶NCNA (Peking), 7 December 1966.

⁶⁷"Seen and Heard," World Sports, vol. 33, no. 2 (February 1967), p. 10.

⁶⁸"Heavy International Sports Schedule for China," NCNA, 15 January 1957, in SCMP, no. 1453.

⁶⁹NCNA (Peking), 26 December 1958.

⁷⁰NCNA (Peking), 28 August 1958.

⁷¹"Peking's Sports Guests," China Reconstructs (October 1973), p. 28.

⁷²"Grand Festival of World Table Tennis in Peking," NCNA, 4 April 1961, in SCMP, no. 2473.

⁷³NCNA (Peking), 4 April 1961.

⁷⁴NCNA (Peking), 26 October 1964.

⁷⁵NCNA (Peking), 10 August 1965.

⁷⁶Xin Tiyu, no. 9 (September 1966).

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ "Meeting of Solidarity and Friendship," China Reconstructs (February 1972), p. 13.

⁷⁹ "At Home in the Motherland," China Reconstructs (December 1973), pp. 12-14.

⁸⁰ Peking Review, no. 33 (15 August 1975), p. 11.

⁸¹ NCNA (Peking), 5 August 1975.

⁸² NCNA (Peking), 1 August 1975.

⁸³ Peking Review, no. 34 (22 August 1975), p. 5.

⁸⁴ NCNA (Peking), 31 July 1977.

⁸⁵ Peking Review, no. 17 (28 April 1978), pp. 22-24.

⁸⁶ "Asian Badminton Confederation Strongly Protests Against Obstruction to Restoring Chinese Badminton Association's Rightful Seat by International Badminton Federation's Few Leaders," NCNA (London), 3 July 1975.

⁸⁷ NCNA (London), 3 July 1975.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ NCNA (Peking), 21 May 1977. See also, Vancouver Sun, 6 May 1977.

⁹⁰ Vancouver Sun, 6 May 1977.

⁹¹ Ibid., 6 July 1977.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Ibid., 28 September 1977.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 30 September 1977.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 25 November 1977.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 26 November 1977.

⁹⁷ For details on the founding meeting, organizational structure and member affiliates see, Peking Review, no. 17 (28 April 1978), p. 24.

⁹⁸Ibid.

⁹⁹Ibid. See also, "Asian Badminton Moves Ahead," China Reconstructs (July 1978), pp. 21-24.

¹⁰⁰People's China, vol. 5, no. 21 (1 November 1952), p. 47.

¹⁰¹"Table Tennis World Champion," China Reconstructs (July 1959), pp. 36-37.

¹⁰²NCNA (Peking), 27 February 1961. See also, "The New Workers' Gymnasium," China Reconstructs (May 1961).

¹⁰³"New Horizons for Table Tennis," China Reconstructs (June 1961), pp. 8-12.

¹⁰⁴"China's Secret at the 28th World Table Tennis Championships," China Reconstructs (July 1965), pp. 26-29.

¹⁰⁵NCNA (Peking), 9 April 1967.

¹⁰⁶For an example of the rumors which were circulating among table tennis players and observers see, "No Defense Against Murder," Sports Illustrated (5 May 1969), pp. 70-76.

¹⁰⁷"Korean Table Tennis Team in China," China Reconstructs (November 1970), pp. 46-48.

¹⁰⁸Peking Review, no. 25 (19 June 1970), p. 37.

¹⁰⁹NCNA (Peking), 1 February 1971.

¹¹⁰NCNA (Tokyo), 21 March 1971.

¹¹¹NCNA (Peking), 22 March 1971.

¹¹²NCNA (Nagoya), 26 March 1971.

¹¹³Peking Review, no. 15 (9 April 1971), pp. 10-12. See also, "They Still Swing a Mean Paddle," Sports Illustrated (12 April 1971), pp. 32-33.

¹¹⁴Yin Ching-yao, "The Truth of Ping-Pong Diplomacy," Issues and Studies (August 1971), pp. 25-27.

¹¹⁵Peking Review, no. 19 (12 May 1972), pp. 16-17.

¹¹⁶"Gentle Tigers of the Tables," Sports Illustrated (10 April 1972), pp. 24-25.

¹¹⁷Peking Review, no. 8 (21 February 1975), pp. 12-13.

¹¹⁸Ibid.

¹¹⁹"New Progress in World Table Tennis," China Reconstructs (July 1977), pp. 22-23. See also, Tiyu Bao, 4 April 1977.

¹²⁰"One for All, But Not All for One," Sports Illustrated (18 April 1977), p. 79.

¹²¹For details of Chinese participation in several international tournaments since 1971 see, "Grand Sports Rally of Three Continents," China Reconstructs (December 1973), pp. 2-14; Peking Review, no. 31 (1 August 1975), pp. 10-12; and relevant NCNA releases.

CHAPTER VI

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Spanning nearly three decades, the issue of participation by athletes from the People's Republic of China in the world-wide network of organizations, committees and federations which comprise the Olympic Movement remained essentially unresolved as of 1978. China's position throughout the dispute has been that there is but 'one China' and that the resolution of the problem of who governs the single, united country is an internal affair to be decided by the Chinese people themselves. The official position from Taiwan also supports the notion of one government, but maintains that the ROC administration speaks for the majority of the Chinese people albeit from a position of temporary exile. As the PRC avows to liberate Taiwan, so too does the ROC continue to give verbal assurances of its eventual return to the mainland.

The stance of the Chiang government in this regard complicated attempts during the 1970s by sports organizations from Taiwan, including the Republic of China Olympic Committee, to retain their memberships in several international sport governing bodies. By acknowledging that they did not represent sportsmen in China and

that, in reality, there were indeed 'two Chinas' each deserving recognition according to the statutes and regulations of many of the parent sport bodies these national associations adopted a pragmatic view of the status quo that was openly contrary to the officially enunciated position of the government in Taipei. In contrast, this modified position has never been publicly ascribed to by the All-China Sports Federation or by any of its member associations.

For their parts, the International Olympic Committee and several of the International Sports Federations likewise adopted uncompromising positions on the China question. The stance of these organizations was not to query the proposed affiliation of China but the prior terms and conditions to be met, namely the withdrawal of recognition of the ROC member. To the extent that these organizations remain autonomous, independent bodies committed to the enforcement of their statutes and regulations, the issue of China's membership will remain problematic.

A fundamental issue in the dispute concerns the perspective of each of the many parties involved regarding the perceived nature and role of involvement in sport by governmental and non-governmental bodies. Whereas the IOC, the IFs and the ROCOC claim there should be a complete separation, China does not. The gulf widens further when one considers the fact that China sees the relationship which exists between governmental and non-governmental organizations in, for example, the United States as not being separated but rather closely intertwined. This disagreement has been a major factor in the question of whether or

not issues of a 'political nature' should be or can be discussed in regards to the conduct of international sport.

Discussion

The uncertain status of the Chiang government following the civil war in 1949 was fueled by the developing Cold War between the socialist and capitalist blocs which was exacerbated by the outbreak of the Korean War. The resulting split into two camps was manifest in the extreme polarization of loyalties and in the designation of 'friends' and 'enemies' by both sides. A lasting and undeniable feature of this dichotomy was the rhetoric which characterized the exchanges between China and supporters of the 'two China' concept, most notably the United States.

Each side was equally vociferous in its condemnation of the other. The public pronouncements of U.S. Presidents from Truman to Ford and the support provided by the 'China Lobby', sports organizations and individuals on the issue of Chinese involvement in international sport were as politically based as were comments from representatives of government and sport organizations in China. The difference was that the latter did not deny the political nature of the question of China's status in international sports organizations.

In addition to the vituperation which has continued for a quarter century, a second outcome of the isolation of Chinese athletes from the world sporting community was that the PRC sought alternate means for its athletes to compete internationally. Hence, China gave its wholehearted support to GANEFO and other international meets and

tournaments which provided opportunities for the furthering of solidarity amongst the nations of the developing Third World. Curtailed only briefly during the Cultural Revolution in the mid-1960s, China's interest in expanding its international sporting ties was enthusiastically revived in the 1970s.

The support afforded sports bodies from both China and Taiwan since the debate surrounding the 'two China' question first arose resulted in several international incidents which cast a shadow of doubt upon the stance adopted by the IOC and many of the IFs that the sanctity of amateur sport placed it above and somehow independent of issues of a political nature. Prime examples include the proposed intervention by the American government in the 1960 Winter Olympics, the stand adopted by the Indonesian government at the 1962 Asian Games, and the 'Taiwan Incident' at the 1976 Montreal Games. In the latter instance, several factors in regards to the continuing issue of the recognition of China are apparent.

First, the Canadian government's move to ban athletes from Taiwan who claimed to represent China was a logical extension of its 'one China' policy which had been in effect since the establishment of diplomatic relations with the PRC in 1970. Ottawa's position was that it was not possible to recognize two governments which lay claim to the same territory. To admit individuals as official representatives of the ROC would clearly have compromised this position. The surprising announcement on July 15 that the government would permit the use of the ROC flag and anthem was difficult to

support in light of the firm stand taken prior to this time. If one gives the government credit for taking a stand such as this, one must also criticize the Prime Minister for backing down at the last moment.

Second, at the time the Canadian government gave its support in 1969 to the bid to host the Games, the qualifying phrase "pursuant to the normal regulations" was not included with the specific issue of Chinese participation in mind but rather to cover any possible contingencies which might arise in the subsequent seven years prior to the Montreal Games. Even though the IOC failed to request further clarification of the "normal regulations", the government's handling of the matter was open to criticism. As for the IOC's belief that there should be complete autonomy of decision making by a non-governmental body such as itself in regards to the extending of invitations to compete in international competitions, the action of the Canadian government highlighted the growing difficulty faced by non-governmental organizations in retaining control over their own operations.

Following the obvious change in international attitudes which became apparent, at least in portions of the Asian world, with the decision to admit the sports organization of the PRC to the Asian Games Federation in 1973, the IOC's inability to solve the issue prior to the Montreal Games should have prepared the organization for another challenge on the question of Chinese participation.

Third, whereas in the past Avery Brundage was able, if not to resolve the PRC-ROC dispute, to ensure the participation of athletes from one of the 'two Chinas' in the Olympic Games, Lord Killanin was not. This was in sharp contrast to situations which had arisen in the two previous decades. Killanin is undoubtedly more cognizant of the world situation vis-a-vis China than was his predecessor, a fact acknowledged by officials in the All-China Sports Federation. However, the question of Chinese participation in the Olympics has been clarified little under Killanin's leadership.

Fourth, the Canadian decision to apply a feature of its foreign policy in a situation undoubtedly destined to elicit criticism was taken by Prime Minister Trudeau himself with the support from members of the staff in the Department of External Affairs. Although he played a minor role in the negotiations, the Prime Minister was the architect of the government's stance. Trudeau had initiated the move to recognize the People's Republic and had visited China on three occasions: as an itinerant student in 1949, as a university lecturer in 1960, and as Prime Minister in 1973. Suggestions that wheat sales to China were the motivating factor in Canada's decision to ban Taiwanese athletes who claimed to represent China entirely miss the point and indicate a lack of sensitivity to the political reality of Canadian foreign policy under the Liberal government. The key was Trudeau's own close affiliation with China and his belief in the need to develop an independent Canadian approach toward foreign policy questions. Whether or not his reasons were appropriate or whether they reflected the feelings of Canadians is another matter,

but that they were the major factor in determining the position Canada would take towards Taiwan is the key often overlooked by analysts and critics. One possible explanation for the Prime Minister's partial compromise of July 15 was that he wearied of presenting the government's case to those who were not able either to understand or to accept his intellectual arguments on Canada's China policy.

Finally, even with the continuing support of several individuals and groups (from the United States, international sport governing bodies, the media and the public) the ROC delegation chose not to compete in Montreal. Taiwan's withdrawal from the Games appears to have been a mistake. Although remaining faithful to the principle that a non-governmental body such as the ROCOC should not be required to submit to governmental pressure, in this instance from the Canadian government, ROC sports officials were open to criticism that their actions were politically motivated. More could have been gained had the delegation accepted the compromise solution and stayed in the Games. The presence and involvement of the delegation in Montreal would have resulted in the ROC continuing to receive attention, whereas by returning home they were much more easily forgotten. Taiwan's withdrawal also served to undermine the IOC's claim that the conduct of sport by non-governmental organizations was or should be free from governmental pressure, as it is possible to speculate that the ROC government may have attempted to influence the ROCOC's decision to return to Taipei since the government-controlled media gave the issue

full coverage and government officials were on hand to receive the delegation on its arrival.

Clearly, the 'Taiwan Incident' provided several instances and examples of the interweaving of sport and international politics. In addition to China's relations with the IOC, evidence of the impact of the 'two China' question on other non-governmental sports organizations is also substantial.

The role played by the 'two China' question in the International Badminton Federation and the subsequent establishment of a rival body, the World Badminton Federation, was indicative of the impact of an 'outsider' (China) on an established IF. The refusal of the Soviet Union to compete against a basketball team from Taiwan at the 3rd FIBA World Championships in 1959 which resulted in the U.S.S.R.'s forfeiture of the title also highlights the extent to which the Olympic Movement, in this case specifically the operation of the IFs, has been affected by the China question.

In contrast, although the issue of China's membership was of a recurring and sometimes major concern to many other IFs, the functioning of the largest federations (IAAF, FIFA and FINA) was not adversely affected by the conflict over recognition between 1952 and 1978. The almost perennial issue was seldom unemotional and often disruptive, but with the passing of time it probably became more a nuisance item than a matter of substance for which a solution seemed possible. Repeated referrals to committees became the common responses for many of the IFs and, over time, the success of these bodies in resisting government pressure was most

notable.

In those federations and committees in which China has either maintained or renewed its affiliation, relations have been mutually beneficial. For example, Chinese involvement in table tennis tournaments and competitions has been conducive to further development of the sport for nearly a quarter century. Advancing levels of performance, wider diffusion of the game and interest in Chinese methods of training and techniques have resulted, in part, from China's active participation in the ITTF. In addition, since having been admitted to the Asian Games Federation in 1973 the People's Republic has been an exemplary member. With the future of the AGF in doubt, the role played by China in consolidating the often financially troubled organization may be a significant one. Both materially and administratively China has met its obligations in the AGF since joining five years ago.

The 'two China' question has not been without its droll moments, although one's perspective in the dispute often determined whether these incidents were humorous or ludicrous. The suspension of Canadian broadcaster Ted Reynolds (a suspension from future swimming competitions!) following his participation as a member of a swimming delegation which travelled to China highlights the extremes to which several sport governing bodies went in attempting to retain control over the situation. Although Reynolds did not carry out his threat to sue FINA, the issue did indicate that the IF was 'in over its head' in this case.

In addition to the embroilment of numerous sports organizations in the dispute, over the years countless individuals have assumed a role in the unfolding drama. Due to his position as IOC President for 20 years, Avery Brundage maintained the highest profile of this group and was thus often the target of spokesmen of the pro-China and pro-Taiwan groups. The involvement of other individuals such as the Marquess of Exeter (IAAF), Sir Stanley Rous (FIFA), Norman Kilpatrick (USTTA) and G.D. Sondhi (IOC member) never reached the significance of Brundage. The strong position which he adopted in opposition to China's membership demands was more the result of his views being at odds with the reality of the unfolding new world order following World War II than evidence of a premeditated plan to exclude China. Brundage was the strongest advocate of the separation of governmental and non-governmental involvement in international sport.

Although the rhetoric which punctuated exchanges between the President and Chinese officials, especially at the time of China's withdrawal from the IOC in 1958, suggested that Brundage was under the influence of the prevailing government and public opinion in the United States, it was belief in the incompatibility of questions of sport and politics that influenced his decisions. The uproar generated by supporters of Taiwan's position which resulted from the IOC's proposed name-change for the Taiwan committee in 1959 served to indicate that Brundage was equally open to attacks from both sides. Nevertheless, his open support in regards to the election of Taiwan's Henry Hsu to membership in the IOC in 1970 was highly questionable

considering that such action was certain to embitter the international climate as China emerged from the Cultural Revolution seeking to renew its ties with sports organizations around the world.

As for the significance of the involvement of Chinese individuals since 1949, no one person's contribution was distinctly unique or destined to alter the course of the dispute. Dong Shou-yi, Sheng Zhi-pai, Rong Gao-tang, Zhang Lian-hua, Huang Zhong, Song Zhong and Zhao Zheng-hung all served as important spokesmen at various periods, but because they spoke with a common voice the stance adopted by China throughout the dispute over the recognition of 'two Chinas' was consistent and uncompromising. Clearly, these spokesmen demonstrated that, in China, there was no variation in the approach taken by individuals who occupied either official government or mass organization (ACSF) positions. Working within a framework such as this it is not surprising that Chinese sports officials saw similar structural and functional patterns as being the norm elsewhere in the world. Hence, it was often **relatively easy to perceive** that the pro-Taiwan position adopted by many federations and committees was an extension of official government anti-China policies and, thus, was political in nature.

In the international federations it was usually an individual's official position rather than his or her personality which brought one into the limelight regarding the issue of China's membership. The difficulty arises, however, in determining the impact of government and public opinion in the west which was so strongly influenced by

the United States prior to the mid-1960s. It was not until the emergence of several Third World nations that the decision-making process in many of the IFs received greater scrutiny.

The fact that the issue of 'two Chinas' remains an unresolved problem for many international sports organizations in 1978 suggests that, barring any unforeseen changes in philosophies, attitudes or policies, the involvement of the People's Republic in the Olympic Movement will continue to be peripheral, indirect and limited.

Nevertheless, on the basis of material collected and analyzed in the course of this study several conclusions regarding the lengthy history of the dispute are evident.

Conclusions

The stance adopted by spokesmen for the All-China Sports Federation (Chinese Olympic Committee) and its member associations has been consistent and uncompromising, whereas the position taken by their counterparts in Taiwan has varied with the prevailing international political situation. By extending invitations to athletes from Taiwan to attend meets and competitions on the mainland, China's assertion that Taiwan province is an integral part of 'one China' and that its people are viewed as members of 'one Chinese family' is enhanced.

For their part, sports organizations in Taiwan, including the Republic of China Olympic Committee, give only tacit acknowledgment to ROC government calls for a return to the mainland, while attempting to retain their identity within the Olympic Movement as

a separate nation. The prolonged exile of the Chiang government from, and its refusal to deal with, China has undermined the functioning of sports organizations in Taiwan. Claiming to represent, but denying opportunities for interaction between Chinese people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait only serves to illustrate the absurdity of ROC government statements which maintain that the Taiwan administration represents the wishes of the majority of the Chinese people.

In contrast to the unity of purpose, voice and action of the sports organizations in China in relation to the PRC government, sports bodies in Taiwan have been at variance with the ROC government in acknowledging territorial limits and, thus, have not claimed jurisdiction over athletes on the mainland. By implication the ROC government does claim to represent all Chinese athletes, but by its actions the claim is a hollow one.

In the case of the People's Republic, the international political situation which widened the gulf between the socialist and capitalist camps in the early 1950s was accompanied by an ideological rhetoric which transcended personalities and has survived to the present. That no one individual has played an overridingly significant role in either resolving or perpetuating the dispute gives testimony to the fact that, in spite of the rapid changes which have occurred in society in the past 30 years, there still exist institutions and and beliefs for which modification or compromise is an anathema.

It is precisely this refusal to modify or compromise which has prolonged the dispute between China and the Olympic Movement. Relations between the PRC and the international sporting community have been deadlocked on the question of recognition. As most organizations, committees and federations comprising the Olympic Movement have refused to recognize China's political position on the issue of 'one China' in international affairs, so too has China refused to recognize these groups as autonomous, independent bodies.

The People's Republic of China could enter the Olympic Movement tomorrow, but to do so on terms dictated by the Movement would compromise a political position which China has sustained since Liberation. The Chinese struggle has been arduous, but no more so than that which has resulted from the interplay between sport and politics.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

TEXT OF JOINT COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AT
SHANGHAI, FEBRUARY 27, 1972

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SHANGHAI, FEBRUARY 27, 1972

President Richard Nixon of the United States of America visited the People's Republic of China at the invitation of Premier Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of China from February 21 to February 28, 1972. Accompanying the President were Mrs. Nixon, U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers, Assistant to the President Dr. Henry Kissinger, and other American officials.

President Nixon met with Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the Communist Party of China on February 21. The two leaders had a serious and frank exchange of views on Sino-U.S. relations and world affairs.

During the visit, extensive, earnest and frank discussions were held between President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai on the normalization of relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, as well as on other matters of interest to both sides. In addition, Secretary of State William Rogers and Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei held talks in the same spirit.

President Nixon and his party visited Peking and viewed cultural, industrial and agricultural sites, and they also toured Hangchow and Shanghai where, continuing discussions with Chinese leaders, they viewed similar places of interest.

The leaders of the People's Republic of China and the United States of America found it beneficial to have this opportunity, after so many years without contact, to present candidly to one another their views on a variety of issues. They reviewed the international situation in which important changes and great upheavals are taking place and expounded their respective positions and attitudes.

The U.S. side stated: Peace in Asia and peace in the world requires efforts both to reduce immediate tensions and to eliminate the basic causes of conflict. The United States will work for a just and secure peace: just, because it fulfills the aspirations of peoples and nations for freedom and progress; secure, because it removes the danger of foreign aggression. The United States supports individual freedom and social progress for all the peoples of the world, free of outside pressure or intervention. The United States believes that the effort to reduce tensions is served by improving communication between countries that have different ideologies so as to lessen the risks of confrontation through accident, miscalculation or misunderstanding. Countries should treat each other with mutual respect and be willing to compete peacefully, letting performance be the ultimate judge. No country should claim infallibility and each country should be prepared to re-examine its own attitudes for the common good. The United States stressed that the peoples of Indochina should be allowed to determine their destiny without outside intervention; its constant primary objective has been a negotiated solution; the eight-point proposal put forward by the Republic of Vietnam and the United States on

January 27, 1972 represents a basis for the attainment of that objective; in the absence of a negotiated settlement the United States envisages the ultimate withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the region consistent with the aim of self-determination for each country of Indochina. The United States will maintain its close ties with and support for the Republic of Korea; the United States will support efforts of the Republic of Korea to seek a relaxation of tension and increased communication in the Korean peninsula. The United States places the highest value on its friendly relations with Japan; it will continue to develop the existing close bonds. Consistent with the United Nations Security Council Resolution of December 21, 1971, the United States favors the continuation of the ceasefire between India and Pakistan and the withdrawal of all military forces to within their own territories and to their own sides of the cease-fire line in Jammu and Kashmir; the United States supports the right of the peoples of South Asia to shape their own future in peace, free of military threat, and without having the area become the subject of great power rivalry.

The Chinese side stated: Wherever there is oppression, there is resistance. Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the people want revolution--this has become the irresistible trend of history. All nations, big or small, should be equal; big nations should not bully the small and strong nations should not bully the weak. China will never be a superpower and it opposes hegemony and power politics of any kind. The Chinese side stated that it firmly supports the struggles of all the oppressed people and nations for freedom and liberation and that the people of all countries have the right to choose their social systems according to their own wishes and the right to safeguard the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of their own countries and oppose foreign aggression, interference, control and subversion. All foreign troops should be withdrawn to their own countries.

The Chinese side expressed its firm support to the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in their efforts for the attainment of their goal and its firm support to the seven-point proposal of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam and the elaboration of February this year on the two key problems in the proposal, and to the Joint Declaration of the Summit Conference of the Indochinese Peoples. It firmly supports the eight-point program for the peaceful unification of Korea put forward by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on April 12, 1971, and the stand for the abolition of the "U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea." It firmly opposes the revival and outward expansion of Japanese militarism and firmly supports the Japanese people's desire to build an independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral Japan. It firmly maintains that India and Pakistan should, in accordance with the United Nations resolutions on the India-Pakistan question, immediately withdraw all their forces to their respective territories and to their own sides of the cease-fire line in Jammu and Kashmir and firmly supports the Pakistan Government and people in their struggle to preserve their independence and sovereignty and the people of Jammu and Kashmir in their struggle for the right of self-determination.

There are essential differences between China and the United States in their social systems and foreign policies. However, the two sides agreed that countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. International disputes should be settled on this basis, without resorting to the use or threat of force. The United States and the People's Republic of China are prepared to apply these principles to their mutual relations.

With these principles of international relations in mind the two sides stated that:

Progress toward the normalization of relations between China and the United States is in the interests of all countries;

Both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict;

Neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony; and

Neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states.

Both sides are of the view that it would be against the interests of the peoples of the world for any major country to collude with another against other countries, or for major countries to divide up the world into spheres of interest.

The two sides reviewed the long-standing serious disputes between China and the United States. The Chinese side reaffirmed its position: The Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States; the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of "one China, one Taiwan," "one China, two governments," "two Chinas," and "independent Taiwan" or advocate that "the status of Taiwan remains to be determined."

The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.

The two sides agreed that it is desirable to broaden the understanding between the two peoples. To this end, they discussed specific areas in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports and journalism, in which people-to-people contacts and exchanges would be mutually beneficial. Each side undertakes to facilitate the further development of such contacts and exchanges.

Both sides view bilateral trade as another area from which mutual benefit can be derived, and agreed that economic relations based on equality and mutual benefit are in the interest of the peoples of the two countries. They agree to facilitate the progressive development of trade between their two countries.

The two sides agreed that they will stay in contact through various channels, including the sending of a senior U.S. representative to Peking from time to time for concrete consultations to further the normalization of relations between the two countries and continue to exchange views on issues of common interest.

The two sides expressed the hope that the gains achieved during this visit would open up new prospects for the relations between the two countries. They believe that the normalization of relations between the two countries is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the world.

President Nixon, Mrs. Nixon and the American party expressed their appreciation for the gracious hospitality shown them by the Government and people of the People's Republic of China.

APPENDIX B
OLYMPIC RULES
(1976)

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D. REGIONAL GAMES

E. THE OLYMPIC AWARDS

A - RULES

I - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

1 The aims of the Olympic Movement are to promote the development of those fine physical and moral qualities which are the basis of amateur sport and to bring together the athletes of the world in a great quadrennial festival of sports thereby creating international respect and goodwill and thus helping to construct a better and more peaceful world.

2 The Olympic Games celebrate an Olympiad or period of four successive years. The first Olympiad of modern times was celebrated in Athens in 1896, and subsequent Olympiads and Games are numbered consecutively from that year, even though it has been impossible to hold the Games in any Olympiad.

3 The Olympic Games take place every four years. They unite Olympic competitors of all nations in fair and equal competition.

The International Olympic Committee (I.O.C.) shall secure the widest possible audience for these Games.

No discrimination in them is allowed against any country or person on grounds of race, religion or politics.

4 The International Olympic Committee directs the Olympic Movement and retains all rights to the Olympic Games and to the Olympic Winter Games. Its constitution and powers are stated in the present Rules and Regulations.

The honour of holding the Olympic Games is entrusted to a city and not to a country or area. The choice of a city for the celebration of an Olympiad lies solely with the International Olympic Committee.

Application to hold the Games is made by the official authority of the city concerned with the approval of the National Olympic Committee (N.O.C.) which must guarantee that the Games will be organized to the satisfaction of and in accordance with the requirements of the International Olympic Committee and which must be responsible for all commitments undertaken by the elected city.

Legal protection

7 Only persons who are eligible within the definition laid down in these rules and by-laws may take part in the Olympic Games.

8 Only citizens of a country or area* in which a National Olympic Committee recognized by the I.O.C. operates, are qualified to compete in the Olympic Games under the colours of that country.

*For simplification "country" in the remainder of these rules includes "area".

Recognition of a National Olympic Committee in such a country or area:

- A - does not imply political recognition;
 - B - is dependent on the country or area having had a stable government for a reasonable period.
- 9 The Games are contests between individuals and not between countries or areas.

II - THE INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE

Juridical status, objects and powers

11 The International Olympic Committee was created by the Congress of Paris of June 23rd 1894; it was entrusted with the control and development of the modern Olympic Games.

It is a body corporate by international law having juridical status and perpetual succession. Its headquarters are in Switzerland. It is not formed for profit and has as its aims:

- A - the regular celebration of the Games;
- B - making the Games ever more worthy of their glorious history and of the high ideals which inspired their revival by Baron Pierre de Coubertin and his associates;
- C - encouraging the organization and development of amateur sport and sport competitions;
- D - inspiring, and leading sport within the Olympic ideal, thereby promoting and strengthening friendship between the sportsmen of all countries.

Membership

12 The International Olympic Committee is a permanent organization. It selects such persons as it considers qualified to be members, provided that they speak French or English and are citizens and reside in a country which possesses a National Olympic Committee recognized by the International Olympic Committee, and welcomes them into membership with a brief ceremony during which they accept the required obligations and responsibilities. There shall be only one member in any country except in the largest and most active in the Olympic Movement, and in those countries where the Olympic Games have been held, where there may be a maximum of two.

Members of the International Olympic Committee are representatives of the I.O.C. in their countries and not their delegates to the I.O.C.

They may not accept from Governments or from any organization or individual, instructions which will in any way bind them or interfere with the independence of their vote.

Members with long and active service in the I.O.C. who wish to resign, may be elected to honorary membership. Such Honorary members may attend the Olympic Games under the same conditions as the I.O.C. members.

13 A member:

A - may resign at any time;

B - if elected after 1965, must retire upon reaching the age of 72;

C - shall cease to be a member if he changes his nationality or no longer lives in his country; fails to attend meetings, or to take any active part in I.O.C. affairs for two years, or if his subscription is more than one year in arrear; or by reason of circumstances that may arise, is not in a position properly to carry out his duties as a member;

D - shall not be personally liable for the debts and obligations of the I.O.C.;

E - may be expelled by resolution of the I.O.C. if in the I.O.C.'s opinion he has betrayed or neglected its interests or has been guilty of unworthy conduct.

Organization

16 The President may take action or make a decision where circumstances do not permit it to be taken by the International Olympic Committee or its Executive Board. Such action or decision is subject to ratification by the I.O.C. at its next meeting.

III - THE NATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEES

24 A - Only National Olympic Committees recognized and approved by the International Olympic Committee can enter competitors in the Olympic Games and the qualifying rounds. Therefore, in order that contestants from a country or geographical area can participate in the Olympic Games, there must be a National Olympic Committee in that country which must be composed of at least five National Federations. These Federations in turn must be active members of the International Federations governing their sport on the Olympic programme. The National Olympic Committees must also conduct their activities in accordance with the Olympic Rules and Regulations and the high ideals of the Olympic Movement in order to be recognized by the International Olympic Committee.

IV - THE OLYMPIC GAMES

International Sports Federations

30 The following International Sports Federations governing Olympic sports are recognized by the International Olympic Committee:

International Archery Federation
International Amateur Athletic Federation
International Amateur Basketball Federation
International Bobsleigh and Tobogganing Federation
International Amateur Boxing Federation
International Canoeing Federation
International Amateur Cyclists Federation
International Equestrian Federation
International Fencing Federation
International Football Federation
International Gymnastics Federation
International Amateur Handball Federation
International Hockey Federation
International Ice Hockey Federation
International Judo Federation
International Luge Federation
International Union for Modern Pentathlon and Biathlon
International Rowing Federation
International Shooting Union
International Skating Union
International Skiing Federation
International Amateur Swimming Federation
International Volleyball Federation
International Weight-Lifting Federation
International Amateur Wrestling Federation
International Yacht Racing Union

Entry forms

35 Since only those National Olympic Committees recognized by the International Olympic Committee can enter competitors in the Olympic Games, a country without a National Olympic Committee must form such a Committee and have it recognized by the International Olympic Committee before it is permitted to take part in the Olympic Games.

C - INSTRUCTIONS

I - POLITICAL USE OF SPORT

The International Olympic Committee notes with great satisfaction that its efforts are universally approved, it rejoices in the enthusiasm which the Olympic Movement has encouraged among different nations and it congratulates those which with a view to encouraging popular sports have adopted vast programmes of physical education.

It considers, however, as dangerous to the Olympic ideals, that, besides the proper development of sports in accordance with the principles of amateurism, certain tendencies exist which aim primarily at a national exaltation of the results gained instead of the realization that the sharing of friendly effort and rivalry is the essential aim of the Olympic Games.

V - ORGANIZATION OF THE GAMES

CONDITIONS LAID DOWN FOR CANDIDATE CITIES

5. Participants

All National Olympic Committees recognized by the International Olympic Committee are entitled to send participants (competitors and officials in accordance with Rule 40) to the Games to which they shall be admitted without discrimination on grounds of religion, race or political affiliation. It is desirable that such persons shall be allowed to enter the host country simply on presentation of the Olympic identity card referred to in article 38.

VI - QUESTIONNAIRE FOR CANDIDATE CITIES
APPLYING FOR THE GAMES

I. Respect of the I.O.C. Rules

1. Can you guarantee that your government will agree to abide by, as priority, the I.O.C. Rules and Regulations throughout the duration of the Games? Can you produce evidence to this effect?
2. What legal form will be given to the Organizing Committee?
3. Are there any laws, regulations or customs that would limit, restrict or interfere with the Games in any way?
4. Unhindered entry in the country must be accorded to all accredited persons.
5. Can you guarantee that no political meeting or demonstration will take place in the stadium, or any other sports ground or in the Olympic Village during the Games?
6. Do you agree with the conditions laid down in articles 21 and 40 of the I.O.C. Rules and Regulations? Can you obtain the agreement of your national television, your government or other authorities controlling television, to ensure that the I.O.C.'s exclusive rights are respected?
7. Are the Olympic symbols and emblem in your country protected by law? Will you obtain such protection for the Olympic emblem, as well as those of the Organizing Committee, before the Games and enforce it through the normal processes of law?
8. Have you noted rule 54 of the I.O.C. Rules and Regulations and do you guarantee you will abide by it?

D - REGIONAL GAMES

Rules adopted by the International Olympic Committee
at its 47th Session in Helsinki, July 1952 and under review

In order to enjoy the patronage of the International Olympic Committee, and to be permitted to display the Olympic Flag. Regional Games must be conducted in accordance with the following minimum requirements:

1. The Games must be restricted to amateurs. They must not extend over a period of more than sixteen days.
2. Contestants must belong to National Federations which are members of International Federations recognized by the International Olympic Committee and participating countries must have National Olympic Committees recognized by the International Olympic Committee. Invitations to participate in the Games must be sent to these National Olympic Committees or other appropriate sports bodies by the Organizing Committee of the Games.
3. In order to further the high ideals of the Olympic Movement (which these Games should serve, according to Baron de Coubertin, who first suggested that they be organized to supplement the Olympic Games), the Games shall be confined to athletic sports controlled by International Federations recognized by the International Olympic Committee. They shall not be held in conjunction with other events such as Fairs or Exhibitions, and no other athletic event of importance shall be held at the same time, nor in the preceding or following week.
The Games shall be conducted in a dignified manner and without commercial exploitation. Commercial installations and advertising signs shall not be permitted inside the stadium or other sport grounds.
4. They must not be held within the period of twelve months following or preceding the Olympic Games. They must not be held more frequently than once in four years in the same region. Entries must be limited to the region designated. The International Federations concerned shall be notified as soon as the date of the Games is fixed, and must approve the facilities and proposed technical organization at least two years in advance of the opening.
5. The ceremonies in connection with the Games may be similar to, but must not be identical with those of the Olympic Games. There must be no political or other extraneous events during the Games. The loud speaker must be used for sport purposes only and no political speeches are to be permitted. In fact there must be no commercial or political intervention whatsoever.

6. Control of all of technical arrangements for the Games, including the appointment of juries and officials, must be in the hands of the International Federations concerned. Provision must be made for the presence of a representative of each International Federation whose sports is on the programme, sufficiently in advance of the opening of the Games to insure that the facilities are adequate and in order, and that the regulations for that sport are being followed.
7. There must be an International Court of Appeal similar to that described in Olympic art. 44 for the sole purpose of settling any matter of dispute outside the control of the respective International Federations.
8. The rules and regulations of the Games and the list of events on the programme must be submitted to the International Olympic Committee, and to each of the International Federations concerned, for approval. They should be furnished in two (French and English) or more languages so that all participants may be fully informed.
9. Provision must be made for the presence of a representative of the International Olympic Committee, who shall prepare a complete report of the Games for that organization.
10. The words "Olympic" and "Olympiad", the five rings and the Olympic motto "Citius - Altius - Fortius" must not be used in any manner in connection with Regional Games. The Olympic flag may be used only in one place and that is in the Stadium on a flag pole alongside the centre pole bearing the flag of the Games.
11. Countries which are eligible to participate in the Games of a particular region may organize themselves into a Regional Federation or similar entry and appoint a governing council or committee which may include members of the International Olympic Committee of that region and representatives of the International Federations.

APPENDIX C
SEQUENCE OF OLYMPIC GAMES

SEQUENCE OF OLYMPIC (SUMMER) GAMES

Olympiad Number	Games Number	Games Dates	Host City
I	1	April 1896	Athens, Greece
II	2	May - October 1900	Paris, France
III	3	July - October 1904	St. Louis, USA
IV	4	August - October 1908	London, England
V	5	May - July 1912	Stockholm, Sweden
VI	-	(Not held - originally awarded to Berlin)	
VII	6	April - September 1920	Antwerp, Belgium
VIII	7	May - July 1924	Paris, France
IX	8	July - August 1928	Amsterdam, Holland
X	9	July - August 1932	Los Angeles, USA
XI	10	August 1936	Berlin, Germany
XII	-	(Not held - originally awarded to Tokyo)	
XIII	-	(Not held - originally awarded to London)	
XIV	11	July - August 1948	London, England
XV	12	July - August 1952	Helsinki, Finland
XVI	13	November - December 1956	Melbourne, Australia*
XVII	14	August - September 1960	Rome, Italy
XVIII	15	October 1964	Tokyo, Japan
XIX	16	October 1968	Mexico City, Mexico
XX	17	August - September 1972	Munich, Germany
XXI	18	July - August 1976	Montreal, Canada
XXII	19	July - August 1980	Moscow, USSR

*Equestrian events only were held in Stockholm, Sweden, in June 1956.

SEQUENCE OF OLYMPIC WINTER GAMES

Games Number	Games Dates	Host City
1	January - February 1924	Chamonix, France
2	February 1928	St. Moritz, Switzerland
3	February 1932	Lake Placid, USA
4	February 1936	Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany
-	(Not held - 1940)	
-	(Not held - 1944)	
5	January - February 1948	St. Moritz, Switzerland
6	February 1952	Oslo, Norway
7	January - February 1956	Cortina d'Ampezzo, Italy
8	February 1960	Squaw Valley, USA
9	January - February 1964	Innsbruck, Austria
10	February 1968	Grenoble, France
11	February 1972	Sapporo, Japan
12	February 1976	Innsbruck, Austria
13	February 1980	Lake Placid, USA

APPENDIX D

STATEMENT OF THE CHINESE OLYMPIC COMMITTEE
(THE ALL-CHINA ATHLETIC FEDERATION)
ON NON-PARTICIPATION IN THE
16TH OLYMPIC GAMES
November 6, 1956

STATEMENT OF THE CHINESE OLYMPIC COMMITTEE
(THE ALL-CHINA ATHLETIC FEDERATION)
ON NON-PARTICIPATION IN THE
16TH OLYMPIC GAMES

November 6, 1956

To the President of the IOC and the Chairman of the Organizing
Committee of the 16th Olympic Games

(Copies to the Chancellor and members of the IOC)

Since 1952, the Chinese Olympic Committee (the All-China Athletic Federation) has consistently notified the IOC that Taiwan is a province of China and the sports organization in Taiwan should be subordinated to the leadership of the national sports organization of China. If the athletes in Taiwan wish to take part in the Olympic Games, they must first participate in the national pre-Olympic selective trials. If selected, they can be members of the unified Chinese Olympic Team. In fact, during the 15th Olympic Games, only the All-China Athletic Federation sent a team to participate in the events.

However, ignoring these facts and in violation of the principle that only one national Olympic committee can be recognized, the IOC has arbitrarily persisted in recognizing "two Chinese Olympic committees" and has allowed Taiwan to send athletes to participate separately in the 16th Olympic Games.

Recently the Executive Board of the IOC has taken the further step of unwarranted interference in the internal affairs of the Chinese people, unscrupulously changing the name of our country. Furthermore, it has accepted a slanderous proposal put forward by the so-called "Taiwan Sports Organization" and is bringing before the 52nd Session of the IOC the question of the Chinese Olympic Committee (the All-China Athletic Federation) notifying athletes in Taiwan to participate in the national selective trials that were held in Peking in October. What has angered us still more is the fact that the organizing committee of the 16th Olympic Games, at the opening ceremony in the Olympic Village, hoisted the flag of the Kuomintang clique which has long been renounced by the 600 million people of China and all the Chinese athletes.

Instead of correcting their mistakes after our firm protest against what they had done, the IOC and the Organizing Committee of the 16th Olympic Games have insisted on inviting Taiwan to send a separate team to participate in the 16th Olympic Games. All this not

only seriously violates the traditions of the Olympic Movement and the Charter of the Olympic Games, but is also a great insult to the 600 million Chinese people and all Chinese athletes, against which we cannot but lodge our strong protest.

The Chinese Olympic Committee (the All-China Athletic Federation) solemnly declares that the Chinese people and the Chinese athletes cannot tolerate this scheme of artificially splitting China. We demand that the IOC and the Organizing Committee of the 16th Olympic Games uphold their honour and reputation and act in accordance with the Charter and spirit of the Olympic Games by immediately correcting their mistakes and recognizing only one national Olympic committee, the All-China Athletic Federation, as the sole organization representing the 600 million Chinese people, and cancel Taiwan's right to send a separate team to the 16th Olympic Games. The Chinese athletes will not participate in the 16th Olympic Games until this matter is settled. The All-China Athletic Federation reserves the right to put forward further demands on this question at a later date.

Rong Gao-tang, Vice President
of the Chinese Olympic Committee
(The All-China Athletic Federation)

APPENDIX E

STATEMENT OF THE CHINESE OLYMPIC COMMITTEE
(ALL-CHINA ATHLETIC FEDERATION)
ON SEVERING RELATIONS WITH THE
INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE
August 19, 1958

STATEMENT OF THE CHINESE OLYMPIC COMMITTEE
(ALL-CHINA ATHLETIC FEDERATION)
ON SEVERING RELATIONS WITH THE
INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE

August 19, 1958

In the past few years, the International Olympic Committee, under the control of its president, Brundage (U.S.A.), in deliberate violation of its noble Charter, recognized the so-called "China National Amateur Athletic Federation" of the Chiang Kai-shek clique in Taiwan as another Chinese Olympic committee, after recognizing the Chinese Olympic Committee (All-China Athletic Federation) as the only legal Chinese committee, thus creating a situation of "two Chinas." The Chinese Olympic Committee has lodged repeated protests against this but the IOC has brazenly ignored our protests. In his recent letters to Mr. Tung Shou-yi, IOC member for China, Brundage went further in his slanders against the Chinese people and openly defended U.S. aggression in occupying our territory of Taiwan and its political plot of creating "two Chinas." People have long been aware that the China policy of the U.S., whether in refusing to recognize New China or creating "two Chinas," has gone bankrupt so completely that the U.S. Department of State had to publish recently a memorandum to make desperate apology for it. But IOC has been willing to be a tool of this bankrupt China policy of the U.S. In these circumstances, the Chinese Olympic Committee has decided to cease to recognize the IOC and to sever all relations with it.

The facts show that for a long time Brundage has abused his powers as president of the IOC and caused the IOC to follow closely the antagonistic policy of the U.S. towards China.

Following the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the All-China Athletic Federation took over the duties of the China National Amateur Athletic Federation and has become the national sports organization of China. According to the IOC Charter, there is no doubt that the All-China Athletic Federation is the only legal national Olympic committee in China. However, in order to support the U.S. policy of refusing to recognize New China and excluding her from international affairs, Brundage declared at the 47th Session of the IOC in 1952 that although Chinese athletes were allowed to participate in the 15th Olympic Games, it did not mean that the IOC recognized any Chinese Olympic committee. Although Brundage attempted by this arbitrary means to rob the All-China Athletic Federation of its legitimate position as the Chinese Olympic Committee, the legitimate position of the All-China Athletic Federation as the Chinese Olympic Committee was finally confirmed and recognized by the IOC at its 49th Session in 1954, thanks to the sense of justice of many Olympic committee members faithful to the Olympic spirit.

The failure of Brundage's attempt to deny recognition to the All-China Athletic Federation is an example of the general fiasco of the U.S. antagonistic policy towards New China. This policy of the U.S. has not hampered New China's existence and development in the least, on the contrary, it has isolated the U.S. itself more and more. In order to escape being passive and isolated and especially to continue its occupation of China's territory of Taiwan, the U.S. has altered its policy and turned to actively engineering the plot of creating "two Chinas." Brundage also hastily began to use the IOC to prepare the way for this policy. Not scrupling to violate the principle of recognizing only one Olympic committee in each country and in the absence of any discussion or decision by the IOC, he unlawfully extended recognition to the so-called "China National Amateur Athletic Federation" of the Chiang Kai-shek clique which has been repudiated by the six hundred million Chinese people. He illegally invited the so-called sports organization in Taiwan to send a separate team to the 1956 Olympic Games, and at the Games went to the length of changing the name of the People's Republic of China to "Peking-China" and styling China's province of Taiwan as "Formosa-China." The Chinese Olympic Committee lodged a strong protest against this and withdrew from the 16th Olympic Games.

Recently, Brundage has been even more brazen in defending the U.S. plot to create "two Chinas" and to continue its occupation of Taiwan. In his letter dated January 8 to Mr. Tung Shou-yi, the IOC member for China, he said preposterously: "there is a separate government in Taiwan," "it (Taiwan) was last part of Japan and not of China," "the natives (of Taiwan) are neither Chinese nor Japanese" etc. Taiwan is China's territory. Both the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations recognized that it should be returned to China. And actually Taiwan was returned to China after the Japanese surrender. Even the U.S. Government, which is at present actively creating "two Chinas," has recognized these facts on more than one occasion. Brundage's absurd arguments cannot change these facts in the least; on the contrary, they have exposed him thoroughly as an imperialist who has sneaked into the international sports organization in order to serve the political schemes of the U.S.

The Chinese Olympic Committee is willing to co-operate with the IOC and has in the past made its utmost efforts to do so. But the stand of the Chinese people against "two Chinas" is unshakable. There is only one China in the world and that is the People's Republic of China. The Chinese people absolutely will not allow a situation of "two Chinas" to exist in any international organization, conference or on any occasion. The fact that the IOC, under the control of Brundage, openly serves the "two Chinas" plot engineered by the U.S. has destroyed all possibilities for the Chinese Olympic Committee to co-operate with the IOC. It is impossible for the Chinese Olympic Committee to consider resuming co-operation with the IOC before the IOC corrects its mistake by withdrawing its recognition of the so-called "China National Amateur Athletic Federation" in Taiwan and truly lives up to its Charter.

There are many just-minded members in the IOC who are genuinely faithful to the Olympic spirit. We are convinced that they will support the righteous stand taken by the Chinese Olympic Committee and will do their best to free the IOC from the control of the bad elements in the international sports circles and enable it to resume its proper role in promoting international sports activities.

The Chinese Olympic Committee
(All-China Athletic Federation)

APPENDIX F

INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE RESPONSE
TO WITHDRAWAL OF THE CHINESE OLYMPIC
COMMITTEE FROM THE IOC, November 1958

INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE RESPONSE
TO WITHDRAWAL OF THE CHINESE OLYMPIC
COMMITTEE FROM THE IOC, November 1958

A laconic press announcement released last August (before it had been officially confirmed according to normal custom), informed the International Olympic Committee that the Olympic Committee of the Peoples' Democratic Republic of China, with its headquarters in Pekin, had decided to withdraw its recognition of the International Olympic Committee. A few days later, on August 25 1958, the official communication was received at the Chancellery in Lausanne.

The Chinese Peoples' Republic withdrew simultaneously from the International Federations of Athletics, Basketball, Football, Wrestling, Weightlifting, Swimming, Shooting and Tennis. In other words, she has taken up a position of "splendid isolation". What are the reasons for this attitude? Let us recapitulate briefly the sequence of events which have taken place since the Second World War. In 1946, the Chinese Olympic Committee had its headquarters at Shanghai, and by 1947 it had moved to Nanking (with Prof. Tung Shou-Yi as its Secretary). After 1951, this Committee withdrew its archives to Taiwan (Formosa), but was not accompanied by Tung Shou-Yi. Meanwhile a second Chinese Olympic Committee had been set up with its headquarters in the capital, Pekin. This committee was also recognized by the International Olympic Committee, but not until the Athens Session on May 15th 1954, and then only by a very narrow majority (23 votes to 21). The fact that it was not recognized for several years was due to its being represented by politicians (attachés of Legation etc.) and not by sportsmen. Tung Shou-Yi, Member of the International Olympic Committee since 1947, remained in Pekin, but he continued to be the Ambassador of the International Olympic Committee for the Chinese Peoples' Republic of Pekin. From 1954 onwards, the quarrel between the "two Chinas" became the "thorn in the side of Olympism".

The original Committee of Formosa continued to be recognized by the International Olympic Committee since it exercises authority over a specific territory. On the other hand, sport in the Chinese Peoples' Democratic Republic, since it was of an organized nature, continued to be associated unconditionally with the Olympic Movement, in the manner which we have just described. Nevertheless, this organization claimed to represent the whole of China. On several occasions, other authorities contested its rights in the sphere of Chinese sport. For reasons known to everybody it would have been impossible for this organization to exercise its authority over the territory of Formosa. It would have been equally impossible for the International Olympic Committee, one of whose aims is the unification of ALL YOUTH throughout the world, to ignore Formosa any more than it could have ignored the continent of China.

We do not intend to make public the contents of the letter in which the Committee of the Peoples' Democratic Republic of China made known their decision to disassociate themselves from the Olympic Movement, nor do we propose to publish the text of the communication received from Tung Shou-Yi. In view of their tendencious and political nature also their openly defamatory tone towards the President of the International Olympic Committee neither communications are worthy of publication. There is only one matter which we would like to mention since Tung Shou-Yi has given considerable publicity to an exchange of correspondence between himself and Mr. Avery Brundage. In reading through this exchange of letters, We are struck by the total absence of any arguments of a political nature in the letters of Mr. Brundage, whereas exactly the opposite is to be found in those of the ex-member of the International Olympic Committee for China. Tung Shou-Yi, doubtless under the orders of his superiors, accuses the President of the International Olympic Committee of serving the ends of the imperialistic policy of the U.S.A. (sic). But has he not himself been guilty of allowing politics to intervene within the International Olympic Committee? His interventions during the Sessions are sufficient proof of this. At the Paris Session of the International Olympic Committee, held in 1955, the President, in his report of the Conference held on the previous day by the Executive Board of the International Olympic Committee and the Delegates of the International Sports Federations and those of the National Olympic Committees, declared: "There was complete harmony throughout, except for a single exception which I must mention here. The representative of the Olympic Committee of the Peoples' Democratic Republic of China made a declaration which was of a 99% political nature. I had to draw his attention to the fact that all matters of a political nature were excluded from the debates of the International Olympic Committee since we are here to consider and discuss only questions relating to sport".

At Melbourne in 1956, and at Sofia in 1957, there were further interventions of a political nature by Tung Shou-Yi, who protested against the recognition by the International Olympic Committee of Formosa, although this Committee has been the first to be recognized at the time when its headquarters were in Shanghai. Further remarks were made by Mr. Brundage opposing himself to all resurgences of political nature at Olympic meetings. It is regrettable that these principles are not better understood in such a large country as China. We can only wish that the Olympic Committee of Democratic China will reform their ways so that they can again be permitted to participate in the worldwide Olympic Movement. In the meantime Professor Tung Shou-Yi's resignation as a member of the International Olympic Committee has been accepted and the Chinese Olympic Committee (Pekin) has been removed from our records and lists.

We wish to underline that Mr. Avery Brundage has always observed a very strict and neutral attitude in front of all interferences of a political nature whatsoever within the International Olympic Committee. The members of the Committee and the delegates of the National Olympic Committees can certify it. And after all this, it is Pekin who accuses Mr. Brundage of raising political questions within the framework of the International Olympic Committee . . . this is indeed the limit!

Moral conclusions: Youth of China, the new generation of a people of 600 millions (who will never be allowed to read these lines), because of the decision of those who control you, it will not be possible for you to meet your comrade athletes from foreign lands, and you are compelled to abstain from taking part in the coming Olympic Games, as was your right, and where you were awaited with open arms. This has come about for political reasons which do not interest the International Olympic Committee.

APPENDIX G

ALL-CHINA SPORTS FEDERATION STATEMENT:
CHINA'S LEGITIMATE RIGHTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL
OLYMPIC COMMITTEE MUST BE RESTORED
May 1975

CHINA'S LEGITIMATE RIGHTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE MUST BE RESTORED

I

As the world knows, under the wise leadership of the Great Leader Chairman Mao Tsetung, the Chinese people, after years of unsurpassed hard struggles, overthrew the reactionary rule of the Chiang Kai-shek clique and, on October 1, 1949, founded the People's Republic of China. The Chiang clique, which fled to Taiwan and has been hitherto prolonging its feeble existence there, is nothing but a handful of remnants discarded by the Chinese people. It has no right whatsoever to represent China, nor have its so-called sports organizations any right to represent sports in China. It is precisely because of this that, in the international sports organizations, the call for the expulsion of the Chiang clique and the restoration of China's legitimate seat is becoming stronger and stronger.

In recent years, in the face of the ever-rising upsurge of the struggles against imperialism, colonialism and hegemonism in the world, and with a view to bringing about justice, some international sports organizations have broken through all obstacles created by a few persons in international sports circles, and have resolutely expelled the Chiang clique and restored China's legitimate seat.

At present, the various national sports associations affiliated to the All-China Sports Federation, the sole legitimate national sports organization in China, are already members of the following international sports federations: ISU (skating), IIHF (ice hockey), FISA (rowing), FIE (fencing), FILA (wrestling), FIBA (basketball), IWF (weightlifting), FIVE (volleyball), ICF (canoeing), ITTF (table tennis), FIDE (chess), FISU (university sports) and ISF (school sports). They are also members of practically all the Asian sports confederations, including table tennis, football, handball, shooting, track and field coaches, basketball, volleyball, weightlifting, fencing, gymnastics, badminton, wrestling, cycling and swimming. The All-China Sports Federation itself is also a member of the Asian Games Federation. In the other international sports organizations, quite a number of their members who stand for justice are also strongly demanding that the Chiang clique be expelled. It is an irresistible historical trend that, in the international organizations, the Chiang clique should be expelled and the legitimate seat of the People's Republic of China restored.

II

In the International Olympic Committee, many friendly countries have once and again put forward, either jointly or individually, draft resolutions on the expulsion of the Chiang clique and the restoration of China's legitimate seat. At the request of the International Olympic Committee, the All-China Sports Federation submitted to the I.O.C. on April 9, 1975 its application for re-affiliation, stating explicitly that the I.O.C. should withdraw its recognition from the Chiang clique and affirm that the All-China Sports Federation is the sole sports organization entitled to represent the whole of China (including Taiwan province) in the I.O.C. and the Olympic movement.

As is known to all, there is only one China in the world, that is the People's Republic of China. Taiwan is a province of China and is an inalienable part of China's territory. This has been clearly stated in the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation. Over one hundred countries in the world having diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China today have accepted this. In 1971, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution by overwhelming majority on the expulsion of the Chiang Kai-shek clique and the restoration of the legitimate seat of the People's Republic of China. Therefore, it is utterly groundless and extremely ridiculous that the International Olympic Committee still tolerates up to now the usurpation of China's legitimate seat by the Chiang clique and refuses to turn it out.

III

The question of the legitimate seat of the All-China Sports Federation in the International Olympic Committee had actually been a long resolved one. After the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, in October the same year, the former China National Amateur Athletic Federation was re-organized as the All-China Sports Federation, sited in Peking. Since then, the All-China Sports Federation has been the sole legitimate national sports organization governing all sports in the whole of China (including Taiwan province).

On February 5, 1952, the All-China Sports Federation cabled the International Olympic Committee: "The All-China Sports Federation is the only sports organization which represents the People's Republic of China. Any other organization, including the sports representatives of the Kuomintang reactionary clique in Taiwan, can in no circumstances be legal representative of China, nor can they be allowed to attend the coming Olympic Games or meetings concerned." The Federation also notified the I.O.C. that it was going to send athletes to participate in the 15th Olympic Games in Helsinki.

In May, 1954, a resolution was adopted at the 49th session of the International Olympic Committee in Athens granting recognition to the All-China Sports Federation (Chinese Olympic Committee).

On May 26, 1954, Mr. Otto Mayer, Chancellor of the I.O.C., says in his letter: "I have pleasure to inform you that at our Athens Session which took place at the beginning of this month, your Committee has been recognized by the International Olympic Committee."

However, in 1955, without the knowledge of the other leading officials and without proper deliberation and approval by the meetings of the I.O.C., Avery Brundage, former President of the I.O.C., resorting to the most despicable means, inserted into the list of National Olympic Committees recognized by the I.O.C. the name of the so-called sports organization of the Chiang clique, thus plotting for a situation of "two Chinas". The delegate of the All-China Sports Federation instantly pointed out his mistake and stated that the I.O.C. should cancel from the list of N.O.C.'s the so-called "China National Amateur Athletic Federation" which was usurping the name of the Olympic Committee of China.

In the following four years, Brundage persisted obstinately in his mistake and went even further in plotting for a situation of "two Chinas". Having protested repeatedly but of no avail, the All-China Sports Federation made a statement on August 19, 1958 declaring publicly its withdrawal from the I.O.C. and the severance of all relations with it.

Therefore, it can well be seen that the usurpation of the legitimate seat of the All-China Sports Federation by the Chiang clique which has long been spurned by the Chinese people is nothing but the single-handed creation of Brundage. In doing so, he not only trampled on the Olympic Rules, but also grossly interfered in the internal affairs of China, thus fully exposing his hostility against the Chinese people.

IV

It is worth noting that, even to this day, in the international sports organizations, a few persons are still deliberately trying to create the situation of "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan". For this purpose, they have disseminated all kinds of fallacies in a vain attempt to mislead the people and confuse public opinion.

1. "Sports having nothing to do with politics." Their purpose in disseminating such a deceitful argument is to give some kind of justification to their attempts to frustrate the restoration of China's legitimate seat in the I.O.C. and other international sports organizations. Such an argument is apparently most untenable. On the contrary, what they have done precisely contradicts the theory of "sports having nothing to do with politics" which they have advocated so much. This can be seen from the fact that it was clearly in the service of those who wanted to create the situation of "two Chinas" that Brundage had plotted so maliciously for it in the I.O.C.

Before the Chiang clique was expelled from the U.N. and the legitimate seat of China restored therein, Brundage, under the pretext that the U.N. had not expelled the Chiang clique, maintained the Chiang clique in the I.O.C. This clearly indicates that, in keeping the so-called sports organization of the Chiang clique, which had usurped China's legitimate seat in the I.O.C., Brundage was taking the United Nations as example and linking politics with sports. In 1971, the 26th United Nations General Assembly adopted the resolution on the expulsion of the Chiang clique and the restoration of China's legitimate seat. Deprived of the above-mentioned pretext, Brundage and his like put up another screen saying that the I.O.C. as "a sports organization is above politics", attempting desperately to continue to harbour the so-called sports organization of the Chiang clique in the I.O.C. and refuse to restore the legitimate seat of the sports organization of the People's Republic of China. Does their self-contradictory attitude not precisely betray their political motives? The vain attempt of a few persons in the I.O.C. to create the situation of "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan" under the cover of "sports having nothing to do with politics" is in itself a political issue. It is an outrageous interference in the internal affairs of China, anything but a question of "sports having nothing to do with politics".

It should also be pointed out that, in recent years, many international organizations, including sports organizations, have expelled the Chiang clique and restored China's legitimate seat. These facts present a forceful refutation of the theory of "sports having nothing to do with politics".

2. Taiwan can be maintained in the I.O.C. under the name of "an area". As is mentioned before, Taiwan is a province of the People's Republic of China and an inalienable part of China's territory. The Chinese people are determined to liberate their own territory Taiwan. The talk of keeping Taiwan in the I.O.C. under the name of "an area" is nothing less than an attempt to create the situation of "one China, one Taiwan". Plotting for the situation of "one China, one Taiwan", just as plotting for the situation of "two Chinas" is nothing but hostility against the Chinese people and the people of the world can never allow the Chiang clique, scum of the Chinese people, to hang on in the I.O.C. by changing its name into Taiwan. The only correct solution of the question of the legitimate seat of China in the I.O.C. is to withdraw recognition from the so-called sports organization of the Chiang clique. Any other formula, such as: changing the name of the sports organization of the Chiang clique, trying to keep Taiwan province of China as a so-called independent "area" in the I.O.C., or welcoming the admission of the All-China Sports Federation on the one hand and refraining from taking firm steps to expel the Chiang clique on the other, is in reality to create the situation of "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan". The Chinese people will never accept such gross interference in their internal affairs.

3. "The Chiang clique has not violated the Olympic Rules and therefore should not be expelled." This is an argument hardly worth refuting. The question is that the Chiang clique has illegally usurped the legitimate seat of the All-China Sports Federation and therefore should be expelled. Since the Chiang clique's presence in the I.O.C. is altogether illegal, there is no point to discuss the question of whether it has violated the Olympic Rules or not. Talking about the Olympic Rules, the illegal usurpation of China's seat by the Chiang clique is in itself a violation of the principle that only one National Olympic Committee can be recognized in one country. Moreover, it was Brundage who took the lead in violating the Olympic Rules by smuggling in the Chiang clique by illegal means, thus interfering in the internal affairs of China. Those who have raised the point that "the Chiang clique has not violated the Olympic Rules" are only trying to keep the Chiang clique in the I.O.C. on this pretext and to allow it to continue to usurp illegally the legitimate seat of China, thus plotting for the situation of "two Chinas".

4. "The athletes of Taiwan will not be able to participate in the Olympic Games and other international meets" after the Chiang clique is expelled.

The fact is, the All-China Sports Federation has always been attentive to the rights of the athletes from Taiwan province to participate in sports meets at home and abroad. In 1974, the All-China Sports Federation notified the Sports Association of Taiwan province asking the athletes from Taiwan province to participate in the trials for the Seventh Asian Games. Those athletes from Taiwan province who had been selected, together with the athletes of other provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions of China, participated in the Seventh Asian Games in Teheran. The All-China Sports Federation had also invited the athletes from Taiwan province to participate in the 1st National Games in 1959, 2nd National Games in 1965 and 3rd National Games in 1975, and they attended the Games. Some well-intentioned friends have raised similar questions. But the attempt of a few persons to frustrate the restoration of China's legitimate seat in the international sports organizations by resorting to this fallacy will prove to be of no avail. It must be pointed out that the participation of the athletes from Taiwan province in sports meets at home and abroad is the internal affairs of the Chinese people. The Chinese people will find solutions to their own problems.

V

The above-mentioned facts all go to prove most irrefutably that the All-China Sports Federation (Chinese Olympic Committee) is the sole legitimate sports organization representing whole China (including Taiwan province). It is entirely illegal that the so-called "Olympic Committee of the Republic of China" has usurped the legitimate seat of China in the International Olympic Committee. It is time the

International Olympic Committee rectified the erroneous policy of its previous leader of plotting for the situation of "two Chinas". The International Olympic Committee must take effective measures to expel the Chiang clique and restore China's legitimate seat in the I.O.C.

Here, we would like to add that sports has developed by leaps and bounds in China since the founding of the People's Republic of China and especially since the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. China is having ever-increasing sports exchanges with over one hundred countries and territories of the world. The friendship and unity between the people and sportsmen of China and those of the other countries has been increasing with each passing day. The spirit of "friendship first, competition second" is winning greater and greater support among the people. Any forces of reaction which seeks to prevent the development of the friendship and unity between the people and sportsmen of China and those of the other countries will only prove their efforts to be in vain.

History is surging ahead. The cause of justice will certainly triumph. The expulsion of the Chiang clique and the restoration of China's legitimate seat in the International Olympic Committee and other international sports organizations is the sacred and inviolable right of the Chinese people, and it is also the common aspiration of the people and sportsmen of the other countries of the world. This is the general trend of the world situation and the people's feeling. Therefore, no matter what intrigues a few persons in international sports circles have played, their attempts are bound to meet with ignominious defeat. With the unswerving struggles waged by the people and sports personages who are upholding justice of the world and especially those of the third world countries, the Chiang clique will certainly be expelled from the International Olympic Committee and the other international sports organizations, and the legitimate seat of the All-China Sports Federation restored therein.

APPENDIX H

STATEMENT OF THE ALL-CHINA ATHLETIC
FEDERATION ON WITHDRAWAL FROM THE
INTERNATIONAL FOOTBALL FEDERATION
June 10, 1958

STATEMENT OF THE ALL-CHINA ATHLETIC
FEDERATION ON WITHDRAWAL FROM THE
INTERNATIONAL FOOTBALL FEDERATION

June 10, 1958

According to the report of the representatives of the All-China Athletic Federation attending the 31st Session of the Congress of the F.I.F.A., the Congress, under the domination of its Chairman Mr. Drewry and some other persons, unreasonably rejected our proposal to exclude the so-called "China National Amateur Athletic Federation" in Taiwan from F.I.F.A. membership and our delegates were treated with gross impertinence. This cannot but arouse our great indignation.

Since the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the sole legal national sports organization in our country is the All-China Athletic Federation. On April 8, 1952 the All-China Athletic Federation wrote to F.I.F.A. stating that the former "China National Amateur Athletic Federation" had been reorganized to form the present A.C.A.F. On June 19 the same year F.I.F.A. wrote in reply to say that "the emergency committee of F.I.F.A. has agreed to the recognition of the new direction of A.C.A.F. having taken over the activities of the former China National Amateur Athletic Federation." That A.C.A.F. is the only legal representation of China in F.I.F.A. is beyond dispute. Article One, Paragraph One of the F.I.F.A. Statutes stipulates "only one association shall be recognized in each country." Therefore, F.I.F.A. has no right to recognize any other sport organization in China except A.C.A.F. At the 29th Congress in 1954, F.I.F.A., under the domination of some people with ulterior motives and in disregard of its decision made in 1952, accepted the so-called "China National Amateur Athletic Federation" in Taiwan as a member. This was a gross violation of the F.I.F.A. Statutes.

A.C.A.F. repeatedly lodged strong protests against this unlawful decision of F.I.F.A. Yet, F.I.F.A. persisted in its mistake on the pretext of various absurd arguments. This year, we once again put forth the motion of disqualifying the membership of the so-called "China National Amateur Athletic Federation" in Taiwan and demanded a discussion at the 31st Session of the F.I.F.A. Congress held this year in Stockholm from June 5 to 6. After our motion was accepted and put on the agenda, Mr. Drewry, President of the F.I.F.A. and others attempted to bypass the item, and then tried by every means to prevent our representatives from delivering their speeches. Finally, they manipulated the session into rejecting our motion by means of the voting-machine. Under such intolerable circumstances, our representatives lodged a strong protest and withdrew from the session.

This act of illegally recognizing the "China National Amateur Athletic Federation" after formal recognition of A.C.A.F. by F.I.F.A., is actually an integral part of the plot to create "two Chinas" engineered by U.S. imperialists. The U.S. imperialists and their followers are not reconciled to the Chinese people's victory and the tremendous development of the People's Republic of China achieved in the past few years. Failing to blot out the existence of the mighty People's Republic of China, they have resorted to all sorts of means to fabricate "two Chinas" on the international scene in an attempt to weaken the ever-growing influence of our country and to legalize U.S. occupation of China's territory of Taiwan. Under the pretext that "politics is irrelevant to sports," they are trying to realize the political scheme of creating "two Chinas" by making international sports organizations give unlawful recognition to sports organizations in Taiwan.

Our stand is firm and unshakable. There is only one China in the world and that is the People's Republic of China. Taiwan is only a province of China. Sports organizations there can only be local bodies of A.C.A.F. All activities to create "two Chinas" in any form constitute gross interference in the Chinese people's domestic affairs, and are absolutely not to be tolerated by them. The Chinese people cannot be separated and China's territory cannot be divided. The Chinese people are determined to liberate Taiwan. The "two Chinas" plot will certainly fail as before.

At the Stockholm Session, when our representatives solemnly declared their decision to withdraw from the Congress, Mr. Drewry, President of the F.I.F.A., impudently said that it was he who ordered them to leave. His outrageous and imbecile statement not only betrayed the hideous face of an imperialist, but also proved that F.I.F.A. through these people's manipulation has become a political tool of U.S. imperialism. Drewry's idiotic clamour deserves no attention but only ridicule. But he and his like must know that the days when the imperialists could order people around at will have gone forever and that the Chinese people have stood up. Anyone who antagonizes the Chinese people will be committing a great mistake which they will come to regret too late.

Quite a number of the members in F.I.F.A. are just-minded. But as F.I.F.A. is now controlled by Drewry and other imperialist elements and persists in being hostile to the Chinese people, A.C.A.F. has decided to withdraw from the International Federation of Football Association. Only when F.I.F.A. has rectified his mistake by disqualifying the sports organization of the Chiang Kai-shek clique in Taiwan from membership will we consider the question of resuming co-operation with it.

A.C.A.F. and the sportsmen of the People's Republic of China are willing to make contacts with their counterparts in other countries and to co-operate with international sports organizations. The growing prestige of the People's Republic of China among international sports

circles will not be impaired and our normal contacts and relations with international sports organizations will not be hampered by the shameless tricks played by a handful of imperialist elements in the international sports circles, who follow the reactionary policies of the United States, such as Drewry, who imagined they could achieve this by making F.I.F.A. which is under their control give recognition to the sports organization of the Chiang Kai-shek clique in Taiwan. The rapid progress and high prestige of great China cannot be weakened. Anyone attempting to do so will be like the proverbial mantis trying to stop the chariot. He will only hurt himself by standing in the way of the inexorably advancing wheel of history.

APPENDIX I

STATEMENT OF THE TABLE TENNIS ASSOCIATION
OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
August 27, 1963

STATEMENT OF THE TABLE TENNIS ASSOCIATION
OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Not long ago, Norman L. Kilpatrick, the President of the United States Table Tennis Association, distributed a circular entitled "Politics and the ITTF" to all member associations of the ITTF, in which he unscrupulously attacked the ITTF and its leadership, overtly peddled U.S. imperialism's scheme for creating "two Chinas" and blatantly interfered in the internal affairs of the Chinese people. Herewith the Table Tennis Association of the People's Republic of China expresses its utmost indignation at this act and deems it necessary to make the following statement:

In his letter, N. L. Kilpatrick went to great lengths to accuse the ITTF of "determining policy on the basis of politics," slandering Ivor Montagu, the President of the ITTF, as having succumbed to "political pressure". Kilpatrick said repeatedly that he was doing this because he was "disturbed" by the "threat" to the ITTF and that he was "motivated by motives of love of sport and fair play." Kilpatrick's "thin veil" looks rather nice but when it is removed the true colors of an ugly face are revealed.

What "threat" against the ITTF has "disturbed" Kilpatrick so much? Has not the ITTF steadily grown and extended its influence for many years under the leadership of the Hon. Ivor Montagu and his colleagues? This has been witnessed by all member associations. What, then, is the "threat" referred to by Kilpatrick? What are the reasons for his being "disturbed" and putting down in black and white his anger at the ITTF leadership? Kilpatrick did not dare to tell outright his real motive in his letter. As a matter of fact, it is very clear. Kilpatrick has been "disturbed" because cordial cooperation exists between the ITTF and its member associations, including the Table Tennis Association of the People's Republic of China, because the ITTF has always handled questions of membership in accordance with the constitution and the decisions of the Congress, because the ITTF has refused to toe the line of hostility to the People's Republic of China taken by U.S. imperialism and its pawns such as Kilpatrick, and because U.S. imperialism has not been able to sell in the ITTF its scheme to create "two Chinas."

In his letter Kilpatrick tried, with fallacious arguments, to assail the ITTF for refusing to grant membership to the Chiang Kai-shek clique in Taiwan on "political grounds". He prated that there existed "another China" than the People's Republic of China, openly peddling the dirty plot of U.S. imperialism to create "two Chinas". We must point out solemnly that the entire Chinese people is resolutely opposed to U.S. imperialism's scheme to create "two Chinas" and that Kilpatrick's design to sell this scheme in the ITTF will never succeed.

Kilpatrick tried to find a powerful support for his absurd argument by invoking the United Nations, asserting that the Chiang Kai-shek clique in Taiwan is a "political unit represented in the United Nations." But, as is known to all, it is precisely because the U.S. has left no vile trick untried to rake together a "majority" in the United Nations that the Chiang Kai-shek clique, which has long been repudiated by the Chinese people, is able to usurp China's seat in the United Nations and the rightful place of the People's Republic of China in the U.N. has, to this day, not been restored to it. In this light, Kilpatrick's use of the signboard of the United Nations not only fails completely to protect him but exposes him as an apologist for the "national policy" of the U.S.

Kilpatrick tried to confuse matters by asking since there are two Vietnams, two Koreas, and two Germanys in the ITTF, why could there not be "two Chinas"? This is sheer nonsense. It is known throughout the world that the Cairo Declaration of December 1, 1943 explicitly stipulated that Taiwan and Penghu Islands grabbed by Japanese imperialism from the Chinese people should be returned to China. These areas which have been Chinese territory since ancient times were recovered by the Chinese Government after V-J Day in 1945 and became a province of China. This is clearly a different case from that of two Germanys, two Vietnams and two Koreas. The emergence of two Germanys was a result of World War II, while the partition of Korea and Vietnam into two parts is a temporary state of affairs covered by relevant international agreements. Even so, the people of these three nations are making unflagging efforts to reunify their countries. It is quite right for the ITTF to extend recognition, according to its own constitution, to both parts of these countries until they put an end to their division. But it is completely unjustifiable for U.S. imperialism, while doing everything possible to prevent their reunification, to use the division of these three countries as a pretext to create "two Chinas".

Still more hypocritical is Kilpatrick's attempt to defend himself by giving as examples the affiliation of Guernsey and Jersey as independent member associations to the ITTF. May we ask: Is there anything at all in common between the affiliation of the Table Tennis Associations of Guernsey and Jersey and such areas of the United Kingdom as England, Scotland and Wales with the ITTF separately, in accordance with their own free will and the constitution of the ITTF on the one hand, and the forcible occupation of Taiwan by U.S. imperialism on the other? If Kilpatrick, as President of the United States Table Tennis Association, wishes to let all the 50 states of the U.S. join the ITTF as independent members, he can do so if he pleases. It is the business of the Americans themselves, in which we have no interest at all. But, we warn Kilpatrick, the Chinese people will never allow the imperialists to poke their nose into the Chinese people's internal affairs.

As is well known, there is only one China in the world and that is the People's Republic of China. Taiwan has been part of China since ancient times. This is an indisputable iron-clad fact. Proceeding from this fundamental fact, the ITTF at its 1956 Congress held in Tokyo unanimously adopted a resolution which pointed out explicitly that Taiwan is an indivisible part of China. This resolution, in accordance with the articles of the constitution that grant membership to regional organizations states that the Taiwan area of China can apply for membership only under an appropriate name. The resolution said, "The associations administering table tennis in, respectively China as a whole and Taiwan as a part, are recommended in any case to communicate with each other with a view to eventual single representation for China." The ITTF has always handled related questions in conformity with the spirit of this resolution. As for the Table Tennis Association of the People's Republic of China, it has time and again written to the local Table Tennis Organization in the Taiwan area, asking table tennis players there to take part in the national championships and selective trials of the People's Republic of China. The relations between the national Table Tennis Organization of the People's Republic of China and the local Table Tennis Organization in the Taiwan area are purely China's internal affair in which no interference by Kilpatrick and his like will be tolerated.

To demand that the ITTF recognize China's territory of Taiwan as an independent unit when it is still under armed occupation by the U.S. means in substance to ask the ITTF to recognize as lawful the forcible occupation of the Chinese territory of Taiwan by the U.S. It is in fact asking the ITTF to follow U.S. imperialism's policy of hostility towards the Chinese people.

We must warn U.S. imperialism and its stooge Kilpatrick, President of the United States Table Tennis Association, that their attempts to mislead people with the deceptive slogan of "no politics", and their cunning trick of using the Sports Organization of the Chiang Kai-shek clique to sell their political scheme for creating "two Chinas", are dreams that will never come true. China will never tolerate interference in its internal affairs. The Chinese people are resolutely opposed to the forcible occupation of their territory Taiwan by U.S. imperialism.

Under the leadership of President Ivor Montagu, the ITTF has developed along a sound path. The sport of table tennis is spreading far and wide throughout the world and among all sections of the people, and the level of play has risen to unprecedented heights. The friendship between the table tennis associations and players of all countries is growing with each passing day. We must not allow people with ulterior motives to undermine this progress and to trample with impunity on the resolutions of the Congress of the ITTF.

We are convinced that all fair-minded people in the table tennis associations of all countries will support this just stand of ours and that together they will safeguard the dignity, the solidarity and the resolutions of the ITTF.

The Table Tennis Association of
the People's Republic of China

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